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ABSTRACT
CONTESTING CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING:
THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION AND THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY
MAY 2004
GEORGE THOMAS, B A., UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
Ph.D, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Sheldon Goldman
In the last decade a lively debate about "extrajudicial" constitutional interpretation
has broken out among constitutional scholars. And while this debate has insisted
upon the centrality of nonjudicial constitutional interpretation, this scholarship
remains rooted in "legal" views of the Constitution, which continue to give
primacy of place to the Court. This dissertation seeks to go further by articulating
a political view of the Constitution, which will allow us to resituate how we think
of the Constitution and place questions of interpretation within this larger
framework. This political view suggests that the constitution calls forth continual
debate about constitutional meaning, that the “settlement” of constitutional issues
is not an essential feature of our constitutional system and, thus, that
constitutional politics with overlapping views, discontinuities, and essentially
unsettled meaning are an inherent feature of our Constitution. Recovering the
political Constitution is an essential step in rethinking what the Constitution is
and, in doing so, overcoming the deeply ingrained myth ofjudicial supremacy.
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"Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No
theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us secure. To suppose that
any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the
people, is a chimerical idea.”
James Madison
INTRODUCTION:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
It recent events are any indication, there is a deep skepticism that
legislative bodies are capable of addressing the Constitution in a high-minded
way. In tact, the one thing that links the two most stunning constitutional events
in recent memory—the impeachment of a president for only the second time in
our history and the Supreme Court s opinion ettectively deciding a presidential
election for the first time in our history—is a deep suspicion that the Congress is
not capable of settling serious constitutional questions. During the House's
impeachment of President Clinton, legal scholars offered to guide the House in
defining what constitutes an impeachable offense, quite sure that the House itself
was not capable of speaking to this delicate constitutional question. And this was
asserted despite the fact that the Constitution clearly vests this very power in the
House, our most democratic national institution, not with lawyers or courts.
In a similar vein, many of those who praise the Supreme Court's opinion
in Bush v. Gore do so on the grounds that it averted a constitutional crisis. That
the Congress would have to determine a presidential election, potentially
choosing between two slates of electors, and, thus, weigh in on serious
constitutional issues, was seen as the root of the constitutional crisis. According to
one of our most preeminent jurists, and one who frequently calls for rigorous
empirical analysis, this itself was cause for alarm: “We only know what could
have ensued and what could have ensued is fairly described as chaos.” 1 Yet
Judge Posner bases his argument on speculation, not empirical evidence. And he
does this despite the tact that the Constitution vests the Congress with this very
power. We are so distrustful of the legislature's ability to reason about the
Constitution that the mere thought of it taking up such questions is reason to
worry; indeed, to precipitate a constitutional crisis. Even those who criticized the
Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore shared this skepticism. While they decried the
Supreme Court's opinion, they were just as worried that the Florida state
legislature might attempt to weigh in on the issue. Most preferred to let the
Florida Supreme Court’s opinion stand—they preferred the voice of a court to the
voice of the legislature. 2 Again, this is odd. because the Constitution itself quite
clearly gives this power to legislative bodies and not to courts. We are reluctant to
let the political branches speak to constitutional questions. We seem to doubt,
even, their capability to do so. But is such doubt warranted?
The Supreme Court itself echoes such thinking. In speaking of Congress’
power under section 5 of the 14 lh Amendment, which plainly says that Congress
has the power to enforce the terms of the amendment, the Court has said that
1
Richard Posner, Democracy’s Deadlock: Breaking the 2000 Election (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 2001). For a critique of this view, see Howard Gillman, The Votes That
Counted: How the Court Decided the 2000 Presidential Election (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2001 ). As Gillman argues, [FJorcing politicians to work through a presidential selection
process without the roadmap of a crystal clear legal process is not a crisis; it is democracy, and it
has all the disadvantages and advantages of democratic politics,” 195. For a defense o(Bush v.
Core, and especially a criticism of the legal academy’s bias, see Peter Berkowitz and Benjamin
Wittes, "The Lawfulness of the Election Decision: A Reply to Professor Tribe" Villanova Law
Review (forthcoming) and Berkowitz, "The Professors and Bush v. Core" Wilson Quarterly
Autumn 200 1
.
2
Jed Rubenfeld, "Not as Bad as Plessy , Worse" and Laurence Tribe, "eroG v. hsuB: Through the
Looking Glass" both in Bruce Ackerman, ed.. Bush v. Gore The Question ofLegitimacy (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
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Congress has been given the power ‘to enforce,' not the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so. what Congress would be
entorcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the ‘provisions of [the
Fourteenth Amendment ].'”3 The meaning of these provisions is to be determined
by the Court. The legislature cannot be trusted with such vexing questions of
constitutional meaning and is thereby obligated to follow the Court's
interpretation. While such claims to judicial supremacy resonate strongly with the
public, scholars, and even members of the so-called political branches themselves,
there is growing criticism of the Court's own insistence upon judicial supremacy.
Scholars on both the left and the right have sought to ‘‘take the Constitution away
from the Court" in the name of democratic government. Still, such critics tend to
view the Constitution in largely legal terms, and it is this, this dissertation argues,
that lends credence to claims ofjudicial supremacy and skepticism that the
political branches may meaningfully speak to the Constitution.
By beginning from the premise that the Constitution is law, the proponents
ofjudicial supremacy suggest that the very nature of constitutional government
requires the Court to act as the supreme and exclusive arbiter of constitutional
meaning. Indeed, as I argue, the legalist view of the Constitution is the crux of
judicial supremacy . 4 If we are under a constitution, so much of conventional
1
City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997). See especially. Cooper v. Aaron , 358 U.S. 1
(1958).
4
Keith Whittington suggests that there are three fundamental objections to extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation, I. It’s anarchic. 2. It’s irrational. 3. It’s tyrannical. While 1 want to
take up these objections in my discussion ofjudicial supremacy, I suggest that they all have their
roots in the view of the Constitution as law akin to ordinary law. Whittington, “Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation-Three Objections and a Response” University ofNorth Carolina
Law Review 80: 3 (2002).
3
wisdom goes, the Constitution must be rigorously and authoritatively enforced by
the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court . 5 This means not only that the Court
is the exclusive interpreter of constitutional meaning, but that its interpretations
are authoritatively binding on the other branches of government
.
6
If the political
branches are free to disregard judicial interpretations of the Constitution, and
thereby continually dispute constitutional meaning, then we cannot be
authoritatively bound by the Constitution as law
.
7
It is useful, here, to distinguish
between two forms ofjudicial supremacy. The strong form ofjudicial supremacy
suggests that the judiciary is the exclusive interpreter as well as the authoritative
interpreter of constitutional meaning (exclusive, after all, implies authoritative ). 8
A modified version ofjudicial supremacy suggests that the Supreme Court is not
the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution, but that its interpretations are final .
9
Constitutional interpretation may well include the Congress, the President, and the
people, but once the Court hands down a decision, its interpretation is taken to be
' Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”
Harvard Law Review 110:7: 1359-1387 (1997).
0
Scott Gant qualifies the notion ofjudicial supremacy by suggesting that the judiciary is not the
exclusive interpreter of the Constitution, but that its interpretations are. once given, authoritative
at least in the short run. Gant, “Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution" Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 24:359-440 ( 1997). For a general
discussion, see also Bruce Peabody, “Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative
Settlement, and a New Agenda for Research" Constitutional Commentary 16: 63-90 (1999).
Alexander and Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,” 1381.
x
See Alexander and Schauer, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation."
1
There is a growing literature by both conservatives and liberals increasingly critical ofjudicial
supremacy—calling it, even, the judicial usurpation of politics. Michael Perry, We the People
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999),
3-14; Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Awayfrom the Courts (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 6-32; Cass Sunstein, One Case at a Time Judicial Minimalism and the
Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998); Scott Douglas Gerber, “The
Judicial Brezhnev Doctrine" Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (2000). "The End ot
Democracy?” First Things November 1996, especially Robert Bork’s “Our Judicial Oligarchs
and Robert George’s “The Tyrant State."
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authoritative, thereby binding the Congress, the President, and the people to its
reading ot the Constitution. On both normative and empirical grounds, the
distinction between a strong torm ofjudicial supremacy and a modified version is
important, but it is not central to the question I wish to raise. Whether judicial
interpretation is held to be exclusive or merely final, each view insists that
authoritative jud.it iul settlement is necessary to constitutional governance.
Even with the turn to history in legal scholarship, much of constitutional
theory remains rooted in theoretical and normative issues, with little attention to
the historical functioning of our constitutional system. Reading the leading
defenders ofjudicial supremacy, for example, one is struck by the fact that they
argue tor judicial settlement in a way that altogether skirts empirical questions:
they insist that nonjudicial constitutional interpretation will lead to chaos,
bringing into doubt the very notion of the Constitution as law. But nowhere do
they bother to show this. 11 Thus many of their concerns about nonjudicial
constitutional interpretation seem to be rooted in their theory of constitutionalism
and not in actual problems of constitutional governance. Modified versions of
judicial supremacy are far more accurate descriptively, as they concede that, like
it or not, the Congress and the President have, on occasion, engaged in
constitutional interpretation, but such thinking still insists on authoritative
10
For this view see Scott Gant, “Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution" and James Fleming, “The Constitution Outside the Courts" Cornell Law Review
86: 167: 21 5-249, 22 1 (review of Tushnet's Taking the Constitution Awayfrom the Courts ),
Sotirios Barber and James Fleming, “The Canon and the Constitution Outside The Court"
Constitutional Commentary 17: 267-273 (2000).
11
Larry Alexander and Fredrick Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation.”
5
settlement by the judiciary. Yet this very notion seems suspect on both
conceptual and empirical grounds.
Judicial supremacy operates as a sort of constitutional myth: its logic and
presuppositions are ottered up to us, but find little grounding in our actual
constitutional history. I he myth, though, is poweriul. Our preoccupation with it
leads us to slight the role that the political branches play in maintaining our
constitutional system and important constitutional developments that exist outside
the courts .
13 A role that in many instances is called forth by the very text of the
Constitution itself. And the myth is made even more powerful as constitutional
theory so often focuses on a perfectly imagined judiciary, measuring it according
to the “ought ol theory, like a platonic form in an imagined polity. Against this,
the political branches are seen in real-world terms, usually in their worst light,
eager to trample on the Constitution. So much of constitutional theory itself often
operates in the land of mythology and not political science; it is perhaps not a
coincidence that one of the most famous defenders ofjudicial supremacy calls his
imaginary judge Hercules . 14
As constitutionalism has come to be seen as primarily about legal
limitations on government by way of legal text, the judiciary is seen as “the one
12
Scott Gant qualifies his version ofjudicial supremacy saying that, well, nothing is final. If that is
so, then why do we really need authoritative judicial settlement? If constitutional questions can be
reopened by the other branches or by the public, then why close them by the judiciary?
1
’ Stephen Griffin, American Constitutionalism From Theory to Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996) and Wayne Moore, Constitutional Rights and Powers ofthe People
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). See also Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) suggesting that constitutional
politics are “extraordinary” and “transformative” events.
14
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
6
institution above all others essential to the preservation of the law .” 15 If the
Constitution is a sort ot "higher law,” it is only in thinking of this law as akin to
“a statute emanating from the sovereign people” and coupling that with judicial
review that it is maintained
.
16
Yet this view collapses the "what of the
Constitution” into the "who of interpretation .” 17 If we insist that the Constitution
is law, we may then posit that the judiciary must interpret the law and must
interpret it according to legal conventions. Such a view, though, conflates
"constitutional fundamentally” with judicial supremacy
.
18
Against this view, this
dissertation seeks to establish a more overtly political view of the Constitution,
drawing on public law scholarship that has begun unpacking the easy merger of
the Constitution-as-law (what is the Constitution?) with the judiciary-as-
interpreter-of-law (who interprets the Constitution?). If the legal Constitution
takes its bearings from John Marshall, the political Constitution might be seen as
James Madison's Constitution. From this view, the Constitution is not just legal
text, but the very framework of government that the text calls to life. The political
Constitution is maintained by political devices and not by the fact that it is “law,”
what Madison called a mere “parchment barrier.” Accordingly, the Constitution
is structured in such a way as to maintain constitutional limits (although this is
l<;
Charles Mcllwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1947) 140.
Edward Corwin, The "Higher Law ” Background ofAmerican Constitutional Law (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1955) 89.
1
1 am following the interrogatives set forth by Walter Murphy, Sotirios Barber, and James
Fleming, American Constitutional Interpretation (New York: Foundation Press, 1995). By asking
WHAT is the Constitution? WHO may interpret it? And HOW is it to be interpreted? Murphy et al
sort out these concepts that are often merged together.
IS
William Harris, The Interpretable Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1993)20-24.
7
only part ot the picture) by this very framework, relying on the political process
itself and the interaction between these branches of government over
constitutional meaning. As the Constitution is our fundamental charter,
maintaining it is a political task tor all the branches, not simply a legal task for the
Court.
At least such has been a crucial recognition in the last decade, as scholars
have turned their attention to the importance of constitutional politics
.
19
The most
significant development in constitutional theory in recent years may well be this
shift in focus from the relationship between law and morality' to the relationship
between "law and politics." Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in Bruce
Ackerman’s two volume We the People
,
which rejects standard narratives of
constitutional evolution in favor of great moments of constitutional conflict and
transformation. Ackerman, among others, offers a regimes analysis of American
constitutional development .' 0 He argues that in extraordinary moments of
constitutional politics, we (as a people) reforge our constitutional understandings
and create “new” constitutional regimes. For Ackerman, there have been three
constitutional regimes—the Founding, Civil War, and New Deal—not one. In this
telling of our constitutional history, the political branches and the people are
primarily responsible for transforming constitutional meaning in these unique
constitutional moments, usually against the Court, which, properly, adheres to the
19
See Mark Graber, "Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and
Neglected Relationship" (Review of Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court in American Politics)
Law and Social Inquiry 27: 309 (2002).
20
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (volume 1) and Transformations (volume 2)
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991 and 1998).
8
older understanding of the Constitution and thereby provokes debate about the
very nature ot constitutional government. The people, then, in a genuine act of
popular sovereignty, ratify new constitutional understandings giving us a new
constitutional regime. Yet, even tor Ackerman, such moments of constitutional
politics are rare—moments of punctuated dispute that disrupt our otherwise placid
constitutionalism. During times of ordinary politics, the Court properly takes up
the primary responsibility ot entorcing and detending the Constitution. In a
similar vein, Keith Whittington has advanced a view ot constitutional regimes that
are attached to “reconstructive presidents," presidents that reconstitute our
lundamental constitutional commitments and thereby alter how we think about the
Constitution."
1
Such presidents are "departmentalists" who argue against the “Old
Court"—the defender of the inherited regime—and recreate the political order and
our constitutional commitments. But here, too, a reconstituted Court takes
primary responsibility tor detending and articulating these new constitutional
understandings. I he common theme of a regimes narrative of our constitutional
history is that “political ' interpretation is, by and large, an extraordinary moment
of constitutional politics, after which we return to a more ordinary politics
—
where the Court, once more, becomes central." There is a good deal of truth to
21
“The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy" in Sotirios Barber and Robert P. George,
eds. Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitutional Making, Maintenance, and Change
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) and "Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy
and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning,” Polity Volume XXXIII, Number 3 (2001).
Whittington's work focus on the political construction ofjudicial power and is thus more open to
regimes being tluid.
22 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise ofLochner Era Police
Powers Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) and Akhil Amar, The Bid of
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) also offer a sort
of regimes analysis of constitutional development, revealing how our essential constitutional
commitments have been radically altered.
9
this, especially the recognition of punctuated moments of constitutional change,
but it misses the way significant constitutional change can come incrementally,
absent extraordinary transformation, or clear-cut political realignment, as well as
the way in which constitutional meaning may remain in a state of unsettlement. A
regimes understanding ot constitutional development is a definite improvement
on progressive views, which too frequently sees constitutional change as an
easy forward movement that has gradually recognized the promise of the “living”
Constitution usually, so such narratives go, by way of Court opinions. Some
claims to judicial supremacy have even been founded in such facile views of
constitutional “development .” 23 Indeed, the very language of “development” is
freighted, insinuating a sort of constitutional evolution that moves in a linear
manner, always to something higher .' 4 Yet. a constitutional regimes approach is
inadequate insofar as it treats constitutional politics as discrete and unusual
moments after which we return to the norm of constitutional settlement and
continuity. Such a packaging of our constitutional history masks persistent
constitutional conflict and disputes over constitutional meaning that are a
recurrent feature of our constitutionalism—a feature, I argue, that is called forth
by our very constitutional framework. A central claim of my dissertation is that
r>
William Brennan, Jr. "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification"
Lecture delivered at Georgetown University, Oct. 12, 1985.
24
See, for such "aspirational" theories of constitutional interpretation, Sotirios Barber, On What
the Constitution Means (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) and "Notes on
Constitutional Maintenance" in Barber and George, eds.. Constitutional Polities ; Michael Perry,
We the People: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999). Though, the Rehnquist Court has surely given pause to such theorizing,
which took much of its inspiration from the Warren Court. One gets the feeling from leading
constitutional thinkers like Mark Tushnet, who wants to "take the constitution away from the
courts," and Cass Sunstein, who would like to see the Court go "one case at a time," that there new
found skepticism of the Court stems from their political inclinations.
10
constitutional discontinuity and unsettlement are crucial to a full understanding of
American constitutional development.
I he argument ot my dissertation unfolds in two steps and the approach
might be aptly described as a sort ot “constitutional theory as political science.”
First, I argue that the preoccupations ot judicial supremacy are rooted in a legal
view ot the Constitution—one that has itself been a part of political and
institutional struggles in our history—and posits it as the only way to see the
Constitution. Against this legal view of the Constitution, I argue that the
Constitution is better understood in political terms. This conceptual unpacking of
the legal Constitution (and its link to judicial supremacy) and a rearticulation of
the political Constitution (unlinking judicial supremacy and constitutional
maintenance) will clear the way for an empirical and historical analysis. The bulk
ot the dissertation examines the lunctioning ot our institutions when contesting
constitutional meaning, treating constitutional debate itself as an arena of political
struggle. 1 examine four historical periods where constitutional meaning was
contested between the political branches and the Court in a sustained fashion.
Through the lens of these constitutional conflicts, we see the political constitution
in action, illuminating how constitutional struggles were actually resolved
between the branches of government w hen meaning was contested and illustrating
how constitutional politics has been a central aspect of our constitutional
development. Moreover, this historical and empirical examination will also allow
' 5
Louis Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense ofConstitutionalism and Judicial
Review (New Haven: Yale University Press, 200
1 ) examines how judicial review may work to
unsettle politics, but the argument on the whole is a normative justification for a particular view of
the Court and judicial review.
me to examine the presuppositions ofjudicial supremacy: does the Court itself act
m ways consistent with the requirements of authoritatively settling constitutional
meaning?
Chapter 1 ot my dissertation seeks to recover a political view of the
Constitution in order to take on the central beginning point ofjudicial supremacy:
as the Constitution is law, it must be enforced by the judiciary. But as Judge
Gibson argued long ago, this is to reason from the very premise that is in dispute;
that is, the Constitution must be treated as law because it is law. 26 If we see the
Constitution not so much as a legal text but an institutional framework of
governance, then the basis ot judicial supremacy and the preoccupations that
come along with it are not so clear. Given this, the first chapter is theoretical and
conceptual, offering a Madisonian view of the Constitution. This will allow us to
broaden our focus, letting us take on many of the presuppositions ofjudicial
supremacy that are rooted in a legalist view of the Constitution and, from there,
move us to examine the whole Constitution, going beyond the Court' s-eye-view,
to pay attention to institutional design, constitutional structure, and the political
give and take between the branches of government. 27 In beginning with a
Madisonian view of the Constitution, I want to show how constitutional structure
was paramount to maintaining the Constitution itself. 1 suggest that in establishing
this framework, we might try to place judicial review and questions of
constitutional interpretation within this larger view. This will allow us to see that
36
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant & Rawle 330 (1825).
"
7
Keith Whittington, “Herbert Wechsler’s Complaint and the Revival of Grand Constitutional
Theory” University ofRichmond Law Review 34:509 (2000).
12
many ot the preoccupations ofjudicial supremacy are rooted in a conceptual view
ot the Constitution and not necessarily in questions of actual constitutional
governance. While 1 draw on theories of “interpretive plurality” like Walter
Murphy s, 1 seek to connect those with larger questions of constitutional design. 28
In fact, I draw heavily on Murphy's conceptual separation of the “what of the
constitution” trom the “who of interpretation.” If we see the Constitution in
political terms, I suggest that we may situate the “who of interpretation” within
the “what of the Constitution.”29 In this way, the Madisonian Constitution
examines the dynamic interaction ot the branches of government, so that we must
understand them in relation to one another as part of an historical and political
process. How each institution functions at a particular time is shaped by political,
constitutional, and institutional struggles and thus is historically contingent.
Whether the Court is the great protector of rights is not an abstract question of
theory, but an historical question. And the answer, very likely, will vary across
time. Similarly, presidents may be central to the development and articulation of
constitutional meaning at one point in history and far less important at another. If
constitutional development is a dynamic process, the claims ofjudicial supremacy
or departmentalism will vary through our history and will very likely be the result
of political struggles, which, in turn, shape how we think about the Constitution.
This Madisonian view invites us to look at the actual practices of constitutional
government to see how constitutional meaning is generated. This will be the task
Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5.
:s
Walter Murphy, “Who Shall Interpret?” Review ofPolities 48: 401 (1986).
13
A Madisonian understanding of the Constitution also illuminates parts of
our constitutional history that are at odds with traditional narratives and
understandings. By treating the Constitution as a political framework of
governance, we can better recognize the Constitution for the imperfect document
that it is: one that does not always give us an easy distinction between law and
politics, one that does not always give us "right” answers to constitutional
questions, and one that does not necessarily call for fundamental settlement of
such questions. In tact, as a framework of governance the Constitution calls forth
perpetual disagreement that asks us to reconcile competing values: an enterprise
that countenances unsettlement and discontinuity, an enterprise that is itself open
to the possibility of “failure.”30 The framework is established, true enough, to
foster and protect American principles, but no framework of government can
guarantee success and, here, the Court cannot "save us in this enterprise (as
proponents ofjudicial supremacy often suggest). The Madisonian Constitution is,
if 1 may play on the phrase, a "living constitution" that is argued over and altered.
Murphy, Barber, and Fleming, American Constitutional Interpretation.
11
See especially Mark Brandon, Free in the World: American Slavery and Constitutional Failure
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). As Brandon notes, there is nothing inherently
problematic about multiple constitutional perspectives coexisting; although, a breakdown of
constitutional dialogue where nothing is shared in common could lead to a constitutional “failure”
as during the Civil War. See also Wayne Moore, Constitutional Rights and Powers ofthe People
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). arguing that multiple perspectives may exist outside
of “official” constitutional channels.
14
not in the neat unfolding of Supreme Court opinions toward a higher end, but in
the heated terrain of political dispute. 31
Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the dissertation turn to four historical periods of
constitutional conflict to illuminate the Madisonian Constitution. 32 By looking at
different institutions on different constitutional issues at different points in time,
these cases are selected to represent various periods in our history, multiple
constitutional issues, and different constitutional actors (and conflicts and
debates). I hus the studies attempt to capture a range of constitutional politics, not
just a tew discrete instances that cut against judicial supremacy and the legal
Constitution that, in Justice Roberts words, “are good for this day and this train
Let me say a word about normative concerns and the nature of a written constitution. The
Madisonian framework is deeply concerned with normative commitments and underlying
constitutional values; it seeks to further and maintain such values through the constitutional
framework. It is not, then, open to whatever change happens to come about, or wholly elastic in its
view of constitutional values. Rather, it provides a framework within which constitutional debates
occur. It does not necessarily call for a single coherent view, or settlement, depending upon the
constitutional issues in question. The written Constitution (and the values it rests upon) is more
likely to be secured through multiple institutions rather than by way of a single institution acting
as the constitutional enforcer. And here the Madisonian Constitution draws explicitly on the
written nature of the Constitution. The Constitution was written so that its terms—constitutional
limits and boundaries, the rights and powers of the people—would be clear to all. The ability to
read the Constitution to make sense of it as fundamental law—did not require special training,
but could be clearly grasped by the average citizen. Indeed, the very move to mark down the
Constitution in writing was a rejection of the unwritten British constitution, not just because it
could be easily altered, but because such a constitution was removed from the citizens who were
the basis of all legitimate authority in the American mind. The Americans thus rejected Chief
Justice Coke s dictum that the law was based on "artificial reason” and therefore the peculiar
province of those tutored in the law insofar as it applied to discerning constitutional meaning. This
highlights, as well, the fundamental distinction between ordinary law (where this might be
acceptable) and the written Constitution. I hus, rooting judicial supremacy in the peculiar training
of lawyers and courts undermines the very foundation of a written Constitution as conceived by
the Americans. A point vividly brought home by Madison in a letter to Jefferson, when he insisted
that these political devices for maintaining the Constitution might fail: these mechanisms "are
neither the sole nor the chief palladium of constitutional liberty. The people, who are the authors
of this blessing, must also be its guardians.” Quoted in Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison
Three Conversations From the Founding (Madison: Madison House, 1995), 21.
As the 14
th Amendment was a fundamental constitutional change (implicating both the Court's
and the Congress’ constitutional power) I am examining post 14 th Amendment cases to hold “The
Constitution” steady for the cases I am sampling.
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only. The cases locus on the details ot constitutional dispute and are largely
descriptive in nature, revealing that the standard vocabulary of authoritative
settlement and its link to judicial supremacy fails to capture the variety of
constitutional dispute and settlement. And while these areas have been examined
before as the subject of scholarly debate, I view them through the lens of
constitutional settlement, using them to illustrate and illuminate the Madisonian
Constitution. These studies suggest that constitutional authority is fluid and
constitutional meaning is shaped in the political arena. Settling contested
constitutional questions is a dynamic process involving the interaction of the
branches of government, so that we must understand the branches in relation to
” My approach itself may be labeled “historical-institutionalism” or “the new institutionalism" in
that it seeks to investigate the historical functioning of our institutions when contesting
constitutional meaning. In this, there is a close connection between my theory and the cases
studies I propose to examine. The cases studies themselves should help refine and alter my theory,
which may be treated as a working hypothesis. As 1 am not attempting to formally test my theory,
this close connection between “evidence" and “theory" is acceptable. Indeed, my theory is not
fully formed, but in the process of being constructed to offer an alternative to our focus on the
Supreme Court as the exclusive and authoritative interpreter of constitutional meaning. The case
studies should allow me to classify and categorize constitutional dispute in a much richer way than
has previously been done, offering us a conceptual handle in speaking about constitutional
settlement. Moreover, in describing these cases I can look for possible causal relations and
generate hypotheses for future research, which might then be tested in a more rigorous manner.
Even if my case studies are primarily exploratory, the division between this type of case
study and a confirmatory case study—where I would rigorously test a hypothesis— is not as stark
as it appears. My exploration will involve comparison between my cases, an examination of
crucial cases, and even an initial probing of my theory (as well as rival theories). While I suggest
that authoritative judicial settlement of constitutional meaning doesn't capture the full range of
constitutional settlement, I don't wish to simply disconfirm this view by sampling on a “theory-
infirming” case study. Nor do I wish to “confirm” some alternate hypothesis. Rather, I want to
examine the range of constitutional settlement and how we arrive at it.
I am theorizing that other types of settlement unsettlement, constitutional dialogue, and
partial settlement—more aptly describe the various ways in which constitutional questions are
actually settled. There is hypothesis probing here. But more importantly, 1 want to offer a more
accurate description of constitutional settlement than currently exists. In this way, my larger
theorizing doesn't seek to falsify theories that focus on the Court and authoritative settlement so
much as incorporate them into a broader theoretical framework. I'm trying to examine what
underlies these different types of settlement. This will allow us to speak to how settlement is
arrived at and how constitutional meaning is generated, providing us with rich insights into this
process and, thereby, a better understanding of our constitutional system.
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one another as part ot an historical and political process. Moreover, these cases
illustrate that constitutional conflict is a perennial feature of our constitutional
framework with all the messy features of unsettled meaning, constitutional
dialogues, partial settlement, and concurrent tensions and discontinuities in
constitutional meaning. In short, these cases suggest that the Madisonian
Constitution more aptly captures our constitutional history than beliefs about the
legal articulation and settlement of constitutional meaning. 34
Chapter 2 examines the conflict between the Court and the Congress over
the meaning of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments from 1870-1883. This
episode is particularly interesting because it comes after the momentous politics
ot the Civil War era, a so-called return to ordinary politics, but we see the
meaning of these Amendments being shaped not in the heat of the Civil War, but
in the far more ordinary politics that follow. Moreover, in the early years we see
conflict between the Congress and the Court on the meaning of rights where,
according to much of constitutional theory, we should see the Court protecting
rights in a principled manner against the Congress. The opposite is true. And the
14
Existing empirical work leads us to be skeptical of the claims of judicial supremacy. Gerald
Rosenberg has shown that Supreme Court opinions do not immediately bring about the
constitutional practices they call forth, Robert Dahl has shown that the Congress and the President
"do generally succeed in overcoming a hostile Court on major policy issues,” and Jeffrey Segal
and Harold Spaeth have shown that the Court does not always follow its own pronouncements on
constitutional meaning. While these works are crucial, my study takes a different tack. See, Gerald
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Cun Courts Bring About Social Change
?
(Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991), Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker” Journal ofPublic Law , 288, Mark Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian
Difficulty” Studies in American Political Development 7 ( 1993), Barry Friedman, “A History ot
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy” 73 New York
University Law Review 2: 333-433 (1998) and Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, Majority Rule or
Minority Will : The Supreme Court 's Adherence to Precedent (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998). Although this alone could hardly support Segal and Spaeth's contention that Court
opinions are the result of the justices’ political preferences and are almost never influenced by
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event that paves the way for a constitutional settlement is the switch in Congress
in the election ot 1874, where it retreats from the early promise of the Civil War
Amendments so that by the time the Court renders opinions on the reach and
meaning ot the fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it is essentially in line with
the Congress's view.
C hapter 3 explores the national government's first entry into national
economic regulation and the Supreme Court's reaction, from 1895-1925. This
period is too often treated as the precursor to the New Deal struggle of the 1930s,
where the "conservative" Court struck down progressive legislation. This period
witnessed a three decades long constitutional debate about the government's
power to regulate the national economy that remained, by and large, unsettled
even as the political branches and the Court engaged in a sort of constitutional
dialogue. It is difficult, then, to treat the New Deal revolution that followed as a
singular and rare moment of constitutional conflict, when it is placed in this larger
context of constitutional drift and unsettlement. The details of constitutional
conflict during this era also make it difficult to sustain the notion that a
conservative court was striking down progressive legislation: the Congress itself
often invited the Court to construct constitutional meaning, illustrating the
important interaction between the branches of government in negotiating
constitutional meaning.
Chapter 4 picks up with the national government's attempt to regulate the
economy, which, after years of unsettlement, was firmly settled by the New Deal
politics of 1935-1941. Here the Court came into line with FDR's constitutional
18
vision, providing tor sweeping regulation of the economy. Yet, this very
settlement provoked a protound constitutional debate about the role of the Court
in protecting constitutional rights (what would become civil liberties) that remains
unsettled to the current day. This movement reveals that some constitutional
issues might be settled even while others remain unsettled and essentially
contested, making it difficult to speak of coherent constitutional regimes, as there
were tensions and discontinuities in constitutional thought at the very core of the
New Deal revolution that, over the course of years, fell away from the initial
settlement and pulled apart the logic of the New Deal Constitution.
1 he attempt to unsettle the New Deal is taken up in Chapter 5 with
President Reagan’s attempted constitutional reconstruction. While Reagan's
attempt to displace the New Deal and reconstruct our constitutionalism is often
characterized as a failure, such characterizations are too hasty in focusing on
whether a full scale constitutional "revolution" occurred. Reagan did not succeed
in over turning such cases as Roe v. Wade
,
which was a central part of his
criticism ol the Court. Yet he did succeed in chastening the New Deal view of
national power and bringing back constitutional federalism: the Reagan justices of
the Rehnquist Court have placed limits on the reach of Congress’ Commerce
Power for the first time since the New Deal revolution and, at the very least, have
reopened a once settled area of constitutional meaning. That this has occurred
while these same Reagan justices upheld a women's constitutional right to
abortion—although this area also moves back and forth—reveals how
constitutional change occurs in some areas and not in others, in fits and starts.
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without leading to full scale constitutional transformation. Indeed, such is the
course ot American constitutional development.
By placing the Court within the political framework, scholars have shown
that it is not a distant countermajoritarian institution upholding our Constitution
against political encroachments. 3 ' Coming from another angle, I want to show
how the political branches are central to maintaining the Constitution. Blinded by
our locus on the legal Constitution and the Court, we rarely investigate how these
political branches are a central part of our constitutionalism. I should also note,
here, that this does not imply the vulgar characterization—often put forward by
behavioral political science that debates about constitutional meaning are all
crass politics .
36
Rather, by situating constitutional debates within a larger
institutional framework, we see that shaping constitutional meaning is far more
political than constitutional theory often recognizes, but, just as surely, our
political institutions are far more important to our understanding of
constitutionalism than we often realize.
Thus, while scholars like Robert Dahl have led us to be skeptical of the
Court's countermajoritarianism. they have little to say about the performance of
the political branches in constitutional terms. I hope to speak to both prongs of
this issue by investigating how our constitutionalism actually functions. In
situating Court opinions within the give-and-take of constitutional politics, we
Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker” Journal ofPublic Law , 288; Mark Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary”; Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change
?
See, for example, Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Altitudinal
Model (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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cannot only ask whether Court opinions authoritatively settle constitutional
meaning, but empirically investigate the presuppositions ofjudicial supremacy.
Many proponents ofjudicial supremacy may well agree that the Court is
countermajoritarian, but they see this as a good thing, as it protects the
Constitution against politics. Embedded in their thinking is an insistence that the
political branches are threats to our constitutionalism. Yet, how have the so-called
political branches actually functioned when it comes to protecting rights and
maintaining constitutional limits? Is the Court's performance truly better in this
regard, as is so often asserted? Does this vary across institutions and over time, so
that we must be attuned to the historical interplay between the institutions and not
simply preoccupied with the Court? These are empirical and historical questions
that are more often asserted than investigated. Even the leading proponents of
judicial supremacy acknowledge that “the empirical dimension [of their claim]
cannot be avoided ." 37 They further acknowledge that the historical functioning of
our system must play a role in any empirical analysis, especially when discussing
the political branches' relationship to questions of constitutional settlement.
Other scholars have similarly insisted that a “sustained historical analysis" with
more concern for the actual practice of constitutional settlement is central to this
debate .
38
Larry Alexander and Fredrick Schauer, “Defending Judicial Supremacy: An Argument”
Constitutional Commentary 2000 Vol. 17: 455-482, 464.
18
Stephen Griffin, “Has the Hour of Democracy Come Round at Last? The New Critique of
Judicial Review” Constitutional Commentary 17:683 (2000), 693; Howard Gillman, “From
fundamental Law to Constitutional Politics—And Back' Law and Social Inquiry
,
199. Bruce
Peabody, “Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a New Agenda
for Research” Constitutional Commentary Vol. 16: 63 ( 1999).
21
Labeling these contests “constitutional politics” raises an important
question of how we separate constitutional politics from ordinary politics. 39 How
do we know, for example, that such disputes are not merely political and policy
disputes disguised as constitutional disputes for rhetorical purposes? One way.
which 1 take up in the chapters that follow, is when we see the political branches
exhibiting a commitment to constitutional text. 40 But 1 do not limit my analysis to
cases where the political branches display fidelity to constitutional text. In part 1
suggest that a Madisonian view of the Constitution makes this easy distinction
between politics and the Constitution difficult. In attempting to maintain
constitutional boundaries and propriety, the Madisonian solution relies in part on
the sell-interested action ol the various actors: “the interests of the man will be
connected to the constitutional rights of the office.”41 It is not always easy to
separate constitutional views from policy preferences or the politics of the day. In
tact, debates about constitutional meaning are almost certainly rooted in the
politics ol the day, which is why a historical analysis that examines the
development ol constitutional meaning—and not simply looking at Court
opinions—is key to understanding our constitutionalism. It would be very
difficult, tor example, to make sense ol Justice Stone's lamous argument for
judicial review in footnote 4 of Carotene Products without understanding the
14
In treating Supreme Court cases as disputed by the political branches, I rely on the
pronouncements and actions of the political branches themselves. The branches must make some
effort to challenge the opinion. They may insist that they are not bound by the Court's opinion,
refuse to enforce it, or attempt by legislation, pronouncement, or judicial appointment to overcome
the Court’s interpretation. This would even include a sustained rhetorical assault on the Court’s
opinions.
40
Gillman, "From Fundamental Law to Constitutional Politics—And Back,” 199-200.
preceding development of "substantive due process" in Lochner v. New York and
the politics that surrounded that decision. 42 Given this. 1 suggest that
constitutional politics is any broad attempt to shape or alter constitutional
meaning. It is constitutional in the broad sense that it contributes to our
constitutional discourse, speaks to and shapes constitutional meaning, and accepts
that we are governed by the Constitution (even while disputing the particulars of
what that means). 43 While such constitutional struggles are rooted in the political
disputes of the day and shape how we think about the Constitution, my concern is
describing how such contests over constitutional meaning play out between the
branches of government rather than with whether or not any particular view of the
Constitution put forth by those branches is correct.
44
Constitutional politics—with continued dispute, unsettled meaning, and
discontinuities—is a sustained and continuous part of American constitutionalism.
Against this backdrop, judicial supremacy operates as a blinding myth. Its claims
are unsubstantiated and yet they continue to dominate constitutional scholarship,
ignoring the rich terrain that our constitutionalism occupies. I hope to show that
constitutional questions often remain unsettled, are reopened, and, when
41
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor
Books, 1 999), no. 5 1 , 290.
42
United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) and Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 ( 1905). See Paul Pierson, "Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political
Processes" Studies in American Political Development, 14 (Spring 2000) 72-92.
44
See Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (New York.
Oxford University Press, 2000) 20-22.
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settlement does occur, it is usually torged by way ot political consensus over time
and not at a single moment with the handing down of a Supreme Court opinion. A
great benefit here is properly situating a discussion of Supreme Court opinions
and constitutional law within the framework of American politics as a whole . 45
This should help give some measure to our Court-centered discussion. As it
stands, scholars give us legal theories that—to put it bluntly—nobody believes,
and dramatic assertions about the importance ofjudicial decisions that are flatly
unsupported by empirical evidence .
46 We rage as if the Court's opinion was
everything, when in fact it is not. Focusing only on the Court, we miss the ways in
which the political system itself—the broad constitutional framework—plays an
ongoing role in maintaining (and creating) constitutional meaning. In articulating
this view, I hope to overcome the deeply ingrained myth ofjudicial supremacy
and recover a political understanding of the Constitution.
44
Again, that’s not to discount normative concerns, they are just not the key to this study. While
this study seeks to look at the actual functioning of our constitutionalism, it would still be fully
compatible with strong normative views of constitutional meaning. Indeed, it suggests that the best
way to protect the proper reading of the Constitution is interpretive plurality rather than always
siding with a particular branch. Thus we may go with the branch that we think is right in any
constitutional dispute.
45
See Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton’s “Introduction” in their edited volume. The Supreme
Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations (Lawrence: University Press ot
Kansas, 1999) 1-11.
46
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope. For a critique of Rosenberg see Bradley Canon and Charles
Johnson, Judicial Politics: Implementation and Impact (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999) 209-
211. While Canon and Johnson reveal some of the shortcomings of Rosenberg's work, they
themselves demonstrate in their discussion of abortion that the Court’s opinions are hardly the
whole story, 3-16.
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CHAPTER 1
RECOVERING THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
“That all power is originally invested in, and consequently derived from the
people.
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of
the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of
acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety.
“That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right
to reform or change their government, whenever it be found adverse to the
purposes of its institution.”—James Madison 1
"Now, it is the proper function of the judicial department to interpret laws, and by
the very terms of the constitution to interpret the supreme law. Its interpretation,
then, becomes obligatory and conclusive upon all the departments of the federal
government, and upon the whole people, so far as their rights and duties are
derived from, or affected by that constitution.”—Joseph Story 2
Constitutionalism in the American tradition suffers from two distinct but
related problems. In the first place, there is the insistence upon a written
constitution as fundamental law that “prescribes the limits of all delegated
power .” 3 This move, so much a part of early American constitutional thought, is
so that the government may truly be said to be limited. The second problem
arises from just this point though: how do we make these written limits effective?
The mere act of writing is itself no guarantee. If the legislature could alter the
Constitution at will, even if written, then we are right back where we started. The
question was how to bring this fundamental law down to earth, so that it might
1 James Madison, proposed amendment with what became the Bill of Rights, which Madison
sought to place as the opening of the Constitution, with the other proposed amendments weaved
into its body, rather than tacked on to the end, in what became know as the Bill of Rights.
2 Commentaries on the Constitution ofthe United States, reprinted with an Introduction by Ronald
Rotunda and John Nowak (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1987 [1833]) 128.
3 Wood, Creation ofthe American Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1998)281.
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actually be effective in maintaining the very limits it purported to establish
.
4
How, then, do we bond the polity to the word of the Constitution, in William
Harris phrase? James Madison's solution was structural and political. But it was
supplemented by another that both complemented it and pulled it in a different
direction. This solution, the legalist solution, makes the Constitution, as law,
cognizable in courts. In this way the Constitution becomes effective and
permanent by making its limits enforceable in the courts, just like ordinary law.
As Gordon Wood has said, "What in the final analysis gave meaning to the
Americans' conception of a constitution was not its fundamental ity or its creation
by the people, but rather its implementation in the ordinary courts of law.”6
The legal view of the Constitution and its solution to the problem of
constitutional governance is, in fact, the popular understanding of constitutional
enforcement .
7
In this view, the Constitution functions as law articulated by the
Court, which insists upon constitutional limits by exercising its power ofjudicial
review. The Supreme Court itself has pushed this argument, insisting that it
4 As Gordon Wood says, "There was therefore no logical or necessary reason why the notion of
fundamental law, so common to Englishman for over a century, should lead to the American
invocation of it in the ordinary courts of law. Indeed, in an important sense the idea of
fundamental law actually worked to prohibit any such development, for it was dependent on such
a distinct conception of public law in contrast to private law as to be hardly enforceable in the
regular court system.” Creation ofthe American Republic, 292. I his is a point Edward Corwin
noted earlier in suggesting that a constitution’s status as fundamental law was a hindrance to its
legality, "Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review.” See especially Robert Burt,
The Constitution in Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) 59-76.
5 William Harris 11, The Interpretable Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1993).
6 Wood, Creation ofthe American Republic , 291 . Similarly, Edward Corwin has remarked that
“the supremacy of constitutions was a real barrier to their legality. ” Corwin, "Marbury v. Madison
and the Establishment of Judicial Review” Michigan Law Review 12: 538, 555 (1914) emphasis in
original.
7
See Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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"speaks tor the Constitution and that once it has spoken we are bound by its
interpretation of the Constitution
.
8
In fact, the Court has gone so far as to say that
as a people we are tested in taking our constitutional ideals seriously by our
willingness to adhere to the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Living up
to our constitutional ideals depends, in no small measure, upon our willingness to
heed the Court's voice . 4 This rather dramatic claim to judicial supremacy suggests
that the Constitution will cease to function as law if it is not authoritatively
interpreted by the Court, which means that the other branches of government, no
less than the people, are bound by the Court's view of constitutional meaning: it is
the Court—whether exclusively or finally—that gets to define the substance of
the Constitution. If the political branches can read the Constitution in their own
light, and thereby disregard or second-guess judicial interpretations, then we are
no longer living under the Constitution, or so advocates ofjudicial supremacy
would have us believe . 10
8
For a clear statement of this see City ofBoerne v. Flores 52 1 U.S. 507, 529 (1997); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
9
“Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from their understanding of
the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all
others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court's legitimacy should be undermined, then, so
would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals." Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992). See also, John Brigham, The Cult ofthe Court
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
10
See especially Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation” Harvard Law Review Vol. 1 10, No. 7: 1359-1387. Scott Gant qualities the notion
ofjudicial supremacy by suggesting that the judiciary is not the exclusive interpreter ot the
Constitution, but that its interpretations are, once given, authoritative—at least in the short run.
Gant, “Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly 24:359-440 (1997).
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It we see the Constitution as a political framework, the insistence on the
judicial enforcement of the Constitution is much more problematic. 11 The aim of
this chapter is conceptual and theoretical, it is a sort of “constitutional theory as
political science."
12
First, 1 argue that a Madisonian view of the Constitution
emphasizes constitutional structure and institutional design as central to
Constitutional maintenance—not simply judicial enforcement. As originally
conceived the political framework itself invites “interpretive plurality,”
suggesting that questions of constitutional interpretation would be resolved as part
of constitutional politics and often in the ordinary political process. Multiple and
even conflicting views of the Constitution are an inherent—even healthy
—
part of
11
Walter Murphy, “Who Interprets?” Review of Politics 48: 401 (1986); Mark Graber, The Civil
War as a Constitutional Failure (unpublished manuscript); Stephen Griffin. American
Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Keith
Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Wayne Moore, Constitutional Rights and Powers of
the People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); William Harris, The Interpretable
Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Mark Brandon, Free in the
World: American Slavery and Constitutional Failure (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1998); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989);
Susan Burgess, Contest for Constitutional Authority (Lawrence: University Press ot Kansas,
1992); Gary Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of C onstitutional Aspiration
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986); Neal Devins, Shaping Constitutional Values
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); and Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues:
Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
12
Keith Whittington, “Herbert Wechsler’s Complaint and the Revival of Grand Constitutional
Theory” University of Richmond Law Review 34:509 (2000).
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the constitutional framework. 13 Second, to draw out Madison's political
Constitution I examine his participation in early constitutional debates. To see the
Constitution through a Madisonian lens suggests a close connection between
constitutional theory and history: examining the Constitution as an institutional
dynamic invites us to view how this dynamic has actually worked (and changed)
in the course of American constitutional development. The articulation and
development of constitutional meaning from the political branches is a key part of
bringing the Constitution to life and maintaining a functioning constitutional
system. I suggest that we may situate judicial review within this framework and
see constitutional law as a part of this larger constitutional whole. Third. I
examine the connection between judicial supremacy and the legal Constitution.
By beginning from the premise that the Constitution is law, the proponents of
judicial supremacy make the Court the enforcer of the Constitution and come very
close to focusing on constitutional law as the whole of our Constitution. Yet in
doing so they subvert the constitutional framework and pull against the nature of a
written constitution, even while drawing on Madison's separation of powers to do
so. By making constitutional questions legal questions, and therefore the peculiar
13
| should also note that when 1 refer to the Madisonian Constitution or the Madisonian solution to
maintaining constitutional government, 1 don't mean to suggest that it has developed exactly as
Madison himself would want it to, or that it is “proper” because Madison saw it this way. Rather, 1
argue that the system can be described as Madisonian because it operates broadly as he suggested
even if many of the particulars go against his own vision. For example, even if we could find
definitive proof that Madison was against judicial review, we could still describe judicial review
as functioning within the Madisonian view of checks and balances. Madison was deeply skeptical
of a continual return to constitutional issues. In Federalist 49, Madison insisted that reverence tor
the laws—and for the Constitution—was necessary to the health and tranquility of the polity. "The
danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions is a still
more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decisions ot
the whole society.” While Madison was speaking specifically against turning frequently to the
people on constitutional questions, his point is equally applicable to making constitutional
questions frequent matters of public debate.
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province of courts and lawyers, the Court is placed above the Constitution rather
than within it. Moreover, by making the written Constitution the peculiar province
of courts and lawyers, we move against it very purpose as a public document open
and accessible to all citizens.
While judicial supremacy has come under fire from both the left and the
right, these critiques tend to focus on the contemporary court and particular
judicial decisions, driven by normative and polemical concerns of constitutional
interpretation. The insistence is often that the Court got it wrong in this or that
instance. The plea is usually for more judicial restraint, a particular theory of
interpretation, or, on occasion, a repeal of judicial power. My concerns here are
driven more by a desire to look at the actual functioning of our system (which is
taken up in great detail in the chapter that follow). Yet, one of the benefits of
thinking of the Constitution in political terms is that it moves us beyond debates
about judicial activism or restraint, both of which have their leet in the legal view
of the Constitution. Both. I argue below, are outgrowths of John Marshall's
opinion in Marbury v. Madison. Those who look to Marshall s insistence that the
Court is the primary enforcer of constitutional limits see the need for an active
judiciary—it is the essence of maintaining the law.
1
^ On the other hand, this very
same concern, with its potentially expansive view ofjudicial power, has led others
14 See Michael Perry, We the People: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court (New
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Scott Douglas Gerber, “The Judicial Brezhnev Doctrine” Harvard Journal ofLaw
and Public
Policy (2000). “The End of Democracy?” First Things November 1996, especially
Robert Bork s
“Our Judicial Oligarchy” and Robert George's “The Tyrant State."
15 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1987).
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to plead for judicial humility. As judicial opinions are taken to be the final word
on the Constitution, the Court ought to deter to the political branches and exercise
such power only when these branches are clearly wrong. 16 Each view, though,
shares a common premise and it is this premise that 1 want to get beyond. We
cannot meaningfully speak of activism or restraint without understanding what the
other branches of government are doing (by looking to the framework), and this is
not a constant but something that varies across time.
Too much constitutional debate, then, occurs within Marshall's
conceptual framework, or between the “two Marshalls” of Marbury,' 1 with an
occasional if futile nod to Judge Gibson's opinion in Eakin v. Raub, calling for the
abandonment ofjudicial review altogether. The Madisonian view offers an
alternative vision. Recovering the political Constitution will help us ask whether
authoritative settlement by the judiciary—and the avoidance of politics and
indeterminacy—is truly central to American constitutionalism. This conceptual
clearing away will then let us turn to an empirical examination of the actual
functioning of our constitutional system in the course of American constitutional
development, which is taken up in the historical studies that follow.
16 James Bradley Thayer, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law”
Harvard Law Review 7: 129 ( 1 893). See also Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
17 Mark Tushnet, “Marbury v. Madison and the Theory of Judicial Supremacy” Robert P. George,
ed„ Great Cases in Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
An
exception is Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1989) (arguing that Marbury only speaks to the Court’s power).
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The Madisonian Constitution
Much like Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall, Madison agreed that a
written constitution was our "peculiar security," the great improvement of our
“political institutions ."
10 And yet Madison was reluctant to rely on the mere
writtenness of the Constitution. A written constitution, like written law generally,
gives clarity to the rights of the people and to the limitations of the government by
way of text .'0 As such, the limits of governmental power would not be subjected
to either the whims of the judge or the legislature. All could turn to the written
constitution's text and thereby grasp, in advance, the limits and powers of the
government. Madison, though, insisted that writtenness, in and of itself, was not
enough to preserve the Constitution. The mere act of writing the Constitution, “a
mere demarcation on parchment,” did not make it self-enforcing. One could
surely imagine, as Marshall did in Marbury
,
a government overstepping its
prescribed constitutional limitations—and doing so despite the fact that those
limitations are clearly demarcated. If constitutional limitations were not somehow
enforced, as Marshall said, then “a written constitution was an absurd attempt on
the part of the people to limit a power that is illimitable.” ' On this score Madison
agreed with Marshall. To be effective the Constitution had to be maintained. But
how?
14
Marbury at 178.
20 Gordon Wood, The Creation ofthe American Republic , 275.
21
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22 Marbury at 177.
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Structure. Political Institutions and the Self-Governing” Constitution
Madison's great political innovation was to make the Constitution “self-
governing,"' 3 to create an institutional framework that would police the
boundaries ot the written Constitution. It is this institutional framework, through
the normal operation of the political process, and not just judicial interpretation
and judicial review that is responsible for maintaining the constitutional polity. In
this sense, Madison's solution to the problem of constitutionalism was political
rather than legal .'
4
The key to constitutional maintenance for Madison is the very
structure the constitutional text calls forth: constitutional design is paramount to
the constitutional enterprise .
25
The division of power between the national and
state governments, the large republic, and the separation of powers and checks
and balances are all institutional innovations that structure our politics in very
particular ways: they favor certain political outcomes over others and through the
ordinary political process maintain a functioning constitutional system.
Constitutional interpretation occurs within this system and allows us to situate
disputes about constitutional meaning and the exercise ofjudicial review within
this larger political framework. What I am calling the Madisonian system is
23
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24
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political in the first instance in that it does not suggest that the Constitution will
be reduced to neat legal rules by the judiciary acting as the sole constitutional
umpire.
The political Constitution, much like the legal Constitution, seeks to limit
the power of the government and secure the rights of the people (although that is
only part of the picture). The primary difference is the solution to enforcing the
very limits the Constitution purports to establish. The legal Constitution attempts
to limit government and enforce constitutionalism by way of the text: the very
writtenness ol the Constitution, as law, is the great way to uphold its limitations
—
with the judiciary enforcing the text. It is an attempt to bond the polity by way of
text ."
6
But can the polity be bound by words—by the written Constitution, with
the judiciary enforcing the text? The political Constitution, as articulated most
fully by Madison, is reluctant to rely on "mere parchment barriers;” it doubts the
simple power of text. Thus the political solution, as Mark Graber suggests,
“limited power primarily through institutional design .”27 Following this,
fundamental constitutional arrangements cannot be seen in legal terms and cannot
be reduced to legal rules, as "the scope of constitutional law is necessarily
narrow.”" In this vein, the Constitution is not the equivalent of law enforced by
the judiciary.
The Constitution is an active institutional framework, a sort of "living
constitution.” Constitutional exposition and development, as well as maintenance,
2b
William Harris, The Interpretable Constitution, 2.
27
Mark Graber, The Civil War as a Constitutional Failure, 23.
28
Griffin, American Constitutionalism, 45.
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takes place within a political process that is structured by the Constitution (as
institutional design) and is not simply “free floating.”29 Part of my project is to
link this institutional framework with the question “Who interprets?”, thus
locating the discussion of constitutional interpretation in the context of the
political C onstitution and judicial review in the context ot the separation of
powers. The “jurisprudential model,” as Keith Whittington calls it, leads us to
focus on the legal Constitution at the expense of the political Constitution. Yet
constitutional maintenance is fundamentally a political task and the political
branches play a central role here even if it is at times tacit or indirect. To recover
the political Constitution is to recognize that even if it is law, it is law of a
fundamentally different sort . 30 And if it is, then we may ask not only what it
means to settle constitutional meaning authoritatively, but whether such
“settlement” is central to the constitutional enterprise. If we see the Constitution
in more Madisonian terms, authoritative settlement does not necessarily come
from the judiciary. But this may also suggest that authoritative settlement is not
the primary constitutional value: many constitutional issues can be left unsettled
or worked out within the confines of the political process, subject to change and
29
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,
140, 6. See also Wayne Moore, Constitutional Rights and Powers
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revision over time . 31 To see the Constitution through a Madisonian lens is to
realize that the Constitution does not always speak through the judiciary and
does not always speak with one voice .”32 It is also to recognize, as a corollary,
that not all constitutional issues are legal issues resolvable by the judiciary . 33
Constitutional interpretation is only a part of the constitutional enterprise. And,
moreover, as much recent scholarship has shown, it is not a distinctly legal
enterprise connected only to the judiciary. The executive and the legislature also
have a role to play when in comes to constitutional interpretation.
Coordinate Construction: Interpretation w ithin the Constitutional Structure
Interaction between the branches of government over constitutional
meaning—often involving high issues of constitutional interpretation, perhaps
involving more ordinary politics—is a central feature of settling such meaning (if
it even need be) and fits within the system of checks and balances and separation
of powers. Scholars have long insisted that the judiciary is not the sole or
authoritative interpreter of constitutional meaning. If we take the Constitution
seriously, as Edward Corwin has argued, we are bound by the Constitution and
not the Court's interpretation of it, which are not the same thing. Thus the other
branches of government must have a say in constitutional interpretation.
11
Tushnet, “Marhury v. Madison 43. As Justice Brandeis argued in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
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Coordinate construction, or departmentalism, as this has come to be
known, 3 emphasizes the political nature of the Constitution more than we often
realize. It is not just that the president and Congress have a legitimate say in
interpreting the Constitution. The point I want to make is deeper. It is that debates
over constitutional meaning are not simply legal debates that call for judicial
resolution, rather, such debates can be a part ot a larger political dynamic that is
part of bringing the Constitution to life and finding workable solutions to
constitutional problems. John Agresto frames the issue perfectly:
If, following Marshall, we base our understanding and
defense of judicial review on the idea that “the Constitution
is law," then the primacy of the Court in the American
system of governance becomes more set. But if our basic
view of the Constitution begins not with what the
Constitution is—law—but with what it establishes—
a
constitutional democracy of separated powers, checked and
balanced—then the activity of judicial review becomes part
of an interlocking totality of governance. In other words,
the idea ot the Constitution as law interpreted by judges
and the idea of the Constitution as a framework for limited
government may well lead to different results. 36
Murphy, “Who Shall Interpret?’’ and Walter Murphy, James Fleming, and Sotirios Barber,
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Lincoln similarly refused to be bound by the Court's settlement in DredSeotf. “I do not forget the
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And surely they do. Political constitutionalism begins from the institutional
framework, whereas judicial supremacy begins from the axiom that the
Constitution is law.
To understand Madison’s political constitutionalism we must begin from
the governing framework the Constitution establishes. We can see how our
Constitution structures our politics in very particular ways by focusing on what
Mark Tushnet calls our “thick” Constitution . 37 The thick Constitution focuses on
such things as the bicameral structure of Congress, the unitary executive, the
independent judiciary, the division of powers between the states and the national
government, the fact, even, that one must be of a certain age before being eligible
to take office. A glance at much of current constitutional law and theory might
suggest that this is all “mere surplusage” in Marshall's phrase .
38
Oddly, though, it
is the bulk of our Constitution. Indeed, the structure of our Constitution
dominated early constitutional debates and thinking . 34 Paying attention to the
actual institutions the Constitution creates will allow us to address two important
and intimately related points. In the first place it will show us how institutional
design was meant to preclude certain possibilities and maintain constitutional
boundaries without resorting, in most cases, to the law, but instead relying on
politics .
40
In a similar fashion, Madison sought to make it nearly impossible for
one branch of the government
—
perhaps dominated by a majority—to ignore the
37
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Constitution's putative limits. Madison was concerned with maintaining rights
and constitutional propriety, yet his solution to these problems lay in structuring
our politics in a particular manner and not merely by writing them down, say, in a
bill of rights .
41
As Tushnet suggests, even while arguing that we may forgo the
thick Constitution, it is the thick Constitution that gives the political branches
incentives to maintain constitutional propriety .42 The political Constitution is, in
fact, as preoccupied by rights and principles as is much of modern constitutional
theory and interpretation. Rather than appealing straight to moral theory,
however, or moral theory disguised as neutral constitutional interpretation, the
political constitution seeks political solutions—institutional solutions—that are
the means of achieving constitutional values and principles.
It is interesting, in this light, that the Federalist Papers
,
the great
exegetical writing on the Constitution, rarely refers to what we would today call
constitutional law. Rather, the Federalist Papers
,
particularly Madison's writings,
refers to the institutional dynamic of the new Constitution. ' In explaining why
the new Constitution is a great improvement in political institutions and how it
will effectively provide for limited (and effective) government, Publius devotes
41
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This has perhaps changed with the ratification of the I4
,h Amendment, which arguably paved
way for the legalization of the Constitution shitting our focus to rights (and the Courts) and away
from constitutional structure. But such a reading relies on a legalist view of the amendment
overlooking the fact that Congress seems to have been entrusted by way of section 5 with
defending (and perhaps defining) constitutional rights. Furthermore, recent scholarship casts
serious doubt on any special connection between rights—even in a bill of rights—and the
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the bulk ot the Federalist Papers to the institutional forms of the new
Constitution. Madison's most famous discussion of this comes in the widely cited
51
s
' Federalist Paper. Federalist 51 begins by asking how we are to maintain “in
practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments as laid
down in the Constitution?"44 Madison says that the first reliance on maintaining
constitutional boundaries is supplied by “exterior provisions.” That is, the primary
reliance on maintaining constitutional forms comes from the large republic,
federalism, the nature of representation, and so forth, which sustain the
constitutional polity by structuring politics in a particular way. However, lest
these devices fail, we must trust in auxiliary precautions: “by so contriving the
interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places.”
45
While power is separated, it must also be checked. Lest the legislature,
Madison's first concern, encroach upon the powers of the executive, or overstep
its constitutionally limited bounds, the executive should be fortified with a
negative (the veto) against the legislature. The negative, however, should not be
absolute, lest the executive, although the weaker branch, overstep its
constitutional limits. While a written constitution is a great improvement in
clearly enumerating the powers of government and its limitations, it is not, ol
itself, “self-enforcing.” What is needed is to order the Constitution, to give it life,
44 The Federalist Papers, No. 51, 288.
45
Ibid, at 288. For a discussion of the solutions Madison rejected, see Burt, The Constitution in
Conflict, 47.
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so to speak, in such a way that the various parties under it will have an interest in
maintaining its boundaries: “But the great security against a gradual
concentration ot the several powers in the same department consists in giving
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others .”46 To drive home this
point Madison argued, “The interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place .”
47
Constitutional limits will be maintained in
that those who hold office under it will have an interest in enforcing its written
provisions; indeed, an institutionally structured self-serving interest! Tushnet has
insisted that the political branches, of which we are so suspicious, often have
“incentives” for adhering to the Constitution, which aptly captures Madison's
idea. The branches of government themselves, often referring to the text of the
Constitution to answer particular questions, would police the Constitution's
boundaries in their political capacity through the framework. The larger design
was to limit power by structure, not narrow legal rules. As Jack Rakove argues,
the Constitution would be interpreted and enforced primarily by way of the
political branches. In fact, as Rakove argues, Madison, like most Federalists,
thought the “[r]eal interpretation of the Constitution would occur as decisions
^4g
taken within government gradually settled its operations in regular channels.”
At the same time, Madison recognized that “in the ordinary course of
government ... the exposition of the laws and the constitution devolves upon the
46
Ibid, at 289.
47
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judicial branch.” But, he insisted, this did not mean that the Court was, in any
way, the final arbiter on the meaning of the Constitution, particularly when it
came to “the limits of the powers of the several departments.” Here Madison
insisted, as many future presidents would, that none “of these independent
departments has more right than another to declare their sentiments on that
point .”
49
To give that power to the judiciary, Madison argued, was not only to
make that department "paramount in fact to the legislature, which was never
intended,” but, even more problematic, it was to render the Constitution a mere
legal document. Yet, can this be avoided? As Stephen Griffin suggests, “The
experience of American constitutionalism shows that you can maintain the written
quality of the constitution only at the expense of abandoning the framework
character of the document and you can maintain the framework character of the
constitution only by abandoning the idea that all important constitutional change
must occur through formal amendment .” 50 Griffin’s point about amendment may
be open to question, but he is certainly right to highlight the tension between the
“text” of the Constitution and the “framework” character, which does seem to call
forth a kind of constitutional politics, open to the possibility of constitutional
conflict and change by way of the framework.
48
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The point I wish to address is twofold: Madison insists upon a political
Constitution policed by the separation of powers. Not only would the Constitution
be maintained, once the system of checks and balances was set in motion, but the
exposition and interpretation of the Constitution would be done by these very
same branches of government—and primarily by the legislature and executive.
This framework character of the Constitution invites the political branches to
speak to, create, and settle constitutional issues, raising important questions of
how they do so. At the same time, the very logic of checks and balances also
gives rise to the notion ofjudicial review. Interestingly, Madison does not refer to
judicial review in Federalist 51, his most prominent discussion of checks and
balances. But the nature ofjudicial review itself seems to be part of the
institutional logic he spells out in Federalist 51. It is, seemingly, the judiciary's
check on the legislature and the executive. But, paradoxically, this check appears
to elevate the judiciary above the legislature and executive if the judiciary is given
“the unique power to enforce the Constitution" as the “Constitution structures
politics and government." 51 Moreover, such a move gives the Constitution a
legalist gloss, even if that seems latent in the document itself. The power of
judicial review “arises circumstantially, literally through the chronology of
action
—
yet absent any conflicting vision, it expresses the latent intent of the
document itself.” Checks and balances seem to give rise to judicial review.
51
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which coupled with the legal Constitution, leads to judicial supremacy. Can an
independent judiciary exercising judicial review be placed within the
constitutional framework rather than above it?
Those who insist on a sort of departmentalism, or coordinate construction,
in constitutional exposition seek to relocate a discussion of constitutional
interpretation in the context of the separation of powers. Even if we make this
move, however, judicial review may still be problematic. It is not simply that
judicial review is a check on the other branches of government, but that it is based
on the notion that the Court is peculiarly suited to the task of interpreting the
Constitution (as it is law). In our day we tend to think of the separation of powers
as an essentially preventative check; that is, it effectively, if inefficiently, puts the
brakes on governmental power. Such a view of the separation of powers comes to
us from Woodrow Wilson and other Progressive critics, and fails to notice the
peculiar effectiveness of the separation ? 3 It is not simply that power is divided
between different branches of government, but that the branches themselves are
structured in a manner that makes them suited to their particular tasks . 34 To follow
this logic is to impart the Court with the constitutional function of passing on the
constitutionality of legislation, as Laurence Tribe suggests. As Tribe would have
it, the separation of powers gives rise to a sort ofjudicial finality in that the Court,
'' Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United Stales (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1910). As Wilson said of Madison’s “Newtonian” system: It is a government
tied up in a “nice poise,” held in “inactive equilibrium.”
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unlike the explicitly political branches, is suited to the task of constitutional
interpretation/ 5 We need not agree with Professor Tribe, but he does put his
finger on a peculiar problem. To put the question in the idiom of modern
constitutional thinking, can judicial review be separated from judicial supremacy?
How this has worked out in practice is an empirical question that is taken up
extensively in the chapters that follow, but conceptualizing the Constitution in
political terms lets us unlink judicial review from the legal Constitution. To draw
again on Murphy's formulation, it allows us to separate the “who of
interpretation from the what ol the Constitution. We can then situate judicial
review within the separation of powers rather than above it.
I o begin to sort this out I want to turn first to two early constitutional
debates in the Congress: (1) the removal debate and (2) the debate over the first
national bank. These two cases are illuminating as they are actual attempts by the
Congress and the executive, led by Madison, to engage the Constitution. They
further illuminate Madison's thinking and demonstrate how his thinking worked
out in actual cases, which, in turn, raises questions about the institutional capacity
of the various branches of government to speak to constitutional questions in both
political and legal ways.
^ Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law , third edition, volume one (New York:
Foundation Press, 2000).
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Madisonian Constructions: Constitutional Politics
The tendency to regard the Constitution as a legal text leads us to focus on
constitutional law often at the expense of the Constitution itself. 56 Constitutional
law is taken to be the equivalent of constitutionalism. So much so, in fact, that we
are preoccupied by the Court and judicial review and. thereby, pay less attention
to how constitutional meaning is shaped by the political branches of government
in ways that do not even come before the judiciary, or how judicial power itself is
historically situated." Such a narrow tocus neglects crucial moments of American
constitutional development, where constitutional questions were settled either by
the political branches or through the interaction of the political branches, the
public, and the Court . 58 Constitutional law is only part of the working
Constitution. The political branches are also critical here and recognizing this we
might try to locate the judicial development of constitutional law within the larger
view of the political Constitution. If we turn to the early debates on the nature and
meaning of the Constitution, they occur primarily between the executive and the
legislature as well as within these branches. Think of the debates over the
president's removal power and the establishment of the national bank .
551
These
debates touch on central issues of constitutional interpretation and development,
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but in no way center on judicial interpretation and exposition. In these central
moments ot constitutional development, the judiciary was essentially silent.
These “Madisonian moments” show us a political Constitution that rejects
an easy distinction between law and politics that is so central to the claims of
judicial supremacy. Whether it is constitutional structure, an institutional clash
between the branches of government over constitutional interpretation, or the
development ot constitutional meaning in non-interpretive ways, the key point is
that these devices are political ways of speaking to and maintaining the
Constitution. Most importantly, if we conceptualize the Constitution in political
terms, we will not see constitutional questions as simply legal questions to be
resolved by the judiciary and thus will not share the fears of proponents ofjudicial
supremacy over politics and indeterminacy in regard to the Constitution. In the
first instance, the Constitution may be upheld (including rights) by ordinary
politics based on its institutional design (as a republican form or government). If
constitutional questions are raised (even about the meaning of rights) the various
branches speak to these, but there is nothing that makes such debated
constitutional questions the sole province of the judiciary. Such questions may be
settled by the political branches without ever turning to the judiciary. They may
also, in the ordinary course of events, be settled by the courts, but that does not
mean they must be settled by courts. Indeed, in many instances such questions
may remain fundamentally unsettled.
Viewing these early cases of nonjudicial exposition should enable us to
glimpse more fully Madison's political Constitution and the way in which
47
constitutional questions are taken up through the interaction of the constitutional
framework—through politics. As Whittington argues, “The jurisprudential model
needs to be supplemented with a more explicitly political one that describes a
distinct effort to understand and rework the meaning of a received constitutional
text ."
60
Whittington is focusing on what he calls “constitutional constructions,”
which develop constitutional meaning in a political rather than a legal fashion.
Here, “political" refers primarily to the fact that it is done in a nonlegal setting,
even while assuming fidelity to constitutional text. At the same time,
constitutional construction is more creative than the narrower and circumscribed
notion ofjudicial interpretation; it is not simply nonjudicial interpretation, but an
attempt to construct constitutional meaning from a broad and occasionally unclear
text. Constructions are attempts to address questions of constitutional governance,
not settle legal issues.
Unlike jurisprudential interpretation, construction provides
for an element of creativity in construing constitutional
meaning. Constructions do not pursue a preexisting if
deeply hidden meaning in the founding document; rather,
they elucidate the text in the interstices of discoverable,
interpretive meaning, where the text is so broad or so
underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful but
exhaustive reduction to legal rules. In such cases, the
interpretive task is to limit the possibilities of textual
meaning, even as some indeterminacies remain . 61
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It is tempting to think of Madison's early attempts at constitutional interpretation
from the Congress as constitutional constructions
.
62
Yet, Whittington at times
seems to adhere to a distinction between law and politics that reinforces the
judiciary's connection with the Constitution as legal text: the judiciary seems to
be the primary enforcer of constitutional boundaries in a negative sense by way of
judicial review. By contrast, the political branches advance larger scale
constitutional visions by way of the creative task of constitutional construction.
So while the political branches advance constitutional development, the judiciary
seems to be the guardian of constitutional limits. Perhaps this is how it works out
historically .
63
But the line Whittington attempts to draw between constitutional
“interpretation" and constitutional “construction" is not always a clear one. This is
so at least partly because the line between “law” and “politics" is not always clear
when we are speaking to constitutional issues. That is not to say that
constitutional politics is not structured by the Constitution; it is, which is the
deeper point, but it is done in ways that do not neatly fit the “law” and “politics”
distinction. We see this vividly in Bruce Ackerman's work on constitutional
change. According to Ackerman, key constitutional developments occur by way
of constitutional politics where the people (as the people
)
alter the existing
Constitution in favor of a new constitution. Ackerman's work moves far beyond
the Court and a formal view of constitutional text (Article V) to see how our
62
In a somewhat similar vain, Louis Fisher has long spoken ot coordinate construction, which,
often captures Madison's own thinking. However, 1 draw on Whittington s notion ot constitutional
construction in that it seems to fundamentally emphasize the political against a merely legal vision
of the Constitution in a way that Fisher does not.
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politics—in extraordinary constitutional moments—shapes and alters our
Constitution. Yet even Ackerman returns quickly to a legal view of the
Constitution with the judiciary enforcing the (new) Constitution. His “theory
relies excessively on judges, for all his examination of the president and the
people, to read the meaning of constitutional revolutions and act accordingly. It is
judges, in the end, who read the tea leaves of constitutional transformation into
the Constitution ."
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Thus constitutional politics is rare and we return to the legal
model of the Constitution. Ackerman himself ultimately seems to call for a legal
settlement of constitutional change by the judiciary. What happens, though, when
a constitutional vision is put forward and accepted, but never ratified by the
Court? This may happen when a president offers a narrow view of constitutional
power, by way of the veto, that is never contested in the Court (as President
Jackson did during the bank war). Or, in a similar vein, what happens when
constitutional argument persists even after the Court has spoken? Constitutional
politics of this sort
—
persistent contests over abortion rights or federalism, for
example—do not easily fit this model. In many cases we have lingering conflicts
without a clear and settled legal view of particular constitutional questions (even
if we have a multitude of theories that tell us how such issues should be settled,
and in fact are settled, by the Constitution if we just read it correctly).
If we recognize the Constitution as a governing framework, the fact that
we might have conflicting constitutional visions or unsettled constitutional issues
is not necessarily disturbing. The Constitution is a broad and occasionally
64 George Thomas, “New Deal Originalism," Polity Volume XXXII, Number 1 (Fall 2000) 157.
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indeterminate text. There are not always “right' answers to constitutional
questions, and such issues—often involving "creedal passions”—are naturally
going to be the subject of much dispute (and revision ). 65 Moreover, the
Constitution itself often leaves judgments to the political branches: it calls forth a
particular kind of politics as much as it calls for a particular settlement. Thus we
should expect that we will have competing constitutional views that change over
time: what is taken to be settled at one moment—or not even important—may
well be altered at another moment in time. As a framework of governance, our
Constitution naturally has its shortcomings—it is imperfect. But this is not going
to be overcome by a particular theory of constitutional interpretation perfectly
implemented by the Court (or even a decidedly wrong theory of interpretation
implemented by the Court to settle the issue). It is when we attempt to treat what
is an institutional framework of governance as law that can be coherently settled
and reduced to legalities that we run into problems. Alexander and Schauer, for
example, insist that to serve its primary mission as law, the Constitution must
settle all such question. But this insistence stems from their positing the
Constitution as law. And like so much of modern constitutional theory, their
preoccupations run the risk of theoretical abstraction. Much of modern
constitutional theory, for example, prescribes a particular role for the Court—as
the great defender of rights, say—but does so without ever bothering to examine
the Court's historical performance in this regard. Constitutional theorizing that is
more informed by political science, paying attention to constitutional design and
65 Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Promise oj Drsharmony (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981).
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how the system has actually worked, will allow us to better get at these important
constitutional questions. As Graber puts it, “rather than ask[ing]
. . . ‘what should
the role of the judiciary be,' the imperfect constitutionalist would want to know'
what roles has the judiciary actually played .”'66 And this applies to the other
branches as well. It is not just that so much of constitutional theory is normative,
but that it is normative in a way that is utterly divorced from our real-world
constitutionalism. Assertions that the judiciary must act as the guardian of the
Constitution, otherwise we will be lost, are voiced, in blithe ignorance of how
rarely the judiciary has ever saved us from ourselves. And so all too often,
constitutional theory treats the judiciary in an idealized world (how it will work in
perfect theory), while examining the political branches from a real-world
perspective. Constitutional theory is far too preoccupied with its perfect theories
oi the Constitution and how our Constitution does not measure up to them, rather
than with looking at the ways in which our system of constitutional governance
actually functions .
67
Let us then turn to examine some Madisonian moments to
illustrate the functioning of this system.
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Mark Graber, “Our (lm)Perfect Constitution” Review of Politics 5 1 : 86, 101 (1989).
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The President ’s Removal Power
In 1789 the First Congress, which of course included many delegates to
the Constitutional Convention, debated whether officials in the executive
branch—who had been appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate
could be removed by the president alone. Madison argued that the Constitution
was not eminently clear on the matter, but that the legislature ought to construe
the Constitution in such a way as to give the president the sole power of removal.
Madison's conclusion was not simply based on interpreting Article II's vesting
clause as requiring this solution. For Madison, the Constitution was not self-
evidently clear on this point and it was the task of the Congress to settle such
disputes, laying the ground rules for future interpretation and setting a clear
precedent so that ordinary politics would not be absorbed by such constitutional
questions. Said Madison, “Among other difficulties, the exposition of the
Constitution is frequently a copious source [of difficult questions] . . . and must
continue so until its meaning on all great points should have been settled by
precedents” —in this case the precedents of the Congress. Madison did not see
the legislation Congress drafted giving the executive the sole power of removal as
67
Christopher Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2001 ). Eisgruber, for example, begins with the notion that our Constitution is a framework of
governance, but then very quickly argues that judges should interpret the Constitution based on
their notions ofjustice (with very little concern about how this has actually worked out
historically). Normative concerns are deeply important and are a fundamental part of
constitutional theory. Still, such normative concerns can take into account our constitutional
history. See, Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990); Sotirios Barber, The Constitution ofJudicial Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
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merely advisory, but rather sought to settle a constitutional dispute—and settle it
by way of legislative construction of the Constitution. William Smith of South
Carolina objected to this construction, insisting that the consent of the Senate was
necessary to remove an appointee as it was necessary to appoint him in the first
place. In drawing out his argument. Smith pointed to Federalist 77, where none
other than Alexander Hamilton, Madison's great collaborator as Publius, argued
that the Senate was necessary “to displace as well as appoint.” Smith then pushed
his argument a step further in insisting that the Congress
—
particularly the
House—had no business in deciding the matter. Given that constitutional meaning
was in doubt. Smith suggested that this was preeminently a judicial question.
Rather than illegitimately attempting to expound on the Constitution, Smith
thought the Congress should wait until the question came before the judiciary to
be settled.
69
Madison insisted that the judiciary was not, nor could it have been meant
to be, the primary expositor of the Constitution. “But the great objection drawn
from the source to which the last arguments would lead us is, that the Legislature
itself has not right to expound the constitution; that whenever its meaning is
doubtful, you must leave it to take its course, until the Judiciary is called upon to
declare its meaning.”
70
For Madison, the Congress had as much right to determine
68
Madison to Thomas Jefferson, June 30 Ih 1789 in William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal,
and Robert Rutland, eds.. The Papers ofJames Madison (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962) XII, 290-291 . See also Rakove, Original Meanings , 349.
69 Gary Jacobsohn notes that the consensus in Congress—unlike Madison’s argument—did not
question “the finality of the judicial determination of constitutionality,” although that is not quite
the same things as endorsing it. The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration ,
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constitutional meaning as the judiciary; indeed, he doubted whether “this question
could even come before the judges ." 71 Madison's argument here is often taken as
the great defense of departmentalism in constitutional interpretation
.
72
This may
be so, but we must be clear on what we mean by departmentalism. In some guises
departmentalism is taken to mean that each department is the primary interpreter
of its constitutional power; that is, it interprets those provisions of the
Constitution that apply to it specifically .
73
In this instance, the Court is not the
final authority on Congress' power, although it may well be on issues addressing
the judiciary. But this is clearly not Madison's argument here. Instead, Madison
insists that the Congress (or any branch) can touch upon constitutional questions.
As the Constitution is the governing framework over all the branches and the
branches themselves are structured in part to maintain the Constitution, they all
may speak to the Constitution; indeed, the idea is that they are bound by the
Constitution and being so bound are obligated to it and not to the other branches.
In fact, Madison’s view seems to suggest that “interpretive plurality" is central to
maintaining the Constitution. If such a task were vested in a single body, the
71
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231-279. Agresto's departmentalism seems to be more
along these lines as well, insofar as he puts emphasis on the dynamic of the checks and balances
and interaction between the branches. The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy , 99-102.
Gary Jacobsohn suggests that Lincoln’s views on judicial review, properly understood, also put it
in this light. The Supreme Court and the Decline oj Constitutional Aspiration, 95-1 12.
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chances of error and misgovernment would be far higher. By vesting this task in
multiple institutions, the Constitution is more likely to be adhered to and we are
more likely to get it right. As Madison argued, “But, I beg to know, upon what
principle it can be contended, that any one department draws from the constitution
greater powers than another, in making out the limits of the powers ofthe several
departments?” And again, “If the constitutional boundary of either be brought into
question, I do not see that any one of these departments has more right than
another to declare their sentiments on that point .”
74 We should even note that in
this case Congress is largely defining executive power.
For Madison the Court had no special relation to the Constitution, which
goes some way to showing us that he did not see the Constitution as “law” to be
enforced mostly by the courts. Madison fully recognized that the Constitution
would contain ambiguity and indeterminacy, but that did not mean the Court
alone should give clarity and final meaning to the Constitution over the other
branches .
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Instead, Madison thought that Congress' construction would be
preferable in this matter. His argument is a reminder that the Constitution is not
only about limitations, but also about constitutional power and creating a
workable government. He thought the legislature would be the best place to come
up with a workable solution to this constitutional question, drawing on its
experience to craft a competent solution to an immediate problem. This also
shows us that Congress may speak to constitutional meaning in ways that do not
accept the dichotomy between “law” and “politics” or between “interpretation"
74
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and "construction,” even while taking fidelity to the Constitution very seriously.
Madison brought this to bear in the "Decision of 1789”: if Congress’ construction
ot the Constitution “is the true construction of this instrument, the clause in the
bill is nothing more than explanatory of the meaning of the Constitution, and
therefore not liable to any particular objection on that account.” Here Madison
seems to be speaking distinctly of congressional interpretation as clarification and
insisting that Congress’ interpretation ought to stand—not because it is Congress'
interpretation, but because it is the correct interpretation. If, on the other hand, the
Constitution “is undecided as to the body which is to exercise it [the power of
removal], it is likely that it is submitted to the discretion of the Legislature, and
the question will depend on its own merits."76 This sounds much more like
Whittington's construction, which Madison is saying depends on the political
judgment of Congress to create a constitutional settlement. Either way, for
Madison Congress' construction of the Constitution should settle the matter and
guide future questions of constitutional meaning on this point. 77 Thus,
constitutional politics from the Madisonian perspective should settle
constitutional meaning, giving us precedents that would guide even the judiciary.
While this is a political solution, it is one that attempts to fit within the
constitutional framework. Madison's solution lays forth a prudent and practical
75
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course of constitutional governance, but one that squares with Article II concerns
and thus is rooted in a larger constitutional vision. But what is so important is not
just reducing the Constitution to a particular meaning—by construction or
interpretation—and passing that along; it is the framework the constitutional text
calls forth. The framework character of the Constitution, holding out the
possibility ot disputes between the branches, moves us to focus on the
persuasiveness (and even political viability) ot answers to constitutional questions
rather than acceptance of the answers imposed by a single branch—especially
given the chance that a single branch could get it wrong or come up with an
unworkable solution.
The Bank ofthe United States
We see a reliance on nonjudicial precedent and settled meaning from
Madison as President when he signed the Second Bank of the United States into
law in 1816. Madison, of course, had argued against the establishment of the First
Bank ot the United States in the First Congress. In this great debate over the
nature of the Constitution and how to properly interpret it, Madison joined with
Thomas Jefferson against his one-time ally Alexander Hamilton. 78 From
11
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Congress, Madison argued that the Constitution did not grant the national
government the power ot incorporation and, therefore, the government could not
incorporate a national bank. Jetterson echoed this argument from the executive
branch as Secretary ot State. Hamilton, also from the executive branch as
Secretary ot the Treasury, insisted that the national government, relying on the
"necessary and proper clause,” had the power . 79 While the debate over
constitutional interpretation is fascinating in and ot itselt, it is not our primary
concern. For our purposes, the compelling point is that a coordinate constitutional
construction between the executive and legislative branches settled constitutional
meaning on this issue (at least tor a time). Madison s and Jefferson's arguments
are interesting in that they show us members of Congress and the executive
articulating constitutional meaning in a way that limits their power. This negative
function—a saying "no” to governmental power by drawing on the Constitution
—
is not just a judicial function. But there is an even more revealing point, which is
altogether neglected by the proponents ofjudicial supremacy. To really
understand the constitutional framework, we must view the branches of
government in relation to one another and examine what each is doing at a
particular moment. As the Court is essentially a reactive institution, its role
depends upon the actions of the executive and legislature, suggesting variation
across time, forcing our thinking about any particular institution to be
contextually sensitive. If the Court, for example, has a broader vision of
constitutional permissiveness than the Congress or the president, then it will
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rarely—if ever—be positioned to strike down acts of Congress as
unconstitutional. Conversely, if we have a truly activist Congress and president
with a broader view of their power than the Court has, then we are likely to see a
much more active Court . 80 Even the terms “activism” and “restraint” must be seen
in relation to the specific actions of the political branches. Thus, the Court may be
a defender of constitutional limits and rights at a particular time, given a particular
Congress and president, but it may not be at a later time. These are empirical
questions, not simply questions of theory and logic.
Against Madison's and Jefferson's objections, the First Congress
established the bank and it was signed into law by President Washington. This
alone, however, was not enough to settle the issue; in fact, the constitutional issue
was only settled over a period of decades .
81
Indeed, this construction, Madison
later said,
had undergone ample discussions in its passage through the
several branches of the Government. It had carried into
execution throughout a period of twenty years with annual
legislative recognition
. . . and with the entire acquiescence
of all the local authorities, as well as of the nation at large;
to all of which may be added, a decreasing prospect of any
change in the public opinion adverse to the constitutionality
of such an institution .
82
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Today we turn to Marshall s decision in McC ulloch v. Maryland as settling this
question; we take a constitutional dispute to be settled only if the Court has
addressed it . 83 In an interesting way, though, the question of whether the national
government could charter a bank was settled and was taken to be settled by the
time it came before Marshall and the Court. As Marshall himself recognized in his
opinion, “It has truly been said that this can scarcely be considered as an open
question, entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation respecting
it. The principle now contested was introduced at a very early period of our
history, has been recognized by many successive legislatures, and has been acted
upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of
undoubted obligation ."84 It would have been wholly shocking if Marshall had
decided the case other than he did, given the constitutional politics that had
83
In discussing McCulloch
,
perhaps the leading constitutional law book, Gerald Gunther and
Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 1997) thirteenth edition,
gives a history of the debate prior to McCulloch and speaks of scholarly debate since McCulloch
,
but does not speak of Jackson’s veto and the effective settlement of the issue for several decades
seemingly against Marshall’s opinion. Gunther and Sullivan acknowledge that ’’the McCulloch
decision, important as it is, was no more the end than the beginning of the debate.” Yet, they are
speaking of the national legislature’s ability to reach local affairs and not the power to establish a
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Law and Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998) fourth edition, gives a similar history and
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opinions—namely. The Legal Tender Cases ( 1 884) and Katzenhach v. Morgan (1996). But this
( 1
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Court missing how the other branches seem to have settled a vital constitutional questions without
turning to the Court. Lee Epstein and Thomas Walker’s Constitutional Law (Washington, D.C.:
CQ Press, 1998) fourth edition, gives a history of the conflict prior to Marshall’s opinion but says
nothing of what came after 1819. This from two leading empirical political scientists! Murphy,
Barber and Fleming, American Constitutional Interpretation , give a history of the conflict and
Jackson’s statement rejecting Marshall’s opinion. But then this book specifically seeks to give an
alternate view of the constitution and questions of constitutional interpretation, rejecting much of
conventional understanding.
84 McCulloch v. Maryland A Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316, 401 (1819).
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already addressed the question (and given his own inclinations ).
85 What is
interesting about Marshall's opinion for us is its claim to judicial supremacy.
Marshall insisted that the constitution ol our country, in its most interesting and
vital parts, is to be considered .”86 And then continued, “But [the question] must be
decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of hostility
of a still more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this tribunal alone
can the decision be made. On the Supreme Court of the United States has the
constitution of our country devolved this important duty .”87 From our vantage
point, we take Marshall at his word. But subsequent history belies Marshall's
argument. The Court's opinion did not cease constitutional argument on the
question. Just over a decade later, the debate was rejoined when President Jackson
rejected Marshall's McCulloch opinion and insisted the bank was not
constitutional. Presidents Van Buren and Polk, “articulated” Jackson's
constitutional “reconstruction,”
88
with President Tyler specifically vetoing-on
multiple occasions-a new bank on similar grounds. The constitutional issue was
settled for a large portion of the nineteenth century against the bank, even if
McCulloch was never overturned (allowing it to be resurrected by twentieth-
century constitutional law while ignoring our actual constitutional history).
“[President] Tyler's vetoes prevented the dismantling of Jacksonian Democracy's
major political achievements. Those same vetoes, however, blocked a case
8
' At least on the question of whether the national government could establish a bank. Whether or
not a state may tax that bank once established was an open question.
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62
challenging the bank's constitutionality from reaching a Supreme Court packed
with Jackson s anti-bank partisans. Thus, Tyler may have inadvertently saved
A/t( ulloch trom the dustbin ol history and denied Jackson's movement what
would have been its greatest victory .”89 The point is that constitutional meaning
may be settled over time, particularly with important constitutional questions, and
in ways that cannot be divorced from politics. Such settlements themselves are
likely to depend upon the political forces of the day, suggesting that a particular
constitutional vision—with its settled meaning—may only be as stable as the
political forces which support it, leaving open the possibility that there is no such
thing as “authoritative settlement” in the long run—whether judicial or
otherwise
.
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Nor does the judiciary seem institutionally capable of resolving such
issues by mere proclamation. To insist, as Alexander and Schauer do, that
constitutional meaning, once settled, should not be revisited is to place a higher
value on absolute clarity than the “true" meaning of the Constitution (if we get it
wrong), as well as to ignore how the constitutional framework establishes a
workable system of government which will almost certainly mean that particular
constitutional settlements will be reopened.
These early debates on constitutional meaning are notable, particularly to
our modern tastes, in that the judiciary plays such an insignificant role in them.
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w As Scott Gant’s defense ofjudicial supremacy recognizes. Gant qualifies his version ofjudicial
supremacy saying that, well, nothing is final. Yes, but if that is so, then why do we really need
authoritative judicial settlement? If constitutional questions can be reopened by the other branches
or by the public, then why close them by the judiciary?
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Here we have the great early debates about constitutional exposition and
governance, absent (mostly) the great expositor of the Constitution—the
judiciary. Yet, Madison's political Constitution does not reject judicial
interpretation ol the Constitution, it only rejects the notion that the Court is the
final interpreter of the Constitution in an authoritative way
.
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Still, Madison did
worry that judicial interpretation might inexorably lead to judicial supremacy. In
an oft quoted letter to John Brown, he made evident this concern!
In the State Constitutions and indeed in the Fed[eral] one
also, no provision is made tor the case of a disagreement in
expounding them; and as the Courts are generally the last in
making ye decision, it results to them by refusing or not
refusing to execute a law, to stamp it with its final
character. This makes the Judiciary Dep[ar]t[ment]
paramount in fact to the Legislature, which was never
intended and can never be proper . 92
For Madison constitutional meaning would be settled across time by the
political interplay between the branches, an activity that would also maintain the
limits of the Constitution. Moreover, tor Madison “this essentially creative task
41
While judicial review might seem to How ineluctably from the very notion of checks and
balances, Madison does not discuss it in those terms. In his classic exegesis of checks and
balances in Federalist 51 which 1 discussed above, Madison never even mentions the judiciary. In
fact, in that very discussion Madison rejects a means similar to judicial review. One notable
solution to keeping the majority in check. Madison says, is to create “a will in the community
independent of the majority—that is, of the society itself.” The Court, as an unelected and
undemocratic branch of government, that great “countermajoritarian” institution, seems
suspiciously independent of society, a solution unacceptable to Madison. It can scarcely be
doubted that Madison was genuinely perplexed by the notion ofjudicial review. Other than
Hamilton’s Federalist 78
,
perhaps the most prominent reference is in Federalist 16, also by
Alexander Hamilton, “If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they
would pronounce the resolution of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the land,
unconstitutional, and void.” The Federalist Papers
,
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does not expose a failing in the constitutional design; it represents a working
constitutional system. Madison s system brought forth mutual interaction
between the different bodies to construct and settle constitutional meaning, while
no one branch was peculiarly suited to the task or supreme in terms of a final say
on the Constitution. Intimately connected with this point is Madison's view that
the system would work in a political rather than narrowly legalistic manner. It is
not simply that the legislature and the executive might rely on prudence as well as
principle in construing the Constitution, but that the very dynamic between them
lends the system a political nature, which makes any easy distinction between
constitutional law and constitutional politics rather tenuous. In the absence of
judicial review, though, it is difficult to see how the Court would play much of a
role here .
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We may best keep judicial review and judicial supremacy distinct from
one another by placing judicial review within the constitutional framework I
sketched above. This key distinction between judicial review and judicial
supremacy gets conceptually blurred, however. The crucial step occurs in thinking
of the Constitution as law akin to ordinary law; it is this transformation that yields
us judicial supremacy. Here I will take up the crucial link between judicial
supremacy and the legal Constitution.
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Judicial Supremacy and the Legal Constitution
In their defense ofjudicial supremacy, Alexander and Schauer argue that
"if a multiplicity of bodies says what the law is, then there is likely to be a
multiplicity of laws, or, more precisely, a multiplicity of interpretations of the
same law. And if . . . knowing what the law is and knowing how to comply are
necessary conditions to legality itself, then multifarious law and multifarious
interpretation are at odds with the rule of law itself."95 Hence, the Constitution's
meaning must be settled by a single body. In making this argument Alexander and
Schauer turn, not surprisingly, to Marbury. The Court itself, in making similar
assertions, has also turned to Marshall's opinion. As Justice Kennedy most
recently put it:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is
preserved best when each part of the government respects
both the Constitution and the proper actions and
determinations of the other branches. When the Court has
interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province
of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what
the law is .
96
The Legal Constitution
Marshall’s opinion is cited by those invoking judicial supremacy because he
was the first and greatest articulator of their central premise: the Constitution is
law. It is this assertion that is key to any notion ofjudicial supremacy. And while
proponents ofjudicial supremacy also turn to the separation of powers—as
Alexander and Schauer, Justice Kennedy, and even Marshall do—the argument
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there, too, depends on the notion that the Constitution is law. Conceptualizing the
Constitution as law' leads to the insistence upon judicial supremacy and
skepticism of nonjudicial interpretation; it is this view of the Constitution that
leads us to a Court-centered focus on constitutional law at the expense our
historical constitutional development.
Edward Corwin insisted, along these lines, that judicial review' rested on
three propositions, and added that it “can rest upon no others.”
1 That the Constitution binds the organs of government;
2 That it is law in the sense of being known to and
enforceable by the courts; 3—That the function of
interpreting the standing law appertains to the courts alone,
so that their interpretation of the Constitution as part and
parcel of such standing law are alone authoritative, while
those ot the other departments are mere expressions of
opinion.
97
Corwin's formulation, as we will see, bears a striking resemblance to
Marshall's own syllogistic reasoning in Marbury. Corwin further noted, though,
what Marshall did not: the third proposition is not readily apparent, or even
accepted. In fact, the third proposition suggests that judicial review and judicial
supremacy must go together, a point Marshall seems to hint at, but does not lay
down explicitly in Marbury (although he says as much in McCulloch). Corwin
himself suggested that the second proposition “needs to be shown,” although it is
no
“registered in the Constitution itself." Although this, too, can be questioned.
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Edward Corwin, “Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review,” 103 and Court
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discussing Federalist 78 in this regard, 8.
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Judge Gibson certainly rejected both the second" and third propositions and thus
rejected judicial review, even if his followers like James Bradley Thayer would
limit review to the “clear mistake' rule and thus plea for judicial restraint. 100
Madison certainly rejected proposition 3, while at times accepting proposition 2.
We might add names to the list of those rejecting propositions 2 and 3 ad
infinitum
,
but the point is that the third proposition only makes sense if one
assumes the Constitution is law in the ordinary and not the political sense of that
word, which proposition 2 also hints at (although it may be qualified). Thus.
Corwin's proposition 2 could cut both ways: read one way, it may fit judicial
review into the Madisonian separation of powers; read another, it blends with
proposition 3 and gives us judicial supremacy. In this, it replicates Marshall's
very opinion in Marbury.
It the "what ot the Constitution" is law, then the "who of interpretation" is
the Court. By beginning from the premise that the Constitution is law, the
proponents ofjudicial supremacy insist that it is the province of the judiciary to
say what the law is—making constitutional interpretation a judicial function and
the Court the primary enforcer of the Constitution; indeed, interpretation itself
becomes a legal enterprise. 101 Proponents ofjudicial supremacy demand that the
Constitution's meaning be clear, conclusively settled, and binding on all. If the
Court is the interpreter of law, it is given an exclusive link to the Constitution,
44
Gibson does accept judicial review of state laws when they conflict with federal law, but only
because the power is clearly derived from Article VI of the Constitution.
1,1,1
See also on Thayer, Barber, The Constitution ofJudicial Power, 78-9 1
.
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leading to an insistence that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution must, of
necessity, bind the other branches of government, settling the law.
1 he insistence on the legal Constitution is the central development in
Marshall s thinking. ‘ From this judicial review ineluctably follows and even, if
pushed, judicial supremacy. Let me draw on Alexander Bickel to restate this
development. A constitution is a law aimed at binding the government itself and,
as such, the constitution is a paramount law to which “ordinary legislative acts
must conform.” 103 True enough. But, as Bickel noted, the real question is who is
“empowered to decide that the act is repugnant [to the Constitution].” 104 In
addressing this question, Marshall mustered his considerable skills of deductive
logic to insist that it was the judiciary. While Marshall does not wholly rule out
1112 Now, we might readily add, even eagerly concede, that Marshall was often driven by the
political context of his opinions and that this is as much the case in Marbury as any where else.
And even if Marshall’s opinion does not establish— in the here and now of 1 803—the power of
judicial review, even if Marshall himself wields the power with great political astuteness, and even
if Marshall did not explicitly insist upon judicial supremacy in Marbury
,
the logic of Marshall's
argument clearly articulates the legal Constitution which makes the argument for judicial
supremacy possible. It may well be that the modern doctrine ofjudicial review (and its merger
with judicial supremacy) was not fully developed until the latter half of the nineteenth century, but
its logic is articulated by Marshall in Marbury. Marshall gives us the legal Constitution and thus
clears a path for the emergence of constitutional law as we know it today. This is perhaps his
greatest significance. His opinions that expounded on the Constitution from the bench give rise to
constitutional law, making him, in the words of his most recent biographer, “the definer of a
nation.” See especially Mark Graber's articles on the Marshall Court. “The Passive Aggressive
Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic Establishment of Judicial Power" Constitutional
Commentary 12: 67-92 (1995); “Establishing Judicial Review: Schooner Peggy and the Early
Marshall Court,” Political Research Quarterly 5 1 : 7-25 (1998); “Federalists or Friends of Adams:
The Marshall Court and Party Politics, ” Studies in American Political Development (1999); “The
Problematic Establishment of Judicial Review” in Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton, eds.. The
Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas: 1999).
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that the other branches can reach such questions, or that they must adhere to the
Court's reading, his logic tends in that direction
.
105
Marshall's formulation begins with the writtenness of the Constitution:
“Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the
theory of every such government must be. that an act of the legislature, repugnant
to the constitution, is void .” 106 So far so good. Marshall then begins his move that
makes the Constitution come before the Court, so to speak, and, in doing so, gives
the Court the power to say what the Constitution means. “If an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its
invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?” 107 To which
Marshall no surprise says this cannot be. From here he proposes to give the
question “attentive consideration .” 108 It is precisely at this point that Marshall
compares the Constitution to ordinary law. “It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases, must of necessity expand and interpret that rule. If two laws
105
Clinton, Marbury v. Madison; Christopher Wolfe, The Rise ofModern Judicial Review (New
York: Basic Books, 1986) 80-84; and Hobson, The Great Chief Justice, all insist that Marshall’s
opinion is much narrower than it has been made out to be by twentieth century proponents of
judicial activism. For them Marshall was simply claiming the right to interpret the judicial power
and not to authoritatively settle the meaning of the Constitution for the other branches. A number
of other scholars reject this specific reading of Marbury, yet insist that Marshall did not claim that
the Court was necessarily the sole and authoritative settler of constitutional meaning. See Hadley
Arkes, Beyond the Constitution
; Harris, The Inlerpretable Constitution ; Barber, The Constitution
ofJudicial Power.
106 Murbury at 177.
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conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.” 104 That
is, the court must determine which conflicting rule governs the case: the law or
the Constitution. This, Marshall tells us, is “the very essence ofjudicial duty.” 110
And rather obviously, it we follow Marshall's formulation, the Court must prefer
the Constitution—supreme law—to an ordinary act of the legislature. If it were
otherwise, the Constitution itself would be an absurd attempt to limit a power that
is illimitable; “it would give the legislature a practical and real omnipotence.” 1 1
1
Marshall's argument moves so swiftly to its conclusion and seems so
intuitively correct that we are likely to agree with him unless we stop to question
his beginning point. That is, that the Constitution is akin to ordinary law. By
doing this, Marshall claims that the Court is the (authoritative) interpreter of the
(legal) Constitution." 2 As Marshall himself frames it: (1) It is the Court's duty to
say what the law is; (2) The Constitution is law; (3) Therefore, it is the Court's
duty to say what the Constitution means. For Marshall's argument to work, the
Constitution must be viewed in legal and not political terms. This has led Sylvia
104 Marbury at 178.
110
Ibid.
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Snowiss to venture that “Marshall transformed explicit fundamental law. different
in kind trom ordinary law. into supreme ordinary law. different only in degree ." 113
I hinking ot the Constitution as law. then, leads us to draw a neat distinction
between “law” and “politics," which, perhaps not tenably, makes us skeptical of
politics and the so-called political branches—in regard to the Constitution. If the
language ot the Constitution is the language ot law, then the Constitution
becomes the special province of those tutored in the law and constitutional
grammar becomes a technical legal grammar. “The establishment ofjudicial
review added the law-politics distinction to the conceptual foundation of
American constitutionalism. This distinction was the justification for the court's
authority to define the limits to government .” 114 It is in this way that Marshall's
legalist formulation lends serious support to judicial supremacy and even draws
on the very Madisonian separation of powers to do so.
1 12
It was just this premise that Judge Gibson refused to grant Marshall in Eakin v. Raub
,
saying in
effect that the Constitution does not come before the Court. 1 have said that Gibson disputed the
second premise of Marshall’s syllogism. To flesh this out let us view Marshall's syllogism: Major
premise: “It is the very essence ofjudicial duty” to decide between conflicting laws. Minor
premise: A conflict between a law and the Constitution is simply a particular variety of a conflict
between laws. Marshall’s conclusion: It is the essence ofjudicial duty to decide on a conflict
between the law and the Constitution. This, of course, inevitably required the judiciary to
expound upon the Constitution. Marshall's argument is such that it rests upon the premise of a
written constitution and nothing in particular within that constitution; it is a purely logical
argument and it was on a point of logic that Gibson disputed Marshall’s reasoning. Gibson insisted
that the Constitution, properly speaking, is not like ordinary law and, thus, brought Marshall’s neat
syllogism crashing down. But all of this has been ably argued elsewhere. See Dean Alfange Jr.,
“Marbury v. Madison : In Defense of Traditional Wisdom” Supreme Court Review 1993 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994) 413-444 and Robert Faulkner, The Jurisprudence ofJohn
Marshall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968)203-212.
112
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Law, Politics, and the Separation ofPowers
The distinction between law and politics is at the heart of Marbury and
claims to judicial supremacy. And as it is the judiciary that gets to draw this
distinction between law and politics, it may thereby “rule the political branches by
defining the outlines of their duties,” making it, in essence, first in “dignity and
authority so tar as the Constitution is concerned. While Marshall plays up the
Constitution's legal nature—and, from there, judicial authority on legal
questions—he does leave a space for political questions that are beyond the reach
of the judiciary. In doing this, Marshall gives breathing space to Madison's more
overtly political Constitution. In the famous “political questions” passage,
Marshall insists, “the province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties
in which they have discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by
the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court."
1 16
This applies to the legislature as well:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the Constitution ... it would become the
painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an act was not the
law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really
calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government,
to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would
be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department,
and to tread on legislative grounds. This court disclaims all
pretensions to such a power.
117
115
Faulkner, The Jurisprudence ofJohn Marshall , 200. Also, Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property
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1 16 Marbury at 170.
1 17 McCulloch at 423.
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Questions ot constitutional power are questions of law and are properly before the
Court; questions ot how that power should be exercised (questions of politics) are
left to the political branches. Insofar as the Constitution has a political and non-
legal realm, Marshall seems to see the free interplay of the branches (executive
and legislative, at least) as determinative of constitutional propriety.
At first glance judicial review intuitively coincides with this system of
checks and balances: it is the judiciary s check on the legislative and executive
branches. This may well go with the constitutional framework. But it does not go
as easily with Marshall's legal Constitution (even as it makes a nod to political
exceptions). The very notion of checks and balances seems to give rise to the
notion ofjudicial review. But the more famous arguments for judicial review, the
ones that we have digested over the years from Hamilton and Marshall, do not see
judicial review as one check in the midst of many. They see it as the check that
maintains the Constitution because they see the Constitution as law.
Following the general analysis of The Federalist Papers
,
we might note
that those dealing with the judiciary (numbers 78 to 83) “do not quite fit into the
whole.” Rather, the treatment of the judiciary “stands somewhat apart from the
rest of the book, just as the judiciary stands somewhat apart from politics.” 1 18 The
Federalist Papers
,
as we have seen, rarely refers to the Constitution's legal status
and insists upon its institutional arrangements as maintaining its primacy. And yet
Hamilton's discussion of the judiciary in the last few Federalist Papers ,
published, incidentally, in the second bound volume and not in the newspapers,
118
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treats the Constitution as primarily a parchment barrier, as so much law, with the
judiciary enforcing the parchment. Let us see Hamilton's famous formulation:
The interpretation ot the laws is the proper and peculiar province
of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the
judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to
ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act
proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be
an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the
superior obligation and validity ought, ot course, to be preferred;
or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the
statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their
agents .
1 19
The Constitution controls, but, to borrow Charles Evans Hughes' phrase, the
Constitution is what the Court says it is; or at least the Court gets to say what the
law is, and, if the Constitution is law, as Hamilton says, then the Court gets to say
what the Constitution means. It is the Court’s “proper and peculiar province" to
do just this. Hamilton is quick to hedge this, suggesting that the judiciary has
“neither FORCE or WILL but merely judgment." Still, the judiciary is, in
Hamilton's formulation, “the faithful guardian of the Constitution.” 120 Whereas
in the earlier Federalist Papers the political dynamic of the Constitution was
emphasized, when the judiciary is discussed the Constitution is seen in legal
terms. Even if the Court may be checked by the other branches—and notably
Hamilton does not set it up in these terms—the Court seems to be the final
interpreter of constitutional meaning. In this regard, the Court's check against
legislative and executive invasions becomes an instrument that enables it to take
up primary responsibility for constitutional interpretation. Thus, questions of
1 19
The Federalist Papers, No. 78, 435.
rj>
The Federalist Papers, No. 78, 433, 438.
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constitutional meaning, in most cases, become legal questions, resolvable only by
the judiciary, constitutional meaning becomes coterminous with constitutional
law . 1 1 In Hamilton's and Marshall's readings, the Court becomes the primary
enforcer of written constitutional limits; the Court makes the Constitution binding
on the government.
At the same time, both Hamilton s and Marshall s legalist arguments draw
on another aspect of the separation of powers that gives weight to the peculiar
relationship between the judiciary and the Constitution—at least if we insist upon
its legality, as they do. While the separation of powers brings to mind checks on
governmental power, as we noted earlier, it also was instituted for effective
governance: each branch was institutionally designed to meet the peculiar nature
of its task. " The Federalist Papers
,
for example, speaks of a unitary executive
designed to meet the needs of executive duties and a plural and bicameral
legislature to foster democratic deliberation .
123
Hamilton also draws this point out
in speaking of the institutional design of the judiciary—namely its independence
and learning in the law
—
pointing to its particular task within the operation of the
government. This is not to say that powers are rigidly separated between the
branches, so that all “executive” power must be delegated to the executive. In
121
“The national courts thus not only judge under the laws but magisterially preside over them."
Faulkner, The Jurisprudence ofJohn Marshall , 20 1
.
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See especially, Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues.
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As Flamilton argues in Federalist 70
,
“Those politicians and statesman who have been the most
celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justness of their views have declared in
favor of a single executive and a numerous legislature. They have, with great propriety, considered
energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable
in a single hand; while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to
deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to
secure their privileges and interests,” The Federalist Papers , 392. See also Nos. 57 and 71
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giving us checks and balances,” the Constitution clearly did not embrace such a
rigid rule of separation. But I have already spoken extensively on checks and
balances in this regard. Here I wish to emphasize the power of separation. If
checks and balances make the government safe, separation of powers helps to
make it competent. Like the other branches, the judiciary is constructed in such
a way as to call forth those virtues required to the art ofjudging, as Hamilton
describes them. Judges, unlike all other high offices, serve by appointment and
during good behavior, insuring their independence, so as to enable them better to
perform their peculiar task. For Hamilton this means men of a particular
character and learning; it is a small number of men “who unite the requisite
integrity with the requisite knowledge” 126 to sit on the bench. Based on their
learning in the law and their subtlety of mind, on their reasoning spirit and
independence form political pressure, judges may justly claim to be uniquely
suited to the task of constitutional exposition. If the Constitution is law, by
training and by institutional design the judiciary is uniquely positioned to lay
down the intricacies of constitutional meaning and stick to such interpretations.
Moreover, we might say that it is their task alone, as the other branches,
constituted as they are, are not suitable for such delicate work. Thus, in
“construing the Constitution, the judge performs a political duty through the
124
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exercise of a technical duty ." 1 ' 7 The result of this is to draw the Court closer to
the Constitution than the other branches.
When the separate judicial establishment performs its distinct
function and when it serves as a complicating element in the
system of checks and balances, the judiciary is but one of the three
branches of the government and as such is unexceptionable. But at
still another level—transcending its other functions, and implied in
the technical knowledge needed by this branch of government
alone—the judiciary acts as special guardian of the principles of
the Constitution .
128
Marshall himself relies heavily on the legal nature of the question in Marbury to
justify the judiciary's authority in resolving the dispute. Marshall insists, again
and again, that whether Marbury is entitled to his appointment is a question for
the judiciary alone, as it is a question of law: "The question whether a right has
vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial
authority ."
129
Marshall draws on his distinction between law and politics and insists that
legal questions are, by their nature, questions for the judiciary. He also insists
upon the inverse: political questions, by their nature, have no place before the
Court .
130
But in the final pages of his decision, the section most read, Marshall
downplays this distinction and posits that the Constitution itself is paramount law
17
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"The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of the departments are the
political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or
rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing
can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a
specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the
laws of his country for a remedy.” Ibid, at 166.
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whose meaning must be discovered by the judiciary . 131 These two threads are not
necessarily contradictory, but they emphasize a difference in the scope and power
of the judiciary. In the first instance, judicial power seems narrow and
circumscribed; it addresses narrow legal questions and appears to fit (as neatly as
it can) into the idiom of Madison's checks and balances as political devices. In
the second, the very meaning of the Constitution becomes a legal question and
thus speaks to the judiciary alone; it nearly asserts what Madison said could never
be intended; that is, it makes the judiciary superior to the legislature. The
proponents ofjudicial supremacy have seized on this second thread, whereas
those who plead for judicial restraint tend to look to the first strand. Now it may
well be that Marshall's rhetoric carries him on in this direction, even though he
would still recognize the boundaries of political questions . 132 The other branches
may reach constitutional issues, so long as they are political and not legal,
although the crucial point, surely, is who says what a “legal" question is.
Jefferson's greatest objection to Marshall's Marbury opinion, let us recall, was
that the Court had said that it could order the executive to deliver Marbury's
appointment by way of a writ ofmandamus. Jefferson's outrage stemmed from
131
"If the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act
of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they
both apply.” Ibid, at 178.
132
Marshall’s later decisions on the Court seem to bear this out. And Marshall saw that the
Congress might constitutionally limit the Court's power to hear cases and thereby limit the Court’s
ability to decided constitutional questions. He prudently recognized the power of the political
branches and the limitations of the Court, even if his own logic might push against such a
recognition. As Stephen Griffin argues, “since the Constitution structures politics and government,
giving the judiciary the unique power to enforce the Constitution is tantamount to making the
judiciary the most powerful branch of government. Since this is not tenable politically, the scope
of constitutional law is necessarily narrow.” Griffin, American Constitutionalism , 45.
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the tact that he thought this was a matter ot executive discretion and, therefore, a
political question. Marshall, of course, thought otherwise
.
133
Following this, proponents ofjudicial supremacy like Alexander and
Schauer insist that the Court must settle all constitutional questions—even those
that aren t clear. In tact, the authoritative settlement ot unclear constitutional
issues becomes one of the Court’s most important functions, “insofar as the
Constitution is susceptible to divergent view about what it means ... an important
tunction ot the Constitution remains unserved .” 134 Such settlement is the Court's
task, venturing that the scope of constitutional law should be ever larger; indeed,
one could say that constitutional questions are judicial questions. These
advocates deny that the other branches have much of a role to play in determining
constitutional meaning. Alexander and Schauer argue, for example, that the
president should be consistent with prior Court opinions on constitutional issues
when he signs or vetoes a law; to act otherwise is to undermine the
Constitution .
135
Laurence Tribe even goes so far as to insist that the executive
should not veto a law because he thinks it unconstitutional. In an extraordinary fit
of hyperbole. Tribe has suggested that such an act is “an abuse of the fundamental
structure of our system of government” in that it “unilaterally . . . deprives the
court of their unique Constitutional function: to pass on legislation that is not
m
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obviously unconstitutional .” 136 An historical understanding of the executive veto
shows that it is utterly appropriate, indeed it is the very basis of the veto as
originally conceived, that the president veto legislation that he thinks goes beyond
the legislature's constitutional limits
.
137
Yet, as Tribe would have it, only the
judiciary may speak to constitutional issues. Alexander and Schauer echo this,
“[the] executive and legislative officials should do what they are assigned to do,
and what \hey are assigned to do does not include constitutional interpretation .” 138
The legislature must only make laws and not question the Court's interpretation of
those laws' constitutionality. The legislature may not even venture nonbinding
opinions as to the Court’s constitutional interpretation. To do so. Tribe says,
undermines our constitutional system: “At stake ... is not simply an attack . .
.
on the binding effect of the Constitution, as construed by the Court, upon those
whom the people elect to public office—those whose oaths to uphold the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land can be enforced in no other way than
through Supreme Court review.”
139
This insistence is not backed up by empirical
evidence, but rests solely on the notion of the legal Constitution. Tribe even
suggests that the oath to uphold the Constitution sworn by both the executive and
legislative branches amounts to an oath to follow the Court's interpretation of the
136
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Constitution and not to look to the document in their own right. If we take the
proponents ofjudicial supremacy seriously in this, legislators should never look to
the Constitution or even be concerned with whether the laws they are passing are
constitutional—they are simply not equipped to answer such questions . 140 While
playing up the separation of powers in this regard. Tribe subverts the Madisonian
vision ot it. The separation of powers becomes the vehicle whereby Tribe
articulates the Court's—and only the Court's—relation to the Constitution. There
are, it would seem, no checks on judicial interpretation other than formal
constitutional amendment. Worse, if only the Court prevents constitutional
violations, we are at its mercy. It it gets them wrong, we have nowhere to turn,
even if the president, the Congress, and the people recognize the fault. This is the
legal Constitution with a vengeance. The Constitution is what the Court says it is.
Such a conception ofjudicial interpretation, Corwin has noted, “invokes a
miracle. It supposes a kind of transubstantiation whereby the Court's opinion of
the Constitution . . . becomes [the] very body and blood of the Constitution .” 141
The focus on the Court and the Constitution as law leads these legal
scholars to neglect questions of constitutional maintenance, history, and
development. Consider Tribe's (and seemingly Alexander and Schauer's)
rejection of the presidential veto on constitutional grounds, suggesting the veto
140 A position, Alexander and Schauer remind us, that FDR pushed when trying to overcome
Congress’ doubts about the constitutionality of some New Deal legislation, but not one he
accepted when the Court rejected that same legislation on constitutional grounds. And if we follow
their logic, the New Deal Constitutional revolution should never have occurred, as the Court, in
the name of stability and settlement, should have adhered to its past decisions even if they were
wrongly decided..
141 Corwin, Court Over Constitution
,
68.
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may only be used for political reasons
.
142
The great irony, of course, is that the
use ot the presidential veto on other than constitutional grounds was itself a major
constitutional development. And the further irony is that the development came as
President Jackson objected to the rechartering of the national bank on both
constitutional and policy grounds, doing the very thing that the proponents of
judicial supremacy say cannot be done. While such defenses ofjudicial
supremacy are extreme, they are not altogether divorced from Marshall's and
Hamilton's legal formulations of the Constitution and its peculiar relationship to
the judiciary
.
143
Alexander and Schauer put all of this quite simply: “We call it
law .” 144
Conclusion: Dueling Constitutions
Madison's constitutionalism suggests that constitutional politics operate
in a far broader realm than that within which the courts operate. Is judicial
finality, even as a matter of prudence, necessary to provide authoritative
settlement, as is so often asserted? This is an empirical question, not a matter of
logic. The opposite might in fact be true. What if the development of
constitutional law as coterminous with constitutionalism has meant the frequent
recurrence to constitutional issues where the Court does not truly provide for
authoritative settlement, but rather invites continual dispute on constitutional
meaning and whether the Court got it right? Could a more political settlement last
142
For Alexander and Schauer the president may veto legislation on constitutional grounds if he is
following past judicial opinions and not exercising independent judgment; in fact, there is
probably an obligation for the president to strike down laws the Court has determined to be
constitutionally suspect.
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longer, in that it must reach consensual settlement between the branches? Is a sort
ot constitutional politics between the branches of government a part of our
constitutional system, even one that connects the Constitution to the public? 145
Constitutional politics may be less tumultuous and more frequent than Ackerman
suggests.
146
It may be that the process of maintaining constitutional boundaries
and articulating constitutional meaning is a much richer process than judicial
supremacy would lead us to believe. These questions will be taken up in the
chapters to follow, not just to investigate the claims ofjudicial supremacy and the
prevailing myth, but to better understand our Constitution.
An historical and empirical analysis will let us see if the Court has, in fact,
acted as the authoritative settler of constitutional meaning. Such an analysis will
also let us get at the presuppositions ofjudicial supremacy: (1) That judicial
review implies judicial supremacy. But must a strong and independent judiciary
exercising judicial review necessarily lead to judicial supremacy? If it does not,
then we may distinguish empirically—and not just conceptually—between
judicial review and judiciary supremacy. (2) The judiciary is the only institution
that cares about constitutional limitations, whereas the president, the Congress,
and the people are eager to overstep such limits and will eagerly do so in the
absence ofjudicial supremacy. If neither of these claims is borne out empirically
(and they are usually posited as fact rather than demonstrated) then the case for
145
The research I'm proposing only focuses on the national government and national law. It may
be that judicial supremacy does not work at the national level, but may well work against state law
and thereby bind the states in an authoritative manner. So I do not take up the issue of states
interpreting the Constitution and not being bound by other interpretations.
146 We the People: Transformations.
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judicial supremacy rests primarily upon an insistence that judicial settlement is
central to the Constitution as law. And if we reject that the Constitution must be
understood in such terms, then the argument for judicial supremacy exists on a
logical plane completely divorced from the actual functioning of our
constitutional government.
As a polity we may give primacy of place to the Court in determining
constitutional meaning. But even if this is true—and it is an empirical question
that is underinvestigated the Court's role is subject to change over time and thus
is historically contingent. Patterns ot constitutional development will very likely
depend upon what all of the branches of government are doing. While we may
accept a sort ot judicial supremacy at one moment—suggesting an often
overlooked political basis to judicial power even at these moments—we may
revise this concept at later moments depending upon the very actions of the
judiciary. This draws our eye toward important constitutional issues and
developments that are not, properly speaking, legal but political.
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CHAPTER 2
CONGRESS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE MEANING OF THECIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS
j_he Fourteenth Amendment: The Centrality of Constitutional Politic
The Fourteenth Amendment offers a unique prism through which we
may view constitutional politics. Unlike most provisions of the Constitution,
this amendment, by way of section 5, explicitly invites congressional
enforcement (and hence interpretation): "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” 1 For those
who hold that the Court alone must interpret the Constitution, section 5 is a
sort of embarrassment. 2 Constitutional language that is aimed at Congress
amounts to an admonition, as Justice Kennedy recently suggested, to enforce
the Court's reading of the Constitution and not the Constitution itself (as
construed by Congress). 3 It is terrain ripe for contests over constitutional
meaning, as it seems to pit judicial supremacy and departmentalism, the
legal and the political constitutions, squarely against one another. 4 (The
Fifteenth Amendment's section 2 poses the same dilemma.)
1
The Constitution of the United States of America.
_
Christopher Eisgruber, “Judicial Supremacy and Constitutional Distortion" Sotirios Barber
and Robert George, eds. Constitutional Politics: Essays on Constitution Making,
Maintenance, und Change ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 72.
3
City oJ Boerne v. Flores 52 1 U.S. 507 (1997).
4
John Finn, “The Civic Constitution: Some Preliminaries,” Sotirios Barber and Robert
George, eds, C onstitutional Politics Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and
Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 54-60 (discussing the distinction
between what he calls the “juridical” Constitution and the “civic” Constitution). See also
William Harris, The Interpretah/e Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1993).
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Not surprisingly, just such a conflict occurred shortly after the
Amendment's ratification when Congress passed a series of acts to enforce the
new amendments to the Constitution. In doing so. Congress necessarily relied
on its own constitutional vision. The acts themselves were attempts to ensure
that the meaning of the amendments would not be subverted in the South,
given the emerging violence and resistance to the dramatic changes in
American federalism these amendments wrought
.
5
The constitutionality of
these acts, and by implication Congress' constitutional interpretation of the
Civil War amendments, came before the Supreme Court under the newly
appointed Chief Justice Waite. But the Court’s initial opinions, given by
Waite himself, hardly settled the matter . 6 To understand how constitutional
meaning was arrived at, we must examine the political branches and not just
the Court; the interaction between these branches is the key to constitutional
settlement
.
7
Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 308-317; Harold
Hyman and William Wiecek, Equal Protection Under Law (New York- Harper and Row
1982).
" Whether the Court got the meaning of the 14 th and 15 th Amendments right, and how its
interpretation of them has changed according to the times, is still heavily debated. A number
of scholars insist that the Supreme Court got the I4 lh and 15 th Amendments wrong; while
others insist that it trimmed the expansive powers of Congress in a correct interpretation of
these amendments. For a discussion of the political nature of the debate over Reconstruction
itself, and its evolution on the Court, see Pamela Brandwein, Reconstructing Reconstruction
The Supreme Court and the Production ofHistorical Truth (Durham- Duke University Press
1999).
Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall (Durham: Duke University Press); Akhil Amar, The Bill
ofRights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals ; William
Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). Charles
Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, IR64-IRRR (New York: Macmillian, 1987) argues
most vehemently that the Court got it right.
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The story begins with the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873). 8 Although at
stake in these cases was a state law that granted a monopoly to the Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, it is a necessary
beginning point because it is the first case in which the Court interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment. As such, I suggest it represents the beginning of
Congressional-Court debate over the meaning of the amendment and not the
judicial solidification ot the amendment, as Bruce Ackerman argues. 9 The
Slaughterhouse C uses may indeed give Supreme Court approval to the
fourteenth Amendment s constitutional legitimacy, given its peculiar
ratification, but this is only part of the story. Scholars have frequently focused
on the constitutional politics of the Civil War and Reconstruction era,
beginning with Dred Scott and moving to the ratification of the Fourteenth
and fifteenth Amendments. This is not surprising as this period witnesses
profound constitutional and political change that can hardly be appreciated by
focusing on the Supreme Court; it calls for an examination of constitutional
politics.
10
Ackerman points us in the right direction by suggesting the
importance of constitutional politics for framing and establishing the
amendment. Yet, Ackerman sees the politics as ending with Slaughterhouse.
As we saw in Chapter 1, constitutional politics is an extraordinary form of
politics for Ackerman, after which we return to ordinary politics and the legal
8
Slaughterhouse Cases
,
16 Wall. 36 ( 1873).
'
Ackerman, IVe the People . Transformations. 211.
Iu
Ackerman, We the People. See William Lasser, The Limits ofJudicial Power (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1987) and Donald Grier Stephenson, Campaigns and the
CountNew York: Columbia University Press, 1999)81-106.
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model ol the Constitution, where the Court once again takes the primary
responsibility tor interpreting and enforcing constitutional meaning. I venture
that this misses a crucial constitutional development about the nature and
meaning of the amendment: constitutional politics, albeit on a smaller scale,
continued after the Slaughterhouse Cases
, as the Congress (often with the
support of the executive branch) attempted to articulate a broad reading of the
C ivil War Amendments that was met with skepticism from the Court. We did
not return to ordinary politics or simple Court enforcement of the Constitution
in 1873. Ackerman's account is odd on another level as well. He sees the
constitutional politics of Reconstruction as a constitutional transformation—
which embraces “substantive due process'—that is then enforced by the Court
(until we get the next "constitutional transformation" in the constitutional
politics ol the New Deal era). But Justice Miller's majority opinion in the
Slaughterhouse C ases (a 5-4 decision), which Ackerman sees as solidifying
this constitutional transformation, hardly supports the constitutional vision the
Court later articulates.
In Slaughterhouse
, Miller upheld a monopoly granted to the Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co. (which the Louisiana
legislature bestowed after being bribed by the company) noting that it did not
violate the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities
clause, due process clause, or equal protection clause. Miller's opinion, in fact,
eviscerated the "privileges and immunities clause," which read that "All
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
89
thereof, are citizens ot the United States and the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States^]" 1
1
Reading this clause. Miller
divided citizenship into two categories—state and national—and argued that
the Fourteenth Amendment only protected those privileges and immunities
which were bestowed by being a citizen of the United States (and not a state
citizen). He then insisted that most privileges and immunities of citizenship
(such as the right to choose your trade) were derived not from our national
citizenship, but Irom state citizenship.
1
' Miller then quickly dismissed the
claim that making butchers pay a fee to the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing
and Slaughter-House Co. (given its monopoly) deprived them of property
without due process. He then held that the equal protection clause was aimed
primarily at the “newly emancipated negroes” and not butchers
.
13
Thus, the
Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the butchers.
Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne all wrote dissenting opinions (and
Field's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Chase, Bradley and Swayne). Field
and Bradley both argued that the Court had badly misread the nature of
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, which, they argued, bestowed
all citizens with the fundamental rights and privileges of citizenship by
making them United States citizens (thus state citizenship was only incidental
to U.S. citizenship). These fundamental rights, then, were not contingent upon
11
The United States Constitution. Amendment XIV, Section I.
Slaughterhouse at 74.
13
Ibid, at 81.
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state citizenship (as Miller held). Moreover, both Field and Bradley found the
monopoly granted unconstitutional-drawing on the privileges and
immunities clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause, as
various parts ot a whole—as it did not serve a legitimate public purpose: the
granting ot a monopoly in no way served as a genuine "health” regulation, but
merely transferred public power to a private company
.
14
In this way. the
constitutional vision Ackerman speaks of, which comes to represent late
nineteenth century police powers jurisprudence, is far better represented by
the various dissents—especially Field's (a point Ackerman himself
concedes) than Miller's majority opinion. As Ackerman argues, "the
Lochner Court was doing what most judges do most of the time: interpreting
the Constitution, as handed down to them by the Republicans of
Reconstruction. What is odd here is that Ackerman is arguing that an
opinion of the Court solidifies a constitutional transformation based on the
Republican Congress constitutional vision, but does so in an opinion that
seems to subvert the very meaning of that vision. I suggest that Ackerman
misses this because he ends the story too soon, and thereby neglects the
significant constitutional change that comes after the Slaughterhouse
Ibid, at 87-88 and at 1 19-20. Swayne went so far as to call the Civil War amendments a
new Magna Charta, which fundamentally altered the relationship between the states and the
national government.
15
Ackerman, We the People, 280.
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decs,on. 16 The Slaughterhouse Cases may, as Ackerman argues, represent an
acceptance ot the Fourteenth Amendment's legitimacy by all nine justices of
the Supreme Court, even while acknowledging that the Court itself was
sharply divided over the Amendment's meaning. This debate over meaning is
a central constitutional development, and it was not settled in the
extraordinary politics of 1 860-1868. but in the far more ordinary politics of
1870-1883. What's more, this debate occurs between the Court and the
political branches, not simply among the justices, or with the newly appointed
justices articulating the Reconstruction Congress’ constitutional vision. We do
not quickly return, after the Slaughterhouse Cases
, to a legal articulation of
constitutional meaning. Indeed, the very meaning of the amendment, despite
the Court s opinion, is debated within Congress, between the Congress and
the Court, and within the Court itself as it modifies and clarifies its
interpretation in subsequent opinions.
Subverting Congress’ Constitution bv Indirection: Reese and Cruikshank
As violence erupted in the South (and in much ot the North) against
Reconstruction governments and the move to black equality, the Republicans
controlling Congress realized that the Civil War Amendments would not be
self-enforcing. In response to this, and with the strong approval of the Grant
Administration, Congress passed a series of enforcement acts from 1870-
’ Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise ofLoehner Era Police
Powers Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) and "The Collapse of
Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the ‘Living Constitution' in the
Course of American State-Building” Studies in American Political Development II: 149-189
(1997) offers a far more persuasive telling of the constitutional vision of the Court during this
era.
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1872. The Acts were an attempt to give sustenance to the newly ratified
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the terms of which were being evaded
by black codes, intimidation, and outright rejection. 17 Congress established the
machinery to implement the acts and bring rigorous enforcement of the
amendments through both the newly created Department of Justice and the
tederal courts. In attempting to enforce section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment
and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress necessarily put
forward, even it indirectly, a view ot the amendments' meanings (the specifics
ot which we will take up below). The various enforcement acts revealed
congressional determination to secure these freshly won rights. Some of this
stemmed from a determination to capitalize on black suffrage in the South,
adding numbers and an important constituency to the Republican coalition.
Republicans were just as motivated by a principled constitutional vision: they
were determined to see that the Union did not return to the pre-Civil War
Constitution as articulated by the infamous Dred Scott decision. A scant few
years alter these amendments ratification, they were already being ignored or
interpreted so as to limit their power. In reaction to this, congressional debates
over enforcement represent a principled constitutional debate about the
meaning ol Section 1 of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
whereby the majority in Congress took the text of the Constitution seriously
and, in doing so, offered a principled constitutional vision that included a
robust view of constitutional rights. Congress’ attempt to protect
1 Hyman and Wiecek, Equal Protection Under the Law, Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals, 327;
Alfred Kelly, Winfred Harbison, and Herman Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins
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constitutional rights in this period is inescapable, and it is the Court that seems
determined to thwart Congress' protection of constitutional rights. 18
The C ourt as Principled Protector ofConstitutional Rights?
In United States v. Reese and United States v. Cruikshank
,
19
the Court
continued its subversion of the Reconstruction Congress’ constitutional vision
begun in the Slaughterhouse Cases. The Court took this a step further in these
cases as each dealt with Congress' enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
and f ilteenth Amendments in addition to the substantive meaning of each
amendment. In doing so, the Court severely limited Congress' enforcement
power. Both Reese and Cruikshank took up the constitutionality of provisions
of the most important Enforcement Act, that of May 1870, which was
generally aimed at protecting the right to vote. The act was entitled "An Act to
enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the Several States
of the Union
. .
.” and set penalties for state officials who denied the right to
vote on racial grounds, or for private persons who conspired to prevent the
exercise ol this right. While these parts of the act were aimed at implementing
and Development
,
Volume 11, Seventh Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991) 346-350.
One might argue, as Michael Less Benedict does, that the Court was merely articulating the
Constitution, which didn’t allow for such sweeping congressional legislation, even if it were
rights enforcing. This is plausible, but irrelevant for the general argument for the judicial
protection of rights. Defenders ofjudicial supremacy like Laurence Tribe and Ronald
Dworkin insist that the Court, unlike the political branches, as it is insulated from popular
will, will protect constitutional rights, in doing so, they do not argue that the Court will
misinterpret the Constitution so as to protect rights that are not there. Rather, they argue that
political branches have no reason to protect rights, while the Court, blessed with
independence, can rely on principle to protect rights. It’s a general proposition that Courts are
more likely to protect rights than legislatures. But it’s not clear that this general proposition is
empirically borne out. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987)
and Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Laurence Tribe,
American Constitutional Law third edition, volume one (New York: foundation Press, 2000).
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the Fifteenth Amendment, the Act also made it a crime to conspire with the
intent of hindering any citizen in the full exercise of any right or privilege
granted by the Constitution or laws of the United States, which was aimed at
protecting the "privileges and immunities of citizenship" in section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment (justified by way of section 5).
In Reese, the Supreme Court took up the constitutionality of sections 3
and 4 of the Act, which made it a crime for any official or any person to act to
deny the right to vote. 1 wo Kentucky municipal elections inspectors were
charged with refusing to receive or count the vote of a black man, William
Garner. Chief Justice Waite s opinion tor the Court is perhaps most
memorable for asserting, “ I he Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right
of suffrage upon anyone.” Rather, it simply “prevents the States, or the United
States,
. . . from giving preference, in this particular, to one citizen of the
United States over another on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”-'
1
Waite then went on to find sections 3 and 4 of the Enforcement
Act unconstitutional, as they were not confined to infringements of voting
rights based upon “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”21
Recognizing the right not to be deprived of the vote based upon race, Waite's
opinion thereby recognized Congress' power under section 2 of the
amendment to enforce this more limited right (rather than the general right to
19
United States v. Reese
,
92 U.S. 214 (1 876) and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U S S42
(1876).
2U
Reese at 217.
21
Robert Goldman suggests Waite didn't explicitly find sections 3 and 4 unconstitutional, but
found them “insufficient." Reconstruction and Black Suffrage: Losing the Vote in Reese and
Cruikshank (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001 ) 100.
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vote). Yet, that seemed to be exactly what Congress was doing in the
enforcement Act of 1870, as sections 1 and 2 of the act, which directly
preceded sections 3 and 4, explicitly addressed the issue of race. As Justice
Hunt pointed out in a compelling dissent, if sections 3 and 4 are read in light
of sections 1 and 2, then they are limited to denying the right to vote based
upon race and therefore are within the clear confines of section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 22 Waite, though, gave an over broad view of a
congressional statute in order to find that statute beyond the scope of
congressional power. 23
Odder still is the fact that Waite's opinion did not specifically find
sections 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Act unconstitutional, instead it found
them insufficient. 24 So they were no longer good law, but what was the
constitutional reason what principle did the Court offer—for rejecting them?
Or, what constitutional guidance did this offer the legislature? As I have
suggested, as a necessary first step for the Court to authoritatively settle
questions of constitutional meaning, it must lay down fully theorized
constitutional opinions that give the political branches clear constitutional
guidance. As a corollary, the Court must follow its precedents to provide for
stable constitutional meaning. Waite's opinion, though, cuts in two directions.
" Reese at 24 1 -242 (Hunt dissenting).
David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1789-1888 (Chicago: the University
of Chicago Press, 1985) 393-394, Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals
,
336, Scaturro, The Supreme
Court 's Retreatfrom Reconstruction (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000) 4 1 , Goldman,
Reconstruction and Black Suffrage , 90- 1 00.
24
Though Waite does invoke language that hints at the unconstitutionality of the whole
statute. Reese at 2 17.
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To borrow Cass Sunstein's language, Waite's opinion is both narrow and
wide, both shallow and deep - Sunstein describes the theoretical grounding of
Court opinions as deep or shallow-, and the range of cases the opinion applies
to as narrow or wide. So a deeply theorized opinion that applies to a range of
cases is both a deep and a wide opinion. Alternatively, a "case-by-case"
approach renders shallow and narrow opinions—that is, an opinion that gives
almost no theoretical grounding to defend its results and does not apply to
legislative activity beyond the current case. 26 In this language, Waite
interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment widely and deeply: it conferred the right
not to be discriminated against based upon race in the exercise of the franchise
and nothing more. His wide and deep reading spelled out very clearly the
meaning and terms ol the fifteenth Amendment and how it would be applied
in the future, even while offering a narrow view of the constitutional right at
stake (that is, it only bestowed a right not to be discriminated against).
Congress could, then, by appropriate legislation, enforce this (narrow) right.
Given his clear constitutional rule, Waite therefore found sections 3 and 4
wanting because they were not clearly hewed to the amendment s meaning
—
they were not based, that is, upon race (which came under the purview of the
Fifteenth Amendment) but general discrimination (which did not). 27
Presumably, Congress could re-pass the legislation, making this issue clear by
narrowing the terms of the statute to racial discrimination, and the Court
Sunstein, One C use ut u Time: Judieiul Minimalism un the Supreme Court (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998) 10-14.
26
Ibid. 17.
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would find it constitutional. If this is so, we have an emerging constitutional
dialogue between Congress and the Court wherein the Court is asking
Congress to clarify the constitutional basis of the statute and giving it clear
constitutional guidance in doing so.“ x But it is not so simple. If we follow
Justice Hunt, we can easily doubt that this is what the Court was asking of
Congress, as Congress had already limited the statute to these very terms. 29 By
way of statutory ( misconstruction, the Court hemmed in Congress'
constitutional power without explicitly denying that power: it told Congress
that it must do what it had already done. 1 hus, under the cover ofjudicial
minimalism, the Court rejected Congress' constitutional vision, but did so in a
way that did not bring it into explicit conflict with Congress. 30 Waite's
opinion let off the two men indicted, but left the constitutional question vague
and at least partly open. This is hardly a principled constitutional opinion
striking down a crass political act of Congress.
I he question ot constitutional clarity and principle is even more
prevalent in Cruikshank. Handed down the same day as Reese, the new Chief
27
Reese at 2 16.
- 8
Charles Fairman argues, "It is not to be doubted that if Congress had enacted the substance
of Sections 3 and 4 in apt language, the validity of the legislation would have been affirmed.”
But it is to be doubted, because there is a powerful argument that Congress had already done
just this and the Court had ignored it. Reconstruction and Reunion. 1864-88, 257. For a
general critic of Fairman, see Curtis, No State Shall Abridge, 1 00- 1 05.
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"By the words ‘as aforesaid,” the provisions respecting race and color of the first and
second sections of the statute are incorporated into and made a part of the third and fourth
sections.” Reese at 242 (Hunt dissenting).
1(1
Belz suggests the opinion was appropriate as it clearly limited congressional action to the
terms of the amendment. Yet he does not take up the fact that Congress, in sections I and 2 of
the act, had already done this. The American Constitution
,
358. As Currie argues, “the Court
got around this difficulty by proclaiming . . . that it had not power to rewrite an overbroad
statute.” The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 1789-1888, 395.
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Justice again wrote the opinion of the Court, but did so in a way that skirted
the constitutionality of the Enforcement Act, even while expounding upon the
meaning of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In the wake of one of
the bloodiest events of Reconstruction, the Colfax Massacre, federal officials
indicted nearly 100 whites for “conspiring" to deprive two black men of their
constitutional rights. The Court's opinion ultimately turned on sections 6 and
7 ot the act, which made it a crime for private citizens to conspire to deprive a
citizen of rights protected by the Constitution or federal law. At first glance.
Waite s opinion seems consistent with the notion that the Court is likely to
provide stable constitutional meaning (by following its precedents) as the
opinion rested squarely on the notion of “dual citizenship" recently articulated
by the Court in Slaughterhouse, following Miller's opinion, Waite divided the
rights ot citizenship those recognized in the “privileges and immunities
clause and the due process clause ot the Fourteenth Amendment—into
state and federal rights. 31 The vast majority of rights. Miller had argued, are
held by virtue of being a citizen of a state. Freedom of speech, the right to
vote, and the like were all based upon state citizenship and therefore protected
by the states. Such rights do not come under fourteenth Amendment
protection. A handful of rights—the right to protection on the high seas, for
example—are conferred by virtue of being a citizen of the United States and
do come under Fourteenth Amendment protection. These are the rights that
Congress can protect under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. All other
11
Cruikshank at 549.
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rights are protected by the state and beyond the reach of congressional
power. 32 This is true, as well, for section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,
which, as we saw in Reese
, did not confer the right to vote, but the right not to
be deprived of one's vote on the basis of race. As with the Slaughterhouse
C uses, the Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, to paraphrase Field,
made it much ado about nothing: it essentially left intact the dubious view of
citizenship articulated by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott- the very view
the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to overturn! The only dramatic
alteration was that now blacks could be citizens of the United States (and were
therefore protected in the few rights of citizenship thereby bestowed).
Once W aite divided rights into federal and state protection, the
question was: Were the rights allegedly violated here, rights protected by the
federal government and therefore subject to Congress' power under section 5
ol the Fourteenth and section 2 ol the fifteenth Amendments? Here Waite did
two extraordinary things. First he turned to an analysis of the indictments
themselves and not section 6 of the enforcement act, which the indictments
were based upon. He then suggested that two of the rights (First and Second
amendment rights) were only protected against the federal government and
not the states, so they were beyond the reach of the statute in this case. 33
Remarkably, Waite relied on Marshall's Barron v. Baltimore opinion in 1835,
which held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states, and ignored the
question of whether section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment had
1_
Unless the state first fails to protect them, which came out of later opinions.
100
fundamentally altered this relationship (as many within Congress who had
framed the amendment argued), leaving Marshall's opinion a historical relic
of pre-Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 34 Instead. Waite rather
cavalierly asserted that it was now “too late to question the correctness of this
construction [Barron v. Baltimore].”35 A constitutional amendment was
reduced to nothing based on a prior Supreme Court precedent! Waite then
concluded that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments only protected one
from being deprived of rights based upon race and then only against official
state action. 1 he trouble with the indictments, Waite argued, was that the
alleged deprivation of rights was not clearly asserted to be based upon race,
nor was it a direct result of state action. 36
What is most remarkable about Waite's opinion is that he reaches out
broadly to expound upon the nature and meaning of both the Fourteenth and
fifteenth Amendments, and, in doing so, rejects much of the congressional
interpretation of these amendments as put forward in the Enforcement Act;
but he does all of this indirectly. In fact, Waite doesn't even question the
” Cruikshank at 553.
' 4
Ibid, at 552.
35
Ibid.
36
It “is nowhere alleged in these counts that the wrong contemplated against the rights of
these citizens was on account of their race or color.” Ibid at 555.
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constitutionality ot section 6 of the Enforcement Act. 37 He merely finds the
indictments wanting: although the clear implication is that not only is this
section of the act unconstitutional, but that Congress' broader reading of the
meaning of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments is invalid. This is a
minimalist judicial opinion that delivers maximum results. Nothing is
explicitly declared unconstitutional. 38 At a glance the opinion seems to rest
upon the particular facts of the case and does not address the broader
constitutional question or give us a constitutional rule to follow; it is, in
Sunstein s terms, narrow and shallow. But this is not truly so. The Court
offers a fully theorized view of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
which rejects Congress’ view as articulated in the enforcement acts and
severely limits Congress' ability to enforce the amendments, if we follow the
logic of Waite's opinion. We might say that all of this is simply dicta, the
trouble is that the reasoning is not superfluous but central to the Court's
narrow conclusion. Waite can only find the indictments “wanting" based upon
his reading of the amendments (which rejects Congress' reading) and his
finding of section 6 of the Enforcement Act overly broad (although he does
not explicitly find it unconstitutional). This is a masterpiece ofjudicial sleight
The Court's opinion is so sly on this fact that Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, Harold Spaeth,
and Thomas Walker, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1994) do not even list United States v. Cruikshank as a Court
decision holding an act of Congress unconstitutional (because it does so by indirection rather
than explicitly) 96. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History
, 604; Belz, The
American Constitution
, 357; Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court
,
395-397; and
Smith, Civic Ideals
,
334-336, all treat the opinion as striking down an act of Congress.
Indeed, all discuss it in explicit terms of the constitutional vision it offered up and not the
narrow holding.
' 8
“It follows that they [the indictments] are not good and sufficient law.” Cruikshank at 559.
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ot hand, not clear reasoning based upon constitutional principle—a sleight of
hand, we ought to notice, that allows the Court to deny, rather than enforce,
constitutional rights that Congress was trying to protect. By not taking on
Congress directly, the Court makes it difficult for Congress to respond. One
gets the feeling that the Court is determined to disallow the rigorous
enforcement of the amendments even if Congress attempted to conform to the
Court s constitutional view. Moreover, the Court's broad constitutional view,
not just the narrow result, is celebrated and becomes the basis of future
Supreme Court opinions which far more explicitly speak to constitutional
meaning
.
39
Principle and Precedent in Court and Congress
As Charles Warren argues, "viewed in historical perspective
. . there
can be no question that the decisions in these cases were most fortunate. They
largely eliminated trom National politics the negro question which has so long
embittered Congressional debates; they relegated the burden and the duty to
protecting the negro to the States, to whom they properly belonged; and they
served to restore confidence in the National Court in the Southern States .”40
Chief Justice Waite, in the tradition ot Marshall and laney, had taken it upon
himselt to deliver the Court's opinion in these highly visible and hotly
contested cases and he was rewarded, by and large, with praise. While we can
hardly be so sanguine as Warren, he does put his finger on something
'
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important: politics. Waite’s opinions are most celebrated because they signal a
retreat from a constitutional vision that the country was growing weary of and
beginning to finding taxing as it threatened an ever increasing national role in
local politics. Rogers Smith suggests that “Chief Justice Waite's opinions for
the Supreme Court were redolent of the Northern Republican retreat from
continued civil rights struggles.”41 The changing political tide, not simply the
Court s opinions, is key to getting at constitutional development. Robert
Goldman reminds us that in Reese and Cruikshank
, important as they were,
only two sections ot the various enforcement acts were found unconstitutional
and those sections, based on the Court's opinion in Reese
, were re-passed
(with little modification) shortly after the decision was handed down (which
I'll take up below). 42 The point is that at this moment in time. Congress's
power to enforce the terms of the Civil War Amendments and the very
meaning of those amendments was still an open constitutional question.
Conceptually, we might characterize this as a movement from an open (or
unsettled) constitutional question to a constitutional dialogue about that
meaning.
1 his initial constitutional dialogue between Court and Congress, short
lived as it was, is illuminating. How did Congress and Court conduct
themselves? Against the persistent insistence that the Court is more likely to
conduct itself in a reasoned manner and base its decisions on constitutional
41
Smith, Civic Ideals, 336.
4
" Goldman, Reconstruction and Black Suffrage, 109. See also Robert Goldman, A Free Ballot
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principle, the evidence here suggests that it fares far worse than Congress in
this particular case. We have already seen the Court’s shortcomings in Reese
and Cruikshank in this regard. While "the country needed elementary
instruction
... to explain basic propositions about the Constitution as it then
stood, attention to the debates in Congress indicate that it was far more likely
to get such instruction from Congress than the Court
.
43
While Fairman tries to
insist that the “consideration [to the Civil War Amendments] given by the
Court was much the most responsible,” this is simply not borne out
.
44
Recent
scholarship on the Civil War Amendments and the Reconstruction Congress
impress upon us the high-minded constitutional debate that took place in
Congress. Congress was not only concerned with producing a clear
constitutional vision, but went out ol its way to enforce the constitutional
norms embraced by the Civil War Amendments in the legislation we have
been examining. Hven it the Court does not act as a principled defender of
constitutional rights, perhaps it provides for constitutional stability against the
unpredictable whims ot the legislature. After all, the leading proponents of
judicial supremacy insist that the Court's settlement function is its most
important function, even it it gets the Constitution wrong . 46 Thus, even if the
43
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Court did not defend constitutional principle, at least it provided for
constitutional settlement, avoiding the chaos that would come if things were
left to the Congress. This is not evident. Congress adhered to a remarkably
stable constitutional vision from 1865-1874. As Hyman and Wiecek
demonstrate. Congress moves from general principles to particular
applications in order to enforce constitutional norms as, at nearly every turn,
they are resisted. This vision itself is stable. Against this, it is the Court that
lacks stability in its treatment of these amendments.
This is reflected in Supreme Court opinions themselves. Early circuit
court opinions, which included sitting Supreme Court justices, were far more
receptive to Congress’ reading of the Civil War Amendments and its
enforcement powers. That began to change with the Slaughterhouse Cases
and then with Reese and ( ruikshank
.
48
It might be suggested that once the
Supreme Court spoke on these issues—and much less generously so than the
C ircuit Courts—it pronounced a uniform view allowing for the settlement of
constitutional meaning. This is plausible in that we see dissenting justices join
later Court opinions. We see this most vividly in Justice Bradley, a sharp
dissenter in the Slaughterhouse Cases. Bradley initially offered a robust
reading of Fourteenth Amendment rights and Congressional power in his
circuit court opinions and in his Slaughterhouse dissent,49 but then, a few
47
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years alter Slaughterhouse
,
in his circuit court opinion in Cruikshank
,
50
he put
forward the logic that Chief Justice Waite would rely on in his Cruikshank
opinion, which flatly rejected Bradley's Slaughterhouse dissent. This
culminated in Bradley's opinion for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases of
1883 (which we will take up below). 51
1 he trouble with this view is that it neglects the evolution of
constitutional meaning under the Supreme Court (and not just changes in the
individual justices' opinions). The Court may follow its precedents (as it did
in ( ruikshank), as proponents of judicial supremacy would suggest, thereby
providing for stability in constitutional meaning. But the precedents
themselves gradually spin out constitutional meaning that, while often
consistent with past cases, is not required by them. The Court does not
provide for more stability in expounding constitutional meaning than the
Congress does. In tact, in these cases, the Court's exposition seems less
principled (both in the sense ol being based on constitutional principle and in
the sense of offering rule-based opinions that the political branches can clearly
follow). As we have seen from Reese and Cruikshank, the Court does not lay
down a clear constitutional rule. For the Court to authoritatively settle
constitutional questions and bind the other branches to its interpretation, it
must give us wide and deep rulings. The Court must settle the constitutional
question before it, not simply the case before it. Alexander and Sherwin
suggest that authoritative settlement “is precisely to settle the question what
50
United States v. Cruikshank
,
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ought to be done.” 5 " For the proponents ofjudicial supremacy, authoritative
settlement is necessary for the Constitution to function as law. Principled and
fully theorized opinions are necessary to this settlement function. Without
them, Alexander and Sherwin argue, we will get instability and indeterminacy
which is detrimental to the very nature of law.
It is doubtful, though, that the Supreme Court always (or even
generally) acts in this fashion. Even if the Court lays down broad rule-based
decisions, particular circumstances will bring new cases under those terms and
the Court will need to address them. So, in a limited sense, there will always
be a revisiting of constitutional questions. This is not terribly problematic
.
53
What is troublesome for such theorizing is when the Court does not pronounce
clear rules in the case before it: Reese and Cruikshank do not tell members of
Congress or the executive branch—or citizens for that matter—“what ought to
be done. Even it we wanted to abide by the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution in these cases, these opinions give us little guidance, exemplified
by the fact that the Court, in Reese
, seems to tell Congress to do what it has
already done. Indeed, there is nothing particularly principled about these
decisions: the Court is hardly offering us principled reasons against the
political will of Congress. One might flip this on its head: the Court seems to
51
Civil Rights Cases
,
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’ Although one does wonder if this itself cuts against the kind of authoritative settlement
Alexander and Sherwin argue for. Indeed, do they end up saying: “follow the Court, whatever
the Court says.” This may not provide any stability, or any “true settlement." The Rule of
Rules
,
13-15. In fact, we might wonder if this is simply the “gun man theory of the law”
applied to the Court, so that the Constitution is whatever the Court says it is.
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be evading a principled constitutional vision by way of faulty statutory
construction and ducking the constitutional issue, even while waxing poetic
about constitutional meaning. There may indeed be passive virtues and
excellent reasons for judicial minimalism, 54 but they are antithetical to the
most prominent arguments for judicial supremacy. Rather than giving us
authoritative settlement, these opinions leave the constitutional question
unsettled, or in a state ot constitutional dialogue at best. Yet, it is not clear that
such unsettlement or dialogue leads to constitutional anarchy. And even if the
Court had offered a broad constitutional rule, it is doubtful that that, in and of
itself, would have been enough to settle the constitutional issue.
joward a Constitutional Settlement: the Congressional Election of 1874
Perhaps the most important development on the road to constitutional
settlement occurred in November ot 1874 when the Reconstruction
Republicans were ousted from control of Congress by the Democratic Party.
By the time Reese and Cruikshank were decided by the Court in 1 876, it is not
clear that there was much congressional opposition to the Court's opinions.
Individual members of Congress, especially Republican holdovers who voted
for the various Enforcement Acts and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, were
alarmed at the Court s construction, but Congress as a whole seemed content
to leave this with the Court. The constitutional questions raised by the
enforcement acts and the Court's opinions were hardly settled at this point,
4
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but the change in Congress represented a seismic shift in the political
landscape that cleared the way for constitutional settlement. From 1870
to 1874, the Republican-dominated Congress passed legislation that a majority
ot the Court viewed as constitutionally suspect. The Court and the Congress
were bound to contest constitutional meaning as the Congress deemed
constitutionally permissible things that the Court viewed as constitutionally
impermissible. I hus the Court rejected Congress’ broad constitutional vision
by finding parts of the Enforcement Act unconstitutional. The precondition for
this clash was Congress' aggressive stance in protecting and enforcing its
substantive vision of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. But given the
lag that occurs between the passage ot legislation and the Court's
pronouncement upon its constitutionality, by the time the Court acted to limit
C ongress s view ol the fourteenth and fifteenth Amendments by finding its
legislation wanting, the (new) Congress was no longer articulating this view.
After the Democrats gained control of the House of Representatives and
officially took their seats in 1875, it neither supported the old Congress's
stance, nor passed new legislation that the Court viewed as constitutionally
suspect,
5
"
not because a majority of the Congress decided to adhere to
Supreme Court opinions per se, but because the new majority—many
Republicans as well as Democrats—had a different view of the Civil War
Amendments, which coincided (more or less) with the Court's. Simply put.
the dominant constitutional vision in Congress moved into alignment with the
Sections 3 and 4 which were struck down in Reese were repassed, but never came before
the Court. Goldman, A Free Ballot and a Fair Count.
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majority ofjustices on the Court. What was a constitutional contest dissipated.
By the time the Court explicitly found the Reconstruction Congress's
handiwork unconstitutional, it was confirming, not disputing, the (new)
majority view in Congress. So we traverse from a period of contested
constitutional meaning to a state of unsettlement and partial constitutional
dialogue back to a state ot uncontested meaning. In this. Congress is central to
the generation of constitutional meaning and the constitutional settlement
ultimately arrived at.
Congress ’v Last Stand
I he last great act of the Reconstruction Congress took place in the
waning days ot the Forty-Third Congress, just before the official change in
power. 1 he Civil Rights Act ot 1 875, passed in honor of the recently deceased
Senator Charles Sumner, who had been trying to pass such legislation for
years, put forward a constitutional vision that the incoming Congress had little
interest in detending. I his constitutional vision would bring this transitory
Congress into direct conflict with the Court. Yet, based on the only Court case
to speak to the relevant constitutional questions when the act was passed. The
Slaughterhouse Cases
,
this was not a forgone conclusion. So while the
Supreme Court opinion was referred to. Congress does not just follow it, even
while many members make reference to it, because the opinion itself needs to
be expounded upon: alone it settles nothing.
5<>
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The most controversial sections of the Civil Rights Act outlawed racial
discrimination in public accommodations based on a broad reading of
Congress s section 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case.
Congress was clearly interpreting section 1 of the Amendment—the privileges
and immunities ot citizenship, due process of law. and equal protection—and
reaching out. by way of its enforcement power, to vigorously protect its
reading of Fourteenth Amendment rights. 57 The congressional debates on the
C ivil Rights Act, much like the earlier debates, reveal a high level of
constitutional discussion, with the members engaging in constitutional
interpretation on their own, as well as referring to Slaughterhouse. In making
reference to this Court opinion, some members refused to be bound by it,
arguing that Congress is called upon to legislate, and when it comes to
legislation it must legislate ... in conformity with [its reading] of the
Constitution and not the Court s. s I hese members of Congress thought that
Congress should act in conformity with its interpretation of the Constitution
no matter w hat the Court had or had not said. Just as assuredly, other
Which could have been rooted in 13 th Amendment as well. Hyman and Wiecek, Equal
Justice Under Law.
Frank Scaturro, The Supreme Court 's Retreat From Reconstruction: A Distortion of
Constitutional Jurisprudence (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000) 15. See also Congressional
Record
,
Forty Third Congress, 2
nd
Session Part III (1874) at 1791. Mr. Boutwell, “I am not
disposed to discuss the Slaughter-house decision, as it is called. It will stand legally and
politically for what it is worth. It related to a particular case. In that case and in every other
case like that, if there shall be another case like that, it is law; but it is not law beyond the case
in which the opinion was rendered, and therefore for myself I dismiss that case as a legislator
when 1 come to consider new propositions.” Boutwell then insisted “it is not law beyond the
case; it is not law with reference to the rights of the states generally, and certainly is not law
for the Senate when the Senate is engaged in considering a question which is a different
question from that on which the court passed." Boutwell then offered a reading of the
“privileges and immunities clause” akin to Field and Bradley’s dissents, although never
mentioning them, the logic of which squarely rejected Miller's majority opinion, at 1793.
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congressmen insisted that the Congress was bound by the Court's opinion. 59
Yet there was debate over just what being bound by the Court's opinion
entailed: how did the prior opinion speak to this particular constitutional
issue? In answering this question. Congress was compelled to interpret the
Court's opinion, weighing it, at times, against the Constitution, and against its
own past actions. This Congress was perhaps unique in that many members in
1875 had acted as tramers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. Surely they should know as much about the intent of these
amendments as the Court? In this vein, a number of Senators and
representatives insisted that Congress must go forward despite the
Slaughterhouse C uses, some viewing the opinion as constitutionally wrong,
others viewing it as indeterminate, but all agreeing that Congress should be
bound by the Constitution, not the Supreme Court. 60 Other Congressmen
insisted that the Slaughterhouse Cases presumptively made the act
unconstitutional and that Congress ought to be bound by the Court's
59
Congressional Record, Forty Third Congress, 2"d session. Part 111 at 1792. Mr. Thurman, "1
confess that I am amazed that in the face of the plain language of this section (privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment], in the face of the solemn decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States adverse to this proposition [Civil Rights Act] it yet is
pressed upon the Congress of the United States, and we are asked to do what the language of
the Constitution does not authorize us to do, and what the solemn decision of our Supreme
Court declares we have no power whatever to do,” at 1792.
60
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construction of the Constitution
.
61
Still others cited the Slaughterhouse Cases
to support the act, arguing that even this case recognized that the primary
motivation of the Fourteenth Amendment was black equality, which is
precisely what the Civil Rights Act, targeting public accommodations, was
trying to achieve. 6' The Slaughterhouse Cases did not give Congress clear
guidance here. While placing most rights under the prerogative of the states.
Miller s opinion had clearly stated that the “one pervading purpose found [in
the Civil War Amendments, was] the freedom of the slave race, the security
and firm establishment ol that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppression ofthose who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over Would this last part be enough to justify, for
the Court, a congressional exercise of power that admittedly intruded into the
Ibid, at 1 796. Much of the debate expounded upon the Constitution itself, with no reference
to the Supreme Court, with many congressmen making reference to the “plain meaning of the
Constitution upon its face and adding, "that every judicial exposition of that instrument
sustains this reasonable view, when the Court supported their argument, but not relying on
the Court's opinions alone, at 1797. Others expressed sympathy for the Act, but insisted it
was unconstitutional given their reading of the Constitution: “I entertain, as strongly as any
Senator, the sentiments which have inspired this bill; and in the present unhappy condition of
the South, I would go to the extreme limit ot our constitutional power to support any bill
calculated to protect the colored people of the South or to restore order in that distracted
section. But 1 cannot go beyond the limits of the Constitution" at 1861. One Senator
(Carpenter) noted the vexing question of judicial supremacy against departmentalism, treating
the question of "who interprets?" as an open question, but noting that all agree that the
Supreme Court settles legal questions when they are given jurisdiction in particular cases-
that is, by the legislature, as a way to invoke their rights. He then noted that the
Slaughterhouse Cases settled this issue for those bringing suit (if not for Congress as a
general rule), at 1862. He thus rejected the Civil Rights Act, given the Court's various opinion
on the enforcement acts, as it would "involve the colored man in litigation in which he is
certain to be defeated", at 1863. In these same debates Senator Edmunds accuses the
opponents ot the Civil Rights Act (and the various previous acts) of willfully misreading the
Civil War Amendments—obstructing their meaning at every turn, and acting as if the
Constitution had not, in tact, been amended. He discoursed, at great length, on the nature of
rights and equality under the Constitution without a single reference to a Court opinion, at
1869-1870.
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domain of the states (under pre-Civil War terms)? This was, after all, “the evil
to be remedied by [the Amendments].”64 The Court's opinion on this score is
ambiguous, not because it is an undertheorized opinion—quite the contrary as
we have seen—but because it did not specifically take up this constitutional
question. Court opinions, no less than the Constitution, lend themselves to
legitimate interpretive debate. This is not a nihilistic pronouncement that
opinions are infinitely interpretable, but recognition that as constitutional
debates are olten about particular acts, there may be multiple plausible
readings of just how a past opinion applies to different circumstances. Even if
the Congress wanted to defer to the Court's judgment, given the nature of the
Supreme Court’s decision, the result is a constitutional dialogue. Rather than
broadly settling constitutional issues with the stroke of a pen. Court opinions
are likely to be worked out in the give and take of constitutional dialogue.
1 his may be constitutional dialogue on the road to authoritative settlement,
but in this case, far more than a Court opinion is necessary—for both
Congress and the Court—to settle this contested constitutional question.
In relying on Court opinions to guide its constitutional interpretation,
the Congress must inevitably read those Court opinions and, thereby, venture
into constitutional interpretation in most cases (as the opinions themselves
will not offer clear guidance on the exact issues before the Congress).
Members of Congress may indeed turn to the Constitution to help them
construe a Court opinion; in fact, assuming it were to follow Court opinions.
Ibid, at 81 .
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Congress may need to interpret Court opinions in the very way that the Court
interprets the Constitution in order to apply them to particular acts. If we
follow the logic of Alexander and Schauer, and other proponents ofjudicial
supremacy, this itself is to enter forbidden terrain. Accordingly, the Congress
should not venture any opinions on constitutionality, as this is the job of the
Court and the Court alone: “legislative officials should do what they are
assigned to do, and what they are assigned to do does not include
constitutional interpretation .”65 The Constitution becomes the sole province of
the judiciary in this case. The whole point of authoritative judicial settlement
is that opinions "supplant the reasons upon which they are based .”66 Those
who wish to follow the terms of settlement are "no longer required to consult
the reasons behind the settlement in determining how to act, they are also
required not to heed those reasons if, from their perspective, those reasons
conflict with the terms of settlement .”67 But as we have seen. Court opinions,
especially on constitutional questions, do not necessarily operate in this way.
At a deeper level, if Congress is simply to follow the latest judicial
pronouncement, we may go far to undermining the Constitution (and
constitutional norms) in the name of upholding it. Constitutional maintenance
requires more than enforcement by the judiciary.
65
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The Court and the Emerging Constitutional Settlement
This constitutional dialogue between the Court and the Congress was
replaced by a univocal Court, as Congress retreated from the sweep of
Reconstruction. The Democrats took control of the House in 1875, Reese and
( ruikshank were handed down shortly thereafter, and the Compromise of
1876 seemed to signal the end of Reconstruction politics altogether. It is
tempting to say that the unsettled constitutional questions over the meaning of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which had convulsed the body
politic tor nearly a decade, were finally settled in Justice Bradley's opinion in
the ( ivil Rights Cases (1883), which struck down sections 1 and 2 of the Civil
Rights Act ot 1 875 and brought an end to this divisive public debate. Warren
suggests something like this: “The meaning and effect of that Amendment
[the Fourteenth], however, so tar as it concerned the negro race for whose
protection it had been primarily adopted, were fully and definitively settled by
Waite and his Court, in a series of eight cases between 1876 and 1884."68
Well, not quite. As I have argued, this does not capture the dynamic that
paved the way tor settlement: the Court's opinion stood because it reflected
the political sentiment of the nation and not because it was the Court's
opinion. Ackerman suggests that these issues were truly settled in the
elections returns of 1868: “With their hold on national power reconfirmed in
the consolidating election. Republicans in the White House and Capitol Hill
l,s
Warren, The Supreme Court in United Slates History
,
600. Even Michael Kent Curtis,
whose work has done so much to resuscitate the Reconstruction Congress, suggests that “after
rulings by the high court” the constitutional issues were settled. Properly parsed this might be
true, but this issues were not settled just be judicial decision. No State Shall Abridge. 170.
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took aggressive steps to pack the Supreme Court with men who would
vindicate their new vision of the Union"61’ Yet Ackerman tries to end the
story in 1873 with the (odd) affirmation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Slaughterhouse. He misses that some of these putative transformative
appointees led the charge in overturning the Republican Congress's and
President Grant's constitutional vision—namely. Waite and Bradley, both
appointed by Grant and confirmed by a Republican Congress. Nor can we say
that, after a lag. these justices were articulating a view based on the realigning
election of 1 860.
7
" Serious public debate on these constitutional issues did not
end in 1 883 with the Court's opinion, in 1 868 with a consolidating election, or
in 1 860 with a political realignment. The Court did not impose its
constitutional view on the political branches, nor did the political branches
bring about their desired constitutional vision by way of Court appointees. A
serious constitutional debate between the Congress and the Court occurred
trom 1868-1874 on these issues. It was the change in Congress (combined
with a change in the presidency with the famous “compromise of 1876") that
paved the way lor constitutional settlement. The Court may well have been
the leading voice in constitutional interpretation after these events, but that
M
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was by and large because it was in agreement with the Congress. 11 In the
ordinary course of events, the Court may well act as the primary expositor of
constitutional meaning, especially when its view coincides, by and large, with
the governing majorities'. But that is a far cry from arguing that the Court
authoritatively settles constitutional meaning when that meaning is contested
by the political branches.
I his is reflected in the Civil Rights Cases. Bradley's opinion, for
eight members of the Bench, struck down sections 1 and 2 of the Act, arguing
that the Fourteenth Amendment only protected rights from state invasion (and
not private discrimination). The Court explicitly rejected Congress'
interpretation of section 1 of the amendment, as well as its reading of its
power under Section 5. The Fourteenth Amendment only prohibited state
discrimination, not private discrimination, and Congress, under section 5,
could only act to preserve rights against state abridgment. 72 While the
constitutional meaning of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Congress' power under section 5, had been left to implication in Cruikshank,
the Court explicitly spelled this out in The Civil Rights Cases. Congress'
section 5 power was severely hemmed in, denying Congress, in essence, the
right to interpret the Constitution on its own; its power was rendered
“corrective," giving it the ability to protect rights only if the states were
1
Warren argues that confidence in the Waite Court was high: "When it is recalled that in
every year from 1850 to 1873 (with the exception of the five years of the war) there had been
Congressional legislation proposed in serious derogation of the Court’s powers, the practical
immunity from assault which occurred form 1873 to 1884 is a notable feature in its history.”
But even this is premised on the change in Congress; it reflects the fact that the Court is in
line with Congress. The Supreme Court in United Stutes History. 563.
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involved in their denial. 7 ’ This further spun ou, the logic the Court had offered
earlier that year in United States v. Haris.” In Haris. Justice Woods, who
like Bradley had once embraced a far-reaching view of the Civil War
Amendments and Congress's ability to enforce them, found section 2 of the
Ku Klux Act of 1871 unconstitutional. 75 The Act made conspiracies to deprive
citizens ot their rights a crime. Woods articulated the view that Bradley would
more fully develop in the Civil Rights Cases that the Fourteenth Amendment
only protected rights against state action (the Fifteenth was rejected as a
constitutional basis of the act as it did not. as Waite said in Reese, confer a
right to vote). 75 Furthermore. Congress could act only if the states themselves
first failed to protect rights. The Thirteenth Amendment basis for the act was
rejected, in a statutory construction reminiscent of Reese, because the
conspiracy charges were not limited to acts against blacks. Harris clearly built
upon Reese and Cruikshunk and was itself more fully articulated in the Civil
Rights Cases. However much these opinions—like Reese. Cruikshunk. and
the Slaughterhouse Cases—thw arted the constitutional vision of the
Reconstruction Congress, they were in line with the political consensus of
1883
.
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Vie New York Timex, for example, claimed that Justice Harlan's
famous lone dissent in the Civil Rights Cases was "a learned, candid, and able
paper." But it went on to say. "the tendency during the war period was toward
the construction he favors. Since (hen a reaction has set in. which, so far. is
beneficial!.]” The Court's opinion "has satisfied public judgment, and Justice
HARLAN'S will hardly unsettle it .”78 The Court's opinion not only reflected
popular will at the time, but seemed to embrace it. This is perhaps best
reflected by Justices Bradley and Woods. Both of these justices (Bradley as a
Supreme Court justice sitting in circuit and Woods as a circuit court judge)
had given the Fourteenth Amendment a broad-based reading in a controversy
that would come before the Supreme Court as part of the Slaughterhouse
C uses. I here both justices embraced the logic that would later be articulated
in Bradley's Slaughterhouse dissent, rejecting Miller's distinction between the
"privileges and immunities" of state citizenship and the "privileges and
immunities” ot United States citizenship. Yet Bradley himself would
implicitly reject this reading in his circuit court opinion in Cruikshank
,
which
served as the doctrinal basis ot Chief Justice Waite's opinion for the Supreme
Court. Woods had further spelled out the “privileges and immunities" of
United States citizenship in United States v. Hall
,
offering, after
corresponding with Bradley, a broad reading ot the “privileges and
immunities ot United States citizenship, which included all rights expressly
secured in the Constitution. He went further in saying that Congress, by way
78 Quoted in Scaturro, The Supreme Court 's Retreatfrom Reconstruction
.
129. My italics.
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of section 5. could enforce these rights agamst
“insufficient” state protection
and not just overt discrimination. In fact. Woods argued. Congress could rely
on the Thirteenth Amendment to do all of this! This early constitutional
interpretation was squarely rejected by Bradley and Woods in Harris and the
( Ml Rights Cases. These justices might have been adjusting their views to
fall into line with Supreme Court precedents as part of the Court's settlement
(unction. Still, such an alteration should at least lead us to wonder about the
putative insularity of the Supreme Court from popular opinion. The shift in
congressional vision in the early 1 870s. combined with the Court's reading,
was the basis of the later constitutional settlement. These developments were
key to shaping the constitutional meaning of these amendments. It is this
meaning, forged in the constitutional politics of 1 870-76. that we inherit as
settled, even it the politics of this era subverted the original meaning of these
amendments. 79
" Hyman and Wiecek offer an insightful line of analysis along these lines. They suggest that
the passage of each subsequent enforcement act and amendment led the Court to read them in
reverse order, which subsequently narrowed their scope rather than widening it. So the
Thirteenth is read in light of the Fourteenth, rather than vice versa. Each successive act was
more specific than the prior, but this was due to southern intransigence and not Congress’s
desire to abandon the broader readings. By being more particular. Congress hoped to thwart
the wide spread evasion of the amendments and various enforcements acts. One result of this
was the almost total eclipse of the Thirteenth Amendment, even though it was initially offered
as far more than a formal end to slavery. Another result was that congressional acts helped
pave the way for the “state action” doctrine the Court would later apply. While each new act
was aimed at bringing an end to southern resistance, it also began to reveal just how deep
Congress s commitment to enforce the amendments would have to be. Real enforcement of
the amendments, it became evident, would require a substantial federal commitment in local
politics—something never before seen. Facing this, it seems that many steadfast supporters of
the Civil War amendments blinked. The Republican constitutional vision altered as the costs
of that vision became apparent. This altered constitutional vision coincided with the Court's
own articulation of constitutional meaning (which itself might have been driven by this
realization).
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Interestingly, the Civil Rights Cases can then be seen as the
culmination of these developments in constitutional meaning: the Court only
articulated a clear and fully theorized constitutional vision of the Civil War
Amendments when that vision was shared by the Congress. It boldly
pronounced (the earlier) Congress’ misinterpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its limited power to enforce the terms of any of the Civil War
amendments, when a national consensus embraced such a reading. In an
interesting twist, in these cases, as public support for Reconstruction (and its
constitutional vision) began to wane, it was (the lame-duck 1875) Congress
who, arguably, supported the Constitution against the democratic impulse.
And it was the Court who went along with the democratic impulse. If there is
countermajoritarian tendency here, it is on the part of the prior Congress, not
the Court. This is the judicial thesis transposed: these members of Congress
adhere to a principled defense of constitutional rights and a willingness to
protect such rights even while it cost them politically. Against this, an
insulated Court outpaces southern resistance: “on the issues of the rights of
American citizens, the Supreme Court was more royalist than the king, more
devoted to a restricted states rights interpretation of the Constitution than even
some southern Democrats.
80 A truly countermajoritarian Court, concerned
with rights and constitutional principle, would have upheld the Civil Rights
Act ol 1875 against a nation that seemed determined to ignore these new
amendments.
80
Curtis, No State Shall Abridge, ! 70.
123
We might push this even further as it relates to the typical view of
judicial supremacy. We should notice that Congress by way of these various
acts is pushing a robust and principled constitutional vision of rights that the
Court that great protector of rights-seems intent on strikmg down. The
early Court opintons do this by clear statutory misconstruction and
sidestepping the broader constitutional issues to reach decisions that go
against the enforcement of congressional acts without explicitly finding them
unconstitutional 81 These opinions are not highly principled, clearly reasoned
articulations of constitutional questions. Nor are they rights protecting. Nor do
they lead to constitutional settlement. The opinions themselves evolve. They
may well build upon one another in a consistent way. each new opinion
developing the (partial) logic of the prior opinion to a wider area and a more
general level ot constitutional articulation. However, this evolution of
constitutional meaning by way of Court opinions is not so simple. In Ex Parle
I arbroughp a year after Harris and a mere eight years after Reese, the
Supreme Court came very close to saying that the Fifteenth Amendment
conferred the right to vote, which was explicitly rejected in these earlier
opinions. Yarbrough was based on the two sections of the Enforcement Act of
1870 that were found wanting (rather than explicitly declared
unconstitutional) in Reese. 1 his time the Court explicitly upheld the action.
8 I AAs David Currie suggests, even while rejecting Congress’ broad constitutional reading, “the
Court s restrictive interpretations ot the Constitution were unavoidable, but by manipulating
the statutory issues of coverage and severability the Court went out of its way to incapacitate
the enforcement authorities after it was too late politically to expect Congress to fill the gap
by enacting narrower statutes.” The Constitution in the Supreme Court. 1789-/888, 402.
s
~ Ex Parte Yarbrough
,
I 10 U.S. 651 ( 1884).
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What is more, the Court explicitly took up the right to vote. Waite's opinion m
RUSe unec
luivocally stated that the Fifteenth Amendment confers no such
right. This was reiterated in Justice Woods' opinion in Harris just the year
before. But Miller's opinion stated that the Fifteenth Amendment “does,
propio vigore, substantially confer the negro the right to vote, and Congress
has the power to protect and enforce that right ."83 Just as we should be
suspicious that the Court is more principled than the Congress, we should be
deeply skeptical of the proposition that its constitutional vision is more stable.
This strongly suggests that “finality of interpretation is hence the
outcome—when indeed it exists—not ofjudicial application of the
Constitution to the decisions of cases, but of a continued harmony of views
among the three departments ."84 When constitutional questions are disputed,
the political branches play a crucial role in the development and settlement of
constitutional meaning. Attempts by the Court to impose a constitutional
settlement in the absence of a shared consensus may promote unsettlement
and even lead to the conflict and chaos that proponents ofjudicial supremacy
are so fearful of.
8
' Taney’s attempt to do just this in Dred Scott is food for
thought. It is also not clear that the clash of constitutional visions, including
the modification and evolution of doctrine, leads to constitutional instability
or chaos. Nor is it clear that the solidification of constitutional meaning, under
Ibid at 665. Miller does, just before, note that it is quite true that, as the Court said in Reese,
the Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right to vote, but only the right not to be
discriminated against in the vote, that it may “operate as the immediate source of the right to
vote.” See also Goldman, Reconstruction and Block Suffrage, 1 15.
84
Edward Corwin, Court Over Constitution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938).
85
Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution, 161.
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the rubric ot Court opinions, is always desirable. This suggests that
constitutional maintenance requires more than judicial enforcement, especially
it the Constitution is to be more than a formal mechanism of legal settlement.
It a commitment to constitutionalism exists only in the Court, it is unlikely to
sustain itself. The constitutional promise of the Civil War Amendments, as we
have seen, could not endure without political support. As political will for
constitutional principle began to flag, we witnessed a retreat from the original
meaning ot the Civil War Amendments and the forging of a more limited
constitutional vision. Even it the Court would have acted to uphold these early
acts and Congress's view of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it is
difficult to imagine that it could have, in itself, sustained the early promise of
full constitutional rights for black citizens. Contrary to so much of
constitutional theory, when the Court is vested with the sole responsibility of
enforcing constitutional limits, our constitutionalism is likely to be less secure,
not more so.
Conclusion: The Subtle Vices of Authoritative Settlement
Even it the Court gets the Constitution wrong, proponents ofjudicial
supremacy are tond ot quoting Justice Brandeis: "in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right." Yet, they often fail to note Brandeis' subsequent sentence: "But in
cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative
practice is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier
8<
’ Burnet v. CorunaJo Oil <& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 ( 1932), Brandeis dissenting.
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decisions. I he Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning!.]" 87 Still, settlement for settlement's sake is deemed to be a higher
constitutional value than constitutional principle or meaning to many
proponents ofjudicial supremacy. 88 Morally speaking, this slights
constitutional principles for the evasive value of closing constitutional
questions and is difficult to reconcile with the notion that the Court will be
more concerned with constitutional principle than will the political branches
or the people. This seems corrosive of constitutionalism because it tells the
Congress to be unconcerned with the Constitution once the Court has spoken
(even it Congress thinks the Court got the Constitution wrong). But, most
importantly, it is unlikely to provide for authoritative settlement in real terms.
So we end up with a distorted view of constitutional meaning, as well as the
evolution, distortion, and evasion of past settlements. It gives us the vices of
authoritative settlement with none of the virtues.
We see just this in the Congress's debate over and passage of the Civil
Rights Act ot 1964, as well as the Court's upholding that Act in Heart of
Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v. McClung. And it is The Civil Rights Cases
of 1 883 that loom so large in this debate. As we have seen. The Civil Rights
Cases held that Congress may not reach private discrimination under section
5. Given that this decision had not been overturned, even if the Court had
Ibid, at 407-408.
88
Alexander and Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,” 1371.
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limited its reach and some members had clearly rejected it89—many in
Congress and the Kennedy (later Johnson) Administration were reluctant to
rest Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on Congress* section 5 power, as
I itle II prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations, much as
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 had done. If the Civil Rights Cases had settled
constitutional meaning, I itle II was unconstitutional if it rested on the
fourteenth Amendment. To get around this settlement Congress and the
Administration advanced the argument that Congress could reach private
discrimination in public accommodations by way of the Commerce Clause
rather than by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. This move was all politics:
Congress rested the Civil Rights legislation on the Commerce Clause because
it thought the Court would uphold it, not because it thought it was regulating
interstate commerce. 1 he ironies abound. Everyone knew Congress was
regulating civil rights, but insisted that it was regulating interstate commerce
because of a past Supreme Court opinion that many thought had been wrongly
decided.
40
Many members of Congress were willing to take a principled
constitutional stand on civil rights, but were precluded from doing so in order
to adhere to Supreme Court precedent. Yet, Title II of the Civil Rights Act and
the Supreme Court opinions that upheld it were not consistent with the Civil
84
The state action limitation doctrine was itself altered by Supreme Court opinions.
Moreover, in Bell v. Maryland several members of the Court were prepared to reject the Civil
Rights Cases out right. Constitutional doctrine was in the process of evolving on the Court
—
surely in relation to political changes—and was not simply held stable.
90
Congressional politics played a part as well, as the legislation was shifted to a more
accommodating committee, away from southerners resistant to the legislation. Lucas A.
Powe, Jr. The Warren Court and American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000 ) 234 -238 .
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RlghtS CaSeS • While the >' managed to get around the Supreme Court's narrow
view of section 5 (limiting it to state action), the Commerce Clause argument
that Title II ultimately rested upon was indirectly rejected by Bradley’s
opinion in 1883. There Bradley insisted that “no one will contend that the
power to pass
. . .[the Civil Rights Act of 1 875] was contained in the
Constitution betore the adoption of the last three Amendments [the Thirteenth,
fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments].”91 As the Commerce Clause was part
of the original Constitution of 1787, Bradley rejected any notion that it gave
Congress the power to reach civil rights. Now, we might think Bradley was
wrong on this score, or we might say that the Commerce Clause has evolved
in such a way as to outrun the past decision. 9' but either way we are evading
the logic ol the ( ivil Rights C uses even while engaging in the pretence of
upholding them.
In a rare moment of lucidity. Counsel for the Fleart of Atlanta Motel
said what everybody knew: “the argument of counsel [Archibald Cox] and of
the government that this is done to relieve a burden on interstate commerce is
so much hogwash; that the purpose of Congress was to pass a law [by] which
some way or another they could control discrimination by individuals in the
United States. The redoubtable Archibald Cox, as Solicitor General arguing
1,1
Civil Rights Cases at 10.
>2
The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence itself had undergone a fundamental
transformation since Bradley’s opinion, culminating in United States v. Darby and Wickard v.
Filburn. For a discussion of these changes, see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Edward White, The Constitution and
the New Deal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
Richard Cortner, Civil Rights and Public Accommodations The Heart ofAtlanta and
McClung Cases (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001 ) 1 15.
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the government's case, refused to touch the section 5 argument, insisting that
Title II was nothing but a regulation of interstate commerce. In its opinions
upholding the Act, the Court indulged this fiction: it felt it unnecessary to
reach the Fourteenth Amendment argument as the Commerce Clause provided
solid constitutional tooting. Out of a feigned respect for Court precedent, the
Court and the Solicitor General perpetuated a constitutional fiction. Just how
is this supportive of constitutionalism and constitutional principles? This gives
us a distorted view of constitutional meaning that is not even in line with past
settlement. So it is difficult to say, yet again, that the Court acts in a more
principled constitutional tashion than the Congress, or that it provides for
more stable settlement than the political branches. Perhaps most importantly,
the promise ol the Civil War Amendments was only realized when Congress
took action: in this Congress acted to protect constitutional rights. And while
this time Congress' action was upheld by the Court, it was done on the
somewhat dubious grounds of Congress's commerce power.
The consequence is that the current Court has persisted in a narrow
reading of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment and claimed
that it alone speaks for the Constitution. In City ofBoerne v. Flores and most
recently in United States v. Morrison
,
94
the Court rejected Congress' ability to
enforce its reading of constitutional rights and, in doing so, rested its opinion
in part on the Civil Rights Cases of 1 883. (I will examine these cases in far
more depth in Chapter 5.) And this, even after a series of Warren Court cases
44
United States v. Morrison
,
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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went some way to rejecting the logic of the Civil Rights Cases 95 Again, this
should lead us to be skeptical of claims that the Court provides for stable
constitutional meaning by adhering to its precedents. Kennedy's opinion in
Boerne is most remarkable as it insists that the Court is the principled
preserver ot constitutional meaning—without offering evidence for this
sweeping proposition ."6 Oddly, though, Boerne struck down an act of
Congress that went out ot its way to protect the rights of religious
minorities—The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA ). 97 In its place
the Court offered a far narrower view of constitutional rights. If we compare
congressional debates over RFRA with the Court's opinion in Boerne
,
it is not
at all clear that the Court is in fact a more principled defender of the
Constitution than the Congress. And, yet again. Court opinions do not provide
any more stability lor constitutional meaning than Congress. Court opinions in
these cases evolve and change as much as congressional attitudes (if not
more). RFRA was passed, after all, because the Court had offered a new
reading ot the “tree exercise clause'' and Congress (perhaps acting too
deferentially )
98
was requiring the courts to return to an older reading. And
while Boerne drew on the Civil Rights Cases
,
the reading that opinion offered
95
See especially Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
H<
Robert Nagel, The Implosion oj American Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001 ) 92-93. And Carolyn Long, Religious Freedom and Indian Rights : The Case ofOregon
v. Smith (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000) 227-250.
n
One could think RFRA unconstitutional on other grounds, without rejecting Congressional
power under section 5. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, “Congressional Power and
Religious Liberty after City of Boerne v. Flores” Supreme Court Review 1997 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1998).
98
Neal Devins, “Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress
Crusade” 5 1 Duke Law Journal 435 (200 1 ).
was rather different than the reading offered by the immediate Warren Court
precedents, shifting, once more, constitutional meaning to the current of the
Court." We are, it appears, once again in a state of constitutional dialogue.
The Congress appears reluctant to accept the Court's reading of section 5, as it
passed the Violence Against Women Act on similar grounds as RFRA. The
Court, tor its part, struck down the act in Morrison
, relying on Boerne. It is
not clear, though, that the Congress will accept the Court's constitutional
interpretation or its claim to judicial supremacy. The result, as I have argued
throughout this chapter, will almost certainly depend on the political give and
take between the branches ot government giving us a sort of “living
constitutionalism where constitutional values are argued over and realized
through political debate and not mere judicial pronouncement. This current
struggle will be taken up in Chapter 5.
n
See Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics
,
264-265.
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CHAPTER 3
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE SUPREME COURTCONSTITUTIONAL DISCONTINUE, DIALOGUE AND DWFT
Either the court must be the final arbiter of what the law is. or else some means
must be found to correct its decisions. If the court is the final and conclusive
authority to determine what laws Congress may pass, then, obviously, the court is
e real iruler of the country, exactly the same as the most absolute king would
be. —Robert LaFollette
'Any citizen whose liberty or property is at stake has an absolute constitutional
right to appear before the Court and challenge its interpretation of the
Constitution, no matter how often they have been promulgated, upon the ground
that they are repugnant to its provisions
. . . When the Bar of the country
understands this, and respectfully but inexorably requires of the Supreme Court
that it shall continually justify its decisions by the Constitution, and not by its own
precedents, we shall gam a new conception of the power of our constitutional
guaranties
. . . What we need is constant and unrelenting professional criticism of
judicial opinions, and constant and unrelenting insistence that judicial errors of
reasoning shall be judicially corrected.’'—Everett Abbott2
In the spring of 1895, the Supreme Court struck down the newly
passed national income tax, 3 held that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act did not
apply to a virtual monopoly of sugar manufacturing, 4 and used this very
same act to uphold an injunction against a labor strike. 5 The public
explosion in reaction to these cases sparked a great debate about the nature
ofjudicial power in a democratic society. The Court was accused of
1 Quoted in Barry Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The
Lesson of Lochner” 76 New York University Law Review 1383 (200
1 ), 1446.
Quoted in Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 1836-1918 (Boston:
Little Brown, 1926).
Pollock v. Farmers ' Loan and Trust Company, 1 58 U.S. 60
1 ( 1 895).
4
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
5
In Re Debs, 1 58 U.S. 564 ( 1 895).
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defending “the propertied class" against labor, 6 of injecting its personal
preferences into law, and of illegitimately usurping democratic power.
Against populist views of democracy and emerging Progressive thought,
the very nature ofjudicial review was suspect, leading to distinctly
“countermajoritarian" criticisms of the Court. The period from roughly
1895 to 1925 is unique in this way, as much of the criticism of the Court
took aim at its anti-democratic nature. Teddy Roosevelt captured this
sentiment in his “Confession of Faith," insisting that “the first essential of
the Progressive program is the right of the people to rule.” 7 And Roosevelt
himself was deeply critical of judges, voicing skepticism ofjudicial
review, and, with characteristic subtlety, suggesting that judges ought to
come into line with the political branches: "I may not know much law, but
I do know that one can put the fear of God in judges." 8 As Barry
Friedman persuasively argues. Progressive criticism of the Court, which
highlighted the centrality of popular rule, was quite different from
criticism of the Court that focused on its (mis)interpretation of the
Constitution. During the New Deal period, as we will see in the next
chapter, critics of the Court generally focused on the fact that it was
misinterpreting constitutional meaning. 1 he problem was not necessarily
judicial power and independence per se—the fact that the Court was
6
Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 1X36- IV 18, 702.
Sidney Milkis and Daniel Tichenor, “Direct Democracy and Social Justice: the Progressive Party
Campaign of 1912” Studies in American Political Development, 8 (Fall 1994): 282-340, 329.
8
Stephenson, Campaigns and the Court: The Supreme Court in Presidential Elections (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1999) 130.
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overturning democratically enacted legislation-but that its interpretations
were not grounded in the Constitution properly read. In the Progressive
era, though, the very legitimacy of the Court was questioned. Indeed, the
traditional narrative of this period paints the Court as overturning
democratically enacted legislation in favor of its economic predilections.
Justice Holmes famous dissenting opinion in Lochner summed up this
countermajoritarian critique:
I think the word ‘liberty,’ in the 14 th Amendment, is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law. 9
Holmes' dissent captured Progressive criticisms ofjudicial power in its
insistence that the proper stance of the Court ought to be deference to
democratic will. This critique was all the more powerful in its insistence
that the Court itself was biased, a sentiment captured in Holmes'
insistence that the Court s opinions rested "upon an economic theory
which a large part ol the country does not entertain" and culminating in
his pithy aphorism: “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”
10
Revisionist scholarship has made Holmes’ easy insinuation—and
much of the traditional narrative of a biased judiciary overturning
democratically enacted legislation
—
problematic. It is not at all clear that
y
Lochner v. New York
,
198 U.S. 45. 76 ( 1905).
10
Ibid, at 75.
135
the Court was simply injecting its personal predilections into the law, so
much as holding to traditional constitutional understandings that were
themselves coming to be deeply problematic as both the states and the
national government first ventured into regulating economic life."
Revisionists persuasively situate the so-called Lochner Court as defending
the eroding constitutional order against dramatic constitutional change,
and not as the lackeys oi the propertied class, twisting constitutional law
to suit their particular interests.
1
- According to revisionists, this early
understanding of the Constitution was altered in 'The Constitutional
Revolution of 1937," a revolution that essentially changed our
tundamental constitutional commitments and abandoned the old
constitutional order. Revisionist scholarship in this way is linked to a
regimes understanding ot American constitutional development: it sees
the old constitutional order giving way to our New Deal Constitution.
Whereas traditionalist accounts see the Lochner era as a corruption of
constitutional understanding and the New Deal as a restoration of John
Marshall s Constitution, revisionists view 1937 as the creation of a new
constitutional order with its own fundamental commitments and vision. 13
11
See especially Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise ofLochner
Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993).
12a
- A view that even seems to be shared by Roscoe Pound in his famous "Liberty of Contract" Yale
Law Journal (1909), where he accuses the Court of adhering to an outdated and unrealistic
jurisprudence.
13
See Howard Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of
a Living Constitution in the Course of American State-Building" Studies in American Political
Development ( 1997); Bruce Ackerman, lie the People: Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1998), G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2000), and Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court (New
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But tor all the talk of the Lochner era and the Lochner Court, leading
revisionist accounts like Ackerman’s tend to focus on the constitutional
struggles of the New Deal years to illuminate the rejection of the Lochner
Court s Constitution and the articulation and construction of a new-
constitutional regime. The New Deal is seen as the centerpiece of
American constitutional development. Howard Gillman’s The Constitution
Besieged is an important exception, but he focuses more narrowly on what
came to be known as substantive due process, leaving out large swaths of
constitutional doctrine. And while almost all accounts of constitutional
change during the New Deal reach back to this period, the specifics of
constitutional conflict remain unexplored. Constitutional-regime accounts
of constitutional development treat the New Deal as a continuation of
Progressive era constitutional conflict.
I his is troublesome because there were, as Friedman notes,
important differences between these periods in terms of the criticisms
leveled against the Court. But, far more importantly, the period of 1 895-
1925 belies the notion that dramatic moments of constitutional politics
result in the recreation of constitutional meaning, giving us new
constitutional understandings, and that such moments of upheaval are
unusual events. The discontinuities in constitutional thought during this
era do not sit easily with critical realignment theory, attaching the Court to
York: Oxford University Press, 1998). See also the exchange between Howard Gillman and
Robert Lowry Clinton in Political Research Quarterly over the Marshall Court.
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the governing coalition of the 1896 election, 14 or with a reconstructive
president who fundamentally reshapes constitutional commitments. 15
While constitutional conflict may have come to a head in the early 1930s
with clashes over the New Deal, and while there are obvious links
between the New Deal criticism of the Court and the Progressive critique
ot the Court, this was a thirty year long era of constitutional uncertainty
and flux: a national "debate over the content of our most fundamental
commitments," 16 but one that lingered, giving us neither a failed
constitutional revolution,
' a crucial constitutional moment, or a clear
constitutional reconstruction.
17
Moreover, when combined with the period
in the last chapter, 1870-1883, this suggests that these so-called periods of
"ordinary politics" are fraught with constitutional struggle. And even if the
constitutional change ot 1937 does have its roots in Progressive criticism
ot the old Constitution, and the emergence of a “living Constitution," the
story is not as simple as the Court defending the old order while the
political branches and the public articulating a new constitutionalism that
eventually triumphs.
This period witnessed neither an evolutionary unfolding of
Supreme Court opinions that attempted to “update" our constitutional
14
Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker” Journal ofPublic Law (1956).
15
Ackerman, We the People ( 1991 and 1998) and Keith Whittington, “The Political Foundations
of Judicial Supremacy" in Sotirios Barber and Robert P. George, eds. Constitutional Politics:
Essays on Constitutional Making, Maintenance, and Change (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001 ).
Whittington, “The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy,”270.
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understandings, nor a great moment of “punctuated equilibrium” that
resulted in dramatic change. Here, revisionist and traditional accounts
have something to teach one another, as I argue in the next chapter as well.
1 raditionalists, I argue, reveal that Supreme Court opinions in this period
were often in conflict with one another and went back and forth in their
understanding. This period was riddled with constitutional uncertainty,
which, in part, is what lent credibility to charges of “judicial bias." At the
same time, the traditional narrative of an undemocratic Court usurping
power is difficult to sustain if we view the Court and the political branches
(especially Congress) in relation to one another, as the Congress itself
often invited judicial and executive construction of legislation (as with the
Sherman Antitrust Act), deferring, in part, to the Court. 18
This period witnessed the national government's first great
attempt to regulate the national economy, an attempt that has come to be
described as state-building, which displaced traditional understandings
of American constitutionalism. But this change in constitutional
understandings occurred, by and large, through the political process, even
while leaving constitutional understandings incomplete. Indeed, it is
1
Ackerman, We the People ( 1 998).
18 On legislative deference to the judiciary, see Mark Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty”
Studies in American Political Development 7. See also Howard Gillman, “How Political Parties
Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891”
American Political Science Review Vol. 96, No. 3 (2002) (noting that various acts of Congress
further extend national jurisdiction from state courts, placing the federal courts at the center of
political disputes. Coincides with increase in governmental activity general, which is then being
challenged in the Courts—often with the approval of Congress—so that we must see the actions of
Congress to realize the Court’s role here. See also Warren. 685-689.
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interesting to note that during this era of constitutional activity, which
witnessed four amendments to the Constitution, a period matched only by
the Civil War and Founding eras
,
20
the most important constitutional
changes occurred not by way of formal amendment, but in the political
arena. This chapter focuses on three key areas of national regulation-
antitrust legislation, the regulation of railroad rates, and the regulation of
labor relations arguing that the Congress (as well as the executive at
times) and the Court were engaged in a constitutional dialogue of sorts (if,
at times, a contentious one) that often left constitutional meaning open or
undetermined. In striking down laws passed by Congress or finding
particular applications unconstitutional, the Court was often asking
Congress to explain more fully the intent of the law. Congress, in turn,
often qualified itself, making the constitutional basis of its actions—and
the reach of the law—clearer. The Court often followed such
congressional qualifications, which, at times, resulted in Court opinions
that were in tension with one another. Yet, in passing legislation, the
Congress itsell often intentionally le ft ambiguous meaning to be resolved
by the Court, deferring, in essence, to the Court's judgment. So even when
the Court limited the reach of congressional acts, much to public dismay,
it is not clear that the Court was truly thwarting congressional will and
settling the constitutional issue against the Congress, as is so often
See especially, Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American Stale : The Expansion ofNational
Administrative Capacity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
•>o
David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U S Constitution, 1776-1995
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996).
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suggested. 2 ' On the contrary, these three areas indicate the way in which
constitutional meaning is shaped by the interaction of the branches of
government and, further, that the Court itself often leaves constitutional
meaning in an unsettled state, working out individual cases that do not
clearly follow its own precedents or theorize deeply and fully about
constitutional meaning to guide the Congress and president.
The tension and uncertainty during this era, no doubt, are in part
due to deep changes in legal thought, with the emergence of Roscoe
Pound's "sociological jurisprudence," the Brandeis Brief, and general
criticism of what has come to be dubbed "classical legal thought." Thus, as
legal historian William Wiecek suggests, "the Court had established two
bodies of doctrine," but ones riddled with "doctrinal inconsistencies" that
could not long coexist. 22 But the shift in legal and constitutional thought
occurred largely because ot politics. 1 he demand tor more governmental
intervention and the persistent attempt to make the Court clarify itself or
reconsider its thought were a result ot the political demands of the day.
I he reworking ot constitutional thought during the Progressive era was a
result ot its particular politics, namely, the insistence that the government
regulate the national economy, intervene on behalf the of laborer, protect
the consumer, and the like, all of which required a more expansive view of
constitutional authority. It is the particular historical clashes rooted in the
George Lovell, “As Harmless as an Infant: Deference, Denial, and Adair v. United States”
Studies in American Political Development
, 14 (Fall 2000) 212-233.
William Wiecek, The Lost World oj Classical Legal Thought (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001 ) 164.
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politics ot the day that shaped and reworked constitutional meaning during
this period, and such a reworking was based upon the political imperatives
of the time.
Woodrow Wilson's great Constitutional Government in the United
States reveals just such thinking, as it reads as an extended argument with
James Madison, calling upon us to drop this archaic Newtonian
Constitution—which holds us in "inactive equilibrium”—in favor of
Darwinian evolution: the Constitution must change to meet the demands
ol the day.
23
Yet, it is not without irony that this reworking of
constitutional thought occurred, by and large, through the Madisonian
separation ol powers. I rue, it did not allow for the neat "evolution" of
constitutional meaning in a lorward-looking
—that is progressive
direction, but neither did the Madisonian Constitution hold us in “inactive
equilibrium.”
Ihe Riddle of Antitrust: Congress, the Court, and the Sherman Act
In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, which made
"contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade" illegal. The Act,
against growing concentration in industrial relations, was seen in part as a way of
protecting the market, but has perhaps best come to be seen as a symbolic act
aimed to satiate public desires for action against the "trusts" while leaving the
larger meaning ot the Act to be worked out by the executive and especially the
Daniel Stid, The President us Statesman: Woodrow Wilson and the Constitution (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1998) and Eldon Eisenach, The Lost Promise ofProgressivism
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994).
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courts
.
24
After all, the Act was passed with virtually no opposition (one vote
against it in the Senate and none in the House), casting doubt on the Act as a clear
outline ot antitrust policy. The Act provided the government the opportunity to
take action against such restraints on trade, prosecuting the businesses,
particularly the trusts, attempting to restrain trade to gam a competitive advantage
or fix prices to their benefit. These cases, fieshed out over more than a decade,
were among the most high-profile cases of the day, with prosecutions under the
Act brought by the executive branch—much to the attention of the public and the
media. Yet, while the administration had primary responsibility for bringing
prosecutions, the Court was called upon to interpret the reach of the Act and its
constitutional application. As the sponsor of the Act himself put it, the application
must be left open lor the Courts to determine in each particular case .'’25 Thus
when Corwin refers to the “judicial legislation” surrounding antitrust, he is not far
off the mark. It is Congress, though, that invited such policy making from the
bench . 26 And, as Corwin himself notes, when Teddy Roosevelt breathed life into
the government s antitrust policy, the Court overwhelmingly upheld such
prosecutions and, in time, moved into line with his reading of the Act.
Donald Morgan, Congress and the Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966)
142. See also Melvin Urofsky and Paul Finkelman, A March ofLiberty: A Constitutional History
oj the United States, Volume II: From 1877 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press.
2002) 535. Scott James argues that the act merely federalized the common law, which only limited
"unreasonable" restraints upon trade, but was reinterpreted by the executive branch for largely
political reasons. Scott James, "Prelude to Progressivism: Party Decay, Populism, and the Doctrine
of 'Free and Unrestricted Competition' in American Antitrust Policy, 1890-1897" Studies in
American Political Development, 13 (Fall 1999): 288-336.
" 5
Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty,” 52. James notes that the Act was misnamed, as
Sherman's original intent was altered by the final bill, "Prelude to Progressivism," 294.
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1 he Court's first foray into the field came in 1 895. In what was popularly
know as the “Sugar Trust Case,” the government sought an injunction under the
Sherman Act to prevent the American Sugar Refining Company from acquiring
four competing sugar producers in Pennsylvania, which would give it control of
ninety-eight percent of the sugar market in the United States. The Court's opinion
in EC Knight was the first time it touched on the Sherman Act, and in an opinion
tor the Court with only Justice Harlan dissenting. Chief Justice Fuller found the
Sugar Trust beyond the reach of Sherman Act. Fuller's opinion upheld the
Sherman Act as constitutional by essentially merging it with his reading of
Congress Commerce Power. And it was his reading of the Commerce Power that
led him to conclude that the Act did not apply to the case at hand. Fuller's
reasoning in Knight drew a distinction between “commerce” and
manufacturing, insisting that the reach of the Commerce Power did not extend
to manufacturing, which was traditionally reserved for the states. Thus Fuller
reasoned that the Commerce Power, and by extension the Sherman Act, did not
apply to manufacturing or those things that only had an “indirect” effect upon
commerce. Congress, Fuller argued, did not in fact intend the Act to touch upon
such areas, a reading which at least found some support in Senator Sherman's
view: the Act goes "as tar as the Constitution permits Congress to go, because it
only deals with two classes of matters: contracts which affect the importation of
goods into the United States, which is foreign commerce, and contracts which
affect the transportation and passage of goods from one State to another. The
Congress of the United States can go no farther than that. It is claimed by no one
144
that it can ."’
7
Moreover, Attorney General Richard Olney who argued the case,
noted that "any literal application of the provisions of the statute is out of the
question ."- 8 Fuller offered a formal distinction between direct" and •indirect"
effects on commerce that was seen as an inherent part of the Commerce Power
and one that many of the Sherman Act's supporters embraced, and one even
shared by Attorney General Olney.w Justice Harlan, in a familiar position of lone
dissenter, forcefully objected to this reading of both the Commerce Power and the
Sherman Act (which were one and the same in Fuller's reading). Yet the reach of
Knight—and its seeming limitation of the Sherman Act—was itself quickly
qualified in subsequent cases.
I he move away from Knight is important, as it paved the way for far more
regulation of antitrust than the opinion itself would seemingly allow and suggests
a far more complex relationship between the Court, the Congress, and the
executive than leaving it with E. C. Knight would suggest. As Owen Fiss notes,
traditionalists like Alan Westin end the discussion with Knight
,
giving credence to
such claims that the Court was willfully anti-democratic and bent on curbing
congressional power against any kind of economic regulation
.
30
But antitrust does
not end with Knight; indeed, the Court almost immediately qualified its broad and
deep construction of the Commerce Clause.
7
Morgan, Congress and the Constitution
,
144.
8
James, "Prelude to Progressivism," 313.
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Owen Fiss, The Troubled Beginnings ofthe Modern State (New York: MacMillian, 1994) I 14.
See also Alan l-urman Westin, "The Supreme Court, The Populist Movement and the Campaign of
1896" The Journal ofPolities, Volume 15, Number I (1953). This is true, too, of Donald Grier
145
The Court's opinions that immediately followed Knight in the spring of
1 895, though, lent credence to Westtn's claims that it was manipulating
constitutional meaning to protect the propertied class against ordinary citizens.
First, in Pollock
,
the Court held that a national tax on incomes over $4,000 (less
than one percent of the population at the time) was an unconstitutional
''direct"
tax.
31
The Pollock opinion caused far more of a public opinion storm than Knight.
as it was seen to run counter to Supreme Court precedents—one dating back to
the Founding generation-that suggested such a moderate tax was constitutional.
While the Court did not explicitly overturn these precedents, its attempt to
distinguish them from earlier cases was unpersuasive. The Democratic Platform
in 1 896 even went so far as to say that not only was "Pollock in error, but that it
departed from previous rulings issued 'by the ablest judges who have ever sat on
that bench. While Pollock itself is beyond the scope of our analysis, it should
not escape notice that its uneasy relationship to past precedent and the peculiar
circumstances under which the opinion itself was rendered—where the switch of
Stephanson Jr., C ampaigns and the Court: 7he US. Supreme Court in Presidential Elections(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) I 17.
' ln Pollock I the Court stuck down a section of the income tax provision of Wilson-Gorman
Tariff Act of 1 894, distinguishing between a tax on income and a tax on real estate, which he
equates with a direct tax and, therefore, read it as unconstitutional. Attorney General Olney
petitioned for a direct rehearing, suggesting the executive branch did not buy the Court’s opinion
and sought to change it immediately (Fiss, 97). In Pollock II (1895) the Court stuck down all
provisions of the income tax, but in doing so, seemingly rejected early Supreme Court opinions—
Hylton v. United States ( 1 796) and Springer v. United States (1881 )—thus revealing how the
judiciary does not always follow its own precedents and putting the lie to the notion that it alone
can provide stability. Moreover, the Court, under pressure from Congress, public opinion, and the
President upheld a similar tax on corporations in Flint v. Stone Tracy Company ( 1 909) prior to the
enactment and ratification of the 16 th Amendment (which, of course, made the income tax
constitutional). Moreover, the switch in votes (and reasoning) from Pollock 1 to II occurred in the
very same year! How is this authoritative settlement? (Fiss 77).
32
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a single justice changed the outcome in such a far reaching case-should lead us
to be skeptical of easy claims ofjudicial stability against the political fluctuation
of the Congress.
Perhaps even more important was In re Debs, where the Court upheld an
injunction against the Pullman Strike. Under the leadership of Eugene V. Debs,
the American Railway Union staged a strike against any train carrying a Pullman
car. The strike crippled rail transportation and United States Attorney General
Olney sought an injunction under the terms of the Sherman Antitrust Act. calling
the strike a "conspiracy'' and "combination" to hinder trade. Adding to the
appearance ot bias in favor of capital and against labor was the fervor with which
Olney prosecuted Debs, a fervor that was not as readily apparent in his argument
before the Supreme Court that very term in £ C. Knight. Indeed. Olney himself
voted against the Sherman Act while a member of Congress and expressed deep
skepticism of the law. writing to a friend that he believed both the income tax and
the Sherman Act “to be no good ”33 The Supreme Court upheld the injunction,
leading Westin to note with superb irony that this was the government's "first
successful criminal prosecution based upon the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court
thus struck down not the oil trust, or the sugar or beef or steel trusts, but the union
trust[.] Westin overstates his case, as Justice Brewer's opinion for the Court
did not, in tact, uphold the injunction based on the Sherman Act—even though it
did not distance itself from the lower court, which did—but on the constitutional
Westin, 27. See also Stephenson,
34
Ibid.
19.
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grounds that the state must be able to preserve order. 35 Westin. though, is surely
right in noting the uneasy-perhaps even contradictory-notion of national power
within the Court's optnions. In £. C Knight, the Commerce Power could not
intrude into the realm of manufacturing, which was constitutionally reserved for
the states, no matter how much it might affect interstate commerce, while in Debs.
national power to put down a labor strike was seen to be extensive, even if its
constitutional foundation was not clearly articulated. 36 The reach of national
power under the Sherman Act continued to riddle the Court, which, in turn,
engaged Congress.
In three cases shortly after E. C. Knight, the Court upheld prosecutions
under the Sherman Act that, as Fiss argues, helped pave the doctrinal foundations
lor I eddy Roosevelt's more aggressive “trust busting" and are not easily squared
with Knight/ 1 In Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic, the Court upheld applications
of the Sherman Act to railroads openly engaged in price-fixing agreements with
one another. 1 he railroads contested that the right to engage in such price-fixing
arrangements was part of their right to contract and therefore precluded the
government from intervening against them. In the Court's opinion in both Trans-
Missouri and Joint Traffic
,
Justice Rufus Peckham, most famous for upholding
liberty ol contract in Lochner
, fell into line with the government's position that
the Sherman Act applied to all “restraints on trade," including contracts to limit
” In re Debs at 599.
John Semonche, Charting the Future: The Supreme Court Responds to a Changing Society,
IH90-1920 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978) 2 18.
,7
Fiss, Troubled Beginnings, I 19-121.
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trade, adopting a per se reading of the Act. 3’ In part. Peckham’s opinion was
distinguished from £. C. Knight in thal the railroads were dearly engaged in
transportation—a form of commerce—and thus fell within Knight v distinction
between "commerce’' and “manufacturing.” And Peckham even invoked a notion
of "direct" and "indirect." noting that price-fixing schemes had a "direct” impact
on interstate commerce and therefore clearly fell within the terms of Knight. Yet.
a question remained that sat uneasily with another emerging line of constitutional
thought, articulated in Allgyer and the soon-to-be decided Lochner case: what
justified the intrusion into “liberty of contract” here? Peckham’s answer was that
the railroads were different. As the “highways of the nation” they were uniquely
affected with a public interest, marking them off, say, from bakers, and thus
allowing governmental regulation in ways that would not be extended to other
industries. The very next year, though, Addyston Pipe brought this logic into
doubt
.
40
In this case, six manufacturers of cast iron pipe colluded together to fix-
prices, deemed necessary, as in the two railroad cases above, to prevent ruinous
competition. Peckham again wrote for the Court, only this time he commanded a
unanimous Court. The opinion upheld the government's action, but in order to do
so it had to get around E. C. Knight and expand upon Trans-Missouri and Joint
Traffic. Following the logic of Knight, the pipe manufactures would seem to fall
38
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 1 66 U.S. 290 ( 1 896) and United States v.
Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
See James, "Prelude to Progressivism" arguing that the government's reading of the Sherman
Act was based on the electoral politics of 1896.
40
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 21
1 (1899).
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under ihe distinction between “commerce” and "manufacturing” (they were, after
all, making goods) and therefore not come under Congress' Commerce Power or
the Court's reading of the Sherman Act. As Fuller had reasoned there.
C ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it "41 He went on:
Manufacture is transformation—the fashioning of raw materials
mto a change of form for use. The functions ofcommerce are
different. The buying and selling and transportation incidental
thereto constitute commerce. If it be held that the term includes the
regulation ot all such manufactures as are intended to be the
subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible todeny that it would also include all productive industries that
contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress
would be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to
regulate
. . .every branch of human industry
.
42
In Addyston
. Peckham held that “certain kinds of private contracts
. . . directly, as
already stated, limit or restrain, and hence regulate interstate commerce .',43
Private companies could not take up this governmental function, one that
Congress had legitimately taken up in passing the Sherman Act:
I he power to regulate such commerce, that is, the power to
prescribe the rules by which it shall be governed is vested in
Congress, and when Congress has enacted a statute such as the one
in question, any agreement or combination which directly operates,
not alone upon the manufacture, but upon the sale, transportation
and delivery of an article of interstate commerce, by preventing or
restricting its sale, etc., thereby regulates interstate commerce to
that extent and to the same extent trenches upon the power of the
national legislature and violates the statute . 44
4
1
E. C. Knight at 1
2
42
Ibid, at 14.
45
Addyston at 229.
44
Ibid, at 241-242.
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While this logic might technically get Peckham around E. C. Knight, it showed
the Court s formal distinction between “commerce” and "manufacturing” to be
somewhat capricious—and raised grave concerns about the stability of the Court's
doctrine. As Harlan had insisted, dissenting in E. C. Knight
,
why should we close
our eyes to the fact that a virtual monopoly on the manufacture of sugar is.
ineluctably, going to have an impact on its sale in interstate commerce?45 Surely
such a concentration of power affected commerce as much as the price-fixing
scheme in Addystun. Peckham's logic in Addyston shares more with Harlan's
dissent in Knight than Fuller's majority opinion—yet, perhaps oddly, both justices
joined it. Indeed, Peckham at one point in the opinion seemed to suggest that
Congress Commerce Power was plenary: “The reasons which may have caused
the framers of the Constitution to repose the power to regulate interstate
commerce in Congress do not, however, affect or limit the extent of the power
itself."
46
Such a reading was clearly inconsistent with Knight. And, just as surely,
Peckham s opinions seemed to expand the logic of Trans-Missouri and Joint
Traffic in narrowing the notion of "liberty of contract. ' In these two opinions,
governmental power to limit liberty of contract was due to the nature of railroads
being affected with a public interest. In Addyston
,
the Commerce Clause itself
was deemed to limit the right to contract (whether affected with a public interest
or not).
Addyston
,
then, seemed to pave the way for a far more expansive
regulation of antitrust than Knight or even the later railroad cases. And Teddy
45 E C. Knight at 44.
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Roosevelt began a highly public campaign to enforce the Sherman Act most
notably bringing a suit to prevent the merging of the Great Northern and Northern
Pacific Railroads in Northern Securities
,
47
This 1905 case, combined with
another, Swift & Co. v. United States
, reopened the reach of the Sherman Act and
the Commerce Power, leaving it unclear whether the newly decided trio of cases
above were still good law. 48 In Northern Securities
, the Northern Securities
Holding Company was created under charter in New Jersey—known often as the
traitor state for its loose corporation laws—tor the express purpose of merging
these two railroads and, thereby, putting an end to competition between them. So
was this a “combination in restraint of trade” under the terms of the Sherman Act?
In its briet betore the Court, the government cited these earlier cases, but also
spoke ot the commerce power in nearly plenary terms: “Congress can regulate
anything and everything in the sense that it can prohibit and prevent its use in a
way that will defeat the law that Congress may constitutionally enact,” citing
Champion v. Ames and going on to argue that “the ‘penetrating and all-
embracing nature of this power has often been stated, explained, and emphasized
by this Court. Gibbons v. Ogden."w The Court upheld the government's
application ot the Act, but split on the reasoning, leaving the state of antitrust (and
the meaning of the Commerce Clause) in disarray. Harlan's opinion for only four
4<>
Addyston at 228.
47
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
48 And Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 ( 1905) itself seemed at odds with Hopkins v.
United States ( 1898), which limited Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce on stockyard
sales of out-of-state cattle, not seeing this movement as part of the flow of interstate commerce.
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justices sat with the logic of the government’s position, as well as Trans-Missouri
,
Joint Pipe
, and Addyston
, even if it threw off some of the limitations in
Peckham's opinions. Harlan reasoned that the combination of these two railroads
would have a direct impact on interstate commerce, limiting competition and
necessarily operating as a restraint upon interstate trade. Not only did this bring
the action under the Sherman Act. for Harlan, much as he had argued in E. C
Knight, it was the impact upon commerce (not the distinction between commerce
and manufacturing) that was central to governmental power under the Commerce
Clause. Justice White dissented on just this issue.
White suggested this case did not fall under the Sherman Act or the
Commerce C lause, because it was not. properly speaking, a railroad case, but a
stock case. The Northern Securities Holding Company had acquired the railroads
in a stock swap, and while this might have an “indirect" effect upon commerce,
the action itself was properly regulated by the states and not by Congress. In this.
White adhered to the distinction of £ C. Knight
,
suggesting that to allow
Congress to reach all such transactions would throw of all limits on the
Commerce Power and intrude on the constitutionally reserved powers of the states
in the Tenth Amendment. White thus clung to a formal distinction that Harlan
rejected: “there was no actual investment, in any substantial sense, by the
Northern Securities Company in the stock of the two constituent companies. It
was, in form, such a transaction, it was not, in fact, one of that kind .”
50
For
Harlan, behind the formality of a stock acquisition, it was a combination in
Ibid, at 353-354.
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restraint of trade: the company was created. Harlan pointed out, for this very
purpose and no other. The Court could not ignore this fact, and the inevitable
restraint on trade made the Sherman Act applicable. Here, too. White disagreed.
Drawing on his dissenting opinions in Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic, White
reasoned that the Sherman Act did not apply to all restraints on trade, but only
unreasonable restraints on trade. In all of these railroad cases (though Northern
Securities need not go so tar as it was not about trade) the agreements leading to
restraint on trade were made to preserve the industry and bring order to the
market, they were thus reasonable restraints on trade, permissible under this
construction ot the Sherman Act (and Commerce Clause)—a reading that finds at
least some tooting in the legislative record, referring to the common law and
reasonable against unreasonable ' 1 restraints on trade, and one that the
Cleveland Administration had partly embraced
.
51
Justice Brewer held in favor of the government, but wrote a separate
concurrence rather than joining Harlan's opinion and agreed with White's
construction of the Sherman Act. This was a construction, in fact, that Roosevelt
partly shared, though Attorney General Philander Knox argued that “the words in
restraint ot trade as used in the act extend to any and all restraints whether
reasonable or unreasonable, partial or total [.]” 52 But Brewer, like Roosevelt, saw
the Northern Securities Holding Company as an “unreasonable” restraint on
trade .
53
51
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The multiplicity of opinions in Northern Securities
—and the tension in
their logic—offered the government little guidance on the meaning of the
Commerce Power. But the Court, as it did in the earlier cases, essentially came
into line with the government's reading of the Act. Even so, it was unclear
whether the Sherman Act applied to all restraints on trade or only unreasonable
restraints on trade. Shortly after the decision, the Roosevelt Administration
brought suits against Standard Oil and the American Tobacco Company that were
as publicly visible as the Northern Securities suit had been. Moreover, Roosevelt
saw the Sherman Act as applying to contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that
lead to unreasonable restraints on trade, which would be determined by the
government under the reach of the Commerce Power, departing from earlier
readings of the Act. Restraints on trade that were reasonable, that brought order to
the market and were deemed to be in line with the public interest, were not
impermissible under the terms of the Act. Arguing before the Court, the
government itself suggested if the Act were so constructed, it would still apply to
this case.
4
for Roosevelt, this should be determined on a case-by-case basis by
the executive branch, but such an approach required an ad hoc approach from the
Court as well, leading to a "patchwork ot often conflicting opinions" as the details
were worked out . 55 The Taft Administration continued the suits and adhered to
American Tobacco at 1 12. A brief partly written by James McReynolds, who would later join
the “four horsemen” in drawing formal distinctions about the commerce clause, distinguished the
case at bar from E C. Knight and even called for a practical, case by case, evaluation of interstate
commerce.
Loren Beth, The Development oj the American Constitution (New York: Harper and Row, 1971
)
141. There is a question of whether TR’s reading was consistent with the original terms of the
Sherman Act, but it certainly shows that the Act itself left this discretion to the executive branch
by relying on it, through the courts, to enforce the Act's terms. See Richard Wagner, "A Falling
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the distinction between unreasonable and reasonable restraints on trade as well, a
reading of antirus, which Taft himself had articulated as a circuit judge in the
AMyS,0n C3Se
' °» Tobacco
,
the Court, under optnions
by Chief justice White, recently elevated to the seat by Taft, came into line "with
the outlook evolving in public opinion at large, as reflected in Theodore
Roosevelt's recommendations on the trust question ."56 Indeed, i, is remarkable
how the Court opinions themselves track perfectly with each Administration's
construction of the Sherman Act, leading Scott James to "see judicial
acquiescence to the more political branches of government" in these various Court
opinions. 7 White's opinion announced what came to be known as the “rule of
reason," which was first articulated in his dissents in Trans-Missouri and Joint
Traffic and was the basis of Brewer's concurring opinion in Northern Securities.
On this issue of whether the government could reach a holding company under
the terms of the Act (which, again, embraced the Commerce Clause), White
abandoned his dissents in these cases, which had adhered to the federalism
distinction between commerce and manufacture, permitting the government to
regulate all unreasonable restraints on trade, even those that would, in the
language of Fuller s Knight opinion, only “indirectly" affect commerce. But.
much like Fuller had done in Knight, White read the Sherman Act as embracing
the Commerce Clause, insisting that there was no “right" to engage in a contract
Out: The Relationship Between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Theodore Roosevelt” Journal of
Supreme Court History Vol. 27 No. 2 (2002),
Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American Constitution
,
422. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. I (1910) and American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106(1911).
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to “unreasonably” restrain trade. Thus there was no legitimate liberty objection to
Congress' regulation—under the Commerce Power—of an unreasonable restraint
on trade. Much like in Northern Securities
, the government sought to prevent a
holding company that would, inevitably, restrain trade and competition. Once
more, the Court came into line with the Administration's position. This brought
some settlement to the area of antitrust—with the Court conforming to the
political branches' view—but it seemingly left the E. C. Knight reading of the
Commerce Power a relic of history.
I he opinion, though, only settled the meaning of the Sherman Act, while
the reach of the Commerce Clause—and the applicability of Knight-vras left
unclear. Could the government reach any such restraints that had an impact on
interstate commerce (thus marginalizing E. C. Knight ), or only those that were
part ol commerce itself (thus adhering to Knight s distinction between commerce
and manufacture)? The unsteady tension was compounded by the Court's earlier
unanimous opinion in Swift, where it upheld that a combination of meatpackers
came under Congress Commerce Power, as their activities. Holmes reasoned for
the Court, were within “the current of commerce.” The current of commerce
theory was utterly at odds with E. C. Knight 's formal distinction between
manufacturing and commerce, as well as its insistence that Congress may only
reach those things that have a “direct" rather than "indirect” affect upon
commerce. Two other cases from these years, the Lottery Case and oleomargarine
case, also sit uneasily with E. C. Knight as they seem to countenance the
Commerce Clause as a sort of federal police power, which was flatly rejected in
157
Kmghl. 1 he oleomargarine case is especially troublesome as it upheld an
extensive congressional tax on yellow-colored margarine (a tax that was hard to
read as a revenue measure, as uncolored margarine was barely taxed), which
entered the forbidden territory of manufacture if Knight's reasoning prevailed. 59
Indeed, the tact that the Commerce Clause was not the equivalent of a federal
police power was at the root of all the Sherman Act cases, putting these two cases
at odds not only with E. C. Knight
, but the latter cases as well. This move away
from t. t Knight would not have been so troublesome if it had merely been
discarded. But it wasn't. Throughout this period, the Court never reconciled the
"current of commerce” theory with the logic of£ C. Knight
, even while it drew
on both strands of thinking. 60
This has led Robert McCloskey to observe “that the Constitution forbids
those departures trom laissez faire that the Court disapproves, and permits those
departures from laissez faire that the Court thinks reasonable and proper. And
obviously this is not a legal “rule" in any understandable sense of the word, but a
statement of policy, or rather an assertion of the power to determine it.”61 And he
went on to note that this seeming inconsistency makes it “harder and harder to
sustain the illusion that the judicial yes or no is based on inexorable constitutional
commands, and it becomes easier and easier for observers to see that judicial
58 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) and Meray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 ( 1904), as
well as opinions upholding the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 ( Hipolite Egg Co. v United
States, 220 U.S. 45 (191 1)) and the Mann Act (Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)).
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review is operating as a subjective and quasilegislative process.”62 This was. in
fact, just the charge that was leveled against the Court by Progressive critics.
While the justices may not have been as sinisterly political as traditional accounts
suggest, constitutional meaning was in a state of drift and disarray. Caught
between new conceptions of constitutional government and the old constitutional
order, the Court was often at sea, offering little guidance to the political branches
in articulating and settling constitutional meaning. Yet the political branches too
altered their reading of the Sherman Act and at times turned to the Court to work
out uncertain constitutional questions, adding to this constitutional flux and drift,
even while engaging in a sort of constitutional dialogue. When the Court, for
example, clearly applied the Sherman Act to labor,63 Congress responded with the
Clayton Act in 1914, which partly exempted labor from antitrust, stating that
labor ... is not a commodity or article of commerce.” Yet how far-reaching the
exemption was is not so clear, as Congress, once more, invited the courts to sort
this out, both as to what was 'lawful" activity and specifically permitting courts to
issue injunctions it necessary to “prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a
property right. When the Court upheld a labor injunction under the terms of
the Act, both Pitney’s opinion allowing an injunction given this particular case
and Brandeis' dissent, denying the injunction's validity, were plausible readings
62
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61
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given the Act's ambiguity. 65 This back and forth persisted in the clash of politics
without resolution and. at times, with stunning inconsistency, as when the Court
struck down the Child Labor Act of 1916. citing (he formal distinctions between
commerce and manufacturing articulated most fully in E. C. Knight
, which,
seemingly abandoned, were dusted off and offered anew in Hammer v. Dagenhart
in 1918.
66
Congress then re-passed a child labor law under its power to tax, which
the Court struck down as well. 67 Chief Justice Taft first drew on Hammer ’s Tenth
Amendment argument, saying that Congress could not. by indirection, reach the
powers of the states, and, secondly, distinguished this tax from the oleomargarine
tax the Court had upheld. Congress could prohibit the movement of goods in
interstate commerce by way of a heavy tax if the goods themselves might be
deemed unhealthy,” but if the products themselves were safe—the evil here was
child labor—then Congress could not use its power in such a fashion. Oddly, even
Holmes joined I aft s opinion, though in his dissent in Hammer he took issue with
the Ienth Amendment argument and even cited the oleomargarine case as
justifying the Congressional regulation of child labor. We see a similar drift and
dialogue, if more vividly, in the government's establishment of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
’ Duplex Printing v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). See Ken Kersch, Discontinuous Development
in American Constitutional Law: Civil Liberties and Civil Rights in the Twentieth Century (New
York: Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming) 236.
Day tried to distinguish from the likes of the oleomargarine case, by saying that Congress could
prevent harmful goods from moving in interstate commerce, but not goods that were, in
themselves, unharmful—and nothing about the products produced with child labor was harmful
per se. See Walter Murphy, Congress and the Court: A Study in the American Political Process
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
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j he Reach oi the ICC: Constitutional Dialogue
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, establishing the Interstate
Commerce Commission, was the first national attempt to regulate the railroad
industry and did so by way of an administrative agency, which was novel at the
time. Traditional accounts suggest that this first attempt at national administration
was thwarted by a hostile Court that severely circumscribed the ICC’s power, just
as it deliberately distorted the Sherman Act to make it toothless. Yet
Congressional intent in establishing the ICC, much like antitrust, was not
perfectly clear and, indeed, allowed Congress to avoid hard choices by creating an
administrative agency with vague guidelines, which invited the courts to enter the
arena. As one scholar noted. “Congress was not troubled by the Court’s railroad
decisions and showed little inclination to strengthen the ICC during the 1890s.”68
But when the Congress did make its intent clear, often against past Supreme Court
opinions, the Court often followed suit. In fact, the ICC itself was established
against a Court opinion that limited state regulation of railroad rates to intrastate
travel, therefore making clear that interstate rate regulation would require national
regulation.
The Court, though, was itself in the midst of working out constitutional
doctrine that is at odds with revisionist accounts that reflect a coherent structure
of constitutional thought during this period, or the notion of a clearly delineated
constitutional regime. That's not to say that there was not a central notion of legal
1,7
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thought during this period, but that this structure of thought itself was fraught with
tensions and discontinuities that needed to be worked out. often leaving
constitutional doctrine at odds with itself. In Gillman s apt phrase, the
Constitution was besieged during this period. But, as I noted at the beginning of
the chapter, we should remember that this was a thirty-year long struggle. While
this constitutional struggle culminated in the Constitutional Revolution of 1937.
given the unsettled and drifting nature of constitutional thought for over thirty
years, it is hard to see the New Deal era as a unique constitutional moment: a rare
instance ol constitutional politics amidst the norm of constitutional settlement.
This is clearly evident in the realm of rate regulation as the Court maintained, at
best, an uneasy relationship to its own hallowed precedent, the 1877 case of Munn
v. Illinois ,
69
In Munn
,
Chief Justice Waite had insisted that, as railroads were cloaked
with a public interest, the judgment of setting rates—particularly the notion of
whether such rates were “reasonable" or not—was to be made by the legislature,
not the Court. Indeed, Waite insisted that for relief of laws we disagreed with,
the proper remedy was to “resort to the polls, not to the courts."71 While the
regulation in this case was a state regulation, the logic of determining the
reasonableness of rate regulation—whether set by the states or the ICC—would
become a key question over the next several decades. Munn itself was severely
69 Munn v. Illinois
,
94 U.S. 1 13 (1877).
° Munn specifically dealt with setting rates for storage in grain elevators, which were held next to
the railroad, but it upheld the logic of the states setting rates if the industry was clothed with a
public interest. The Court did uphold rate regulation of fares in Peik v. Chicago &N. W R Co 94
U.S. 164 (1877).
71 Munn at 134.
162
limited, just over a decade later, by a Court decision holding that rate regulation
could not be vested with administrative bodies as a last resort: that either the
legislature itself must determine rates or the administrative agency must allow for
judicial review to determine the •'reasonableness” of the rate. 72 The Court spun
this logic out more fully in a series of ICC cases in the 1890s.
In It t v. C incinnati, New Orleans, and Texas Pacific Railway Company
,
Justice Brewer rejected the ICC’s claim that it had the power to fix rates under the
1 887 Act, noting that "there is nothing in the act fixing rates.” Vesting the
commission with such a power could not be construed by the terms of the Act and
the Court declined to extend it so far. 73 Although, in fact, the ICC itself did not
argue that it had such a power "in the sense that the state commissioners or
railways are authorized by their legislatures to establish general rates for all
classes and tor all railway[.] We make no such claim.” The ICC went on to say,
"it is the exertion of no general power to prejudge or to fix rates, nor is it the
exertion ot any power to fix rates in general[,]” but the power to remedy cases on
a specific basis when it deems those rates to be unreasonable. 74 Still, the Court
noted that the Act prohibited "unjust discrimination in rates,” prohibited undue
and unreasonable preference, and prohibited railroads from charging more for
short runs than tor long runs. While the Commission might have the power to
entorce the terms ot the Act, that did not give it the power to set rates, nor did it
give it the final say in construing the statute. Indeed, the Interstate Commerce Act
72
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had explicitly exempted intrastate shipments from the terms of the Act and the
reach ot the Commission, with Congress itself explicitly adhering to the Court’s
reading of its Commerce Power. In Cincinnati, New Orleans
, the 1887 Act was
construed in a way to protect the market, much as the Sherman Act was in this
same period, and therefore only aimed at “unreasonable rates,” a word of art,
subject to judicial determination.
I his reading seemed consistent with Congress' interest in preventing
“ruinous competition” among the railroads and bringing some order to rates in
interstate travel, a tactic the railroads themselves favored. True, the railroads
favored this move in part because they preferred national regulation to state
regulation, but this also suggests a key difference between congressional action
and state action: the interests of each were different. The states had little interest
in protecting the market as such, or ordering competition, but wanted to bring
rates into line with state interests, which were often at odds with national
interests. 1 hus, when the Court struck down state laws regulating railroad rates, it
was not thwarting national public policy. In fact. Congress itself seemed to invite
this judicial determination, as, at first, it did not attempt to regulate intrastate
rates, and its legislation followed the Court's ruling in Wabash
, adhering to the
distinction between interstate and intrastate regulation. 75 Even when Congress
finally stepped into this realm, as I will take up below, it did so for reasons often
74
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at odds with state regulation, in the name of a national market, but even here
Congress often called forth judicial determinations of “reasonable.”76
It was on just this issue of “reasonableness” that the Court and the ICC
clashed. In IC C ’ v. Alabama Midland Railway, the ICC once again insisted that it
was not making a general claim to set rates; it did, however, insist that it was
vested with the power to say what was “reasonableness and unreasonableness,
justice and injustice, preference, advantage, and prejudice, disadvantage”77 under
the terms of the Act. These were terms the Commission was competent to
determine, as it was vested with the power of construing and enforcing the statute,
which, “Congress has adequately provided for[.]”78 The Court's construction of
reasonable regulation in Alabama Midland Railway
, which rejected the ICC's
claim, was also plausibly in line with the nature of congressional acts.
7g
Acting
under the long haul/short haul provision, the ICC had ordered the railway to cease
charging a greater rate for a shorter distance of travel (thus charging the shipper a
higher rate for a shorter distance). Turning to section 4 of the Act, which
prohibited differential charging "under substantially similar circumstances and
conditions for a shorter than a longer distance over the same line,” the Supreme
Court struck down the order, rejecting the ICC's construction of the statute and
insisting that the Act itself allowed for lower rates for longer distances (or higher
rates for shorter distances) if it was required by competition. The Court’s reading
7<
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emphasized the "substantially similar circumstances," noting that more remote
shipping destinations, even though shorter, might be serviced by only a single
carrier, justifying a higher cost . 80 In this, the Court once more read the act as
essentially “market reinforcing.” Moreover, the Court pushed this in insisting that
courts hearing appeals from the ICC were not tied to the factual findings of the
Commission, which allowed courts to investigate and weigh the facts of the case
on their own further highlighting the Court's move to determine notions of
"unjust” and “discriminatory” rates, and even articulating a "fair rate of return,"
which it then got bogged down in articulating just what this constituted.
In these cases, the Court was surely shifting from the constitutional
framework laid out in Munn
, which essentially said that such questions were
properly left to the legislature and not the Court. While Munn was not explicitly
overruled, the Court was articulating a logic that was at odds with Waite's
venerable precedent and working to undermine it. Yet, viewed against
congressional action, it s hard to say that the Court was simply thwarting popular
policy. The Interstate Commerce Act itself invited judicial interpretation in its
very ambiguity and was very likely “designed more to placate antirailroad
agitation than to establish strict control over the roads .”
81 And in Cincinnati, New
Orleans
,
the Court had extended an invitation to Congress to clarify the meaning
of the Act: given the separation of powers, one could not assume that Congress
had confirmed an agency with legislative power (rate fixing) if it were not clearly
74
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bestowed. When Congress amended the Act in 1903 with the Elkins Act. it still
did not confer the ICC with rate-making power. The Elkins Act did prohibit secret
rebates and required the railroads to file their rates with the ICC. which the Court
later enforced. And when Congress finally did bestow clear rate making authority
on the ICC in the Hepburn Act of 1906, under the appeal of Teddy Roosevelt, the
Court upheld the power. 82
The Hepburn Act bestowed upon the Commission rate making power for
the first time, allowing it to declare existing rates unreasonable and prescribe new
rates. The Act was not a challenge to the Court's opinion in Cincinnati, New
Orleans
,
so much as a qualification, as Congress had a chance to clarify the issue
in the Elkins Act and did not. Moreover, the Court itself moved into line with
Congress once it had made clear that it vested the ICC with this power. In ICC v.
UUnois Railroad Company in 1910, the Court upheld the Commission's rate-
making power and even went so far as to say that it would confine itself to
questions of law, deferring to the agency's judgment on questions of fact. With
Justice Brewer alone in dissent, the Court noted that it would not “under the guise
of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative functions by setting aside
a law administrative order upon our conception as to whether the administrative
power has been wisely exercised.” In some ways, this echoed Chief Justice
Waite’s insistence from Munn
, that questions of policy were questions for the
legislature and not to be second-guessed under the guise ofjudicial review. And,
no doubt, the Court had been severely criticized throughout this era for doing just
Semonche, Charting the Future
,
209.
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that-as Roosevelt and others criticized the Court's antidemocratic tendencies.
Yet the Court did defer to the legislature, here, when i, stepped in and made its
pohcy clear. The Court did not retreat from substantive review altogether-cither
in regard to ICC rate making or state rate making. The Court insisted that the need
to engage in substantive review of some rates, to make sure they were reasonable,
could be necessary in future cases and. in fact, the Court did find against the ICC
in later cases. Judicial intervention of this sort was not altogether unwelcome. In
passing the Mann-Elkins Act the Congress even called for a continued judicial
role in this regard. While giving the ICC power to suspend rate changes by the
carriers and to condemn short-haul/long-haul distinctions, granting the
Commission the power to intrude into the realm of intrastate rates in the name of
interstate commerce, the Congress gave the ICC virtually full control over
interstate rates. But even here this power was subject to judicial review of the set
rate s reasonableness.” In response to such developments, the Court, much as it
did in antitrust, started to fashion a more expansive view of federal power, even if
it wasn t easily reconciled with past opinions, or always consistent with future
ones. In the Minnesota Rate Cases
,
the Court suggested that congressional
regulation ot intrastate rates, and even preemption of state rates, might be
acceptable with a showing that "adequate regulation of interstate rates cannot be
maintained without imposing requirements with respect to intrastate rates which
substantially allect the lormerf.] I he Court took this even further the next year
in the Shreveport Rate Case
, holding that the ICC could reach wholly intrastate
O-I
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rates it it could show that such rates actually burdened interstate commerce. Of
course, the Court still held wide sway in determining whether such burdens had
been met.
A leading scholar of American political development has suggested that
the Court, moving with public sentiment, was recognizing the basis of the
administrative state. The Court's “actions suggested that it would now use judicial
discretion more cautiously so as to move with, rather than against, the mounting
political pressures lor change, and that in doing so, it would readjust its position
in the new state on its own terms .”84 The Fuller Court, though, had already
recognized congressional power in its earlier decisions, but called on Congress to
clarify that power. When Congress did so, the Court often fell into line. That's not
to say that this was an easy unfolding of constitutional meaning. On the contrary.
C ourt opinions and constitutional doctrine were often in tension with one another
and congressional intent in regard to national regulation and the constitutional
reach of its power was frequently left unclear, to be filled in by the executive
branch, the administrative agency, or by the courts. It was precisely this state of
constitutional unsettlement—a recognition of constitutional indeterminacy—that
added weight to the vociferous criticism of the Court (as I've noted). As the Court
was engaged in the task of drawing boundaries upon w hat was a “reasonable”
regulation and what was not, critics often saw' the Court's distinctions as
arbitrarily overturning democratically enacted legislation. Even if the Court's
opinions were rooted in strong jurisprudential tradition, and even if the Court was
Stephen Skowronek, Building the New American Stale: The Expansion ofNational
Administrative Capacity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981 ) 261
.
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acting within the contours of this doctrine, critics, as Friedman argues,
nonetheless perceived vast and incomprehensible indeterminacy in the
doctrine."85 Charges ofjudicial will, lawmaking, and bias, resonated because
critics of the Court saw these principles as being applied in unpredictable ways.
Indeed, Progressive critics of the Constitution like Herbert Croly were
questioning these very principles, offering an alternate view of the Constitution
(and democracy) and calling upon judges to defer to the legislature when it
operated within the bounds of "reasonable" disagreement. As with antitrust, this
decades long struggle reveals profound discontinuities within constitutional
doctrine, which remained in a state of constitutional drift. We see this, just as
evidently, in struggles over the regulation of labor and "liberty of contract”
The Ebb and How of Due Process
The year 1908 was, in many ways, as an explosive a year for the Court as
1895, as it again handed down a troika of opinions that set off political debate.
I he Court invalidated C ongress prohibition ot “yellow dog contracts,”86 applied
the Sherman Antitrust Act to labor, 8 and invalidated a congressional attempt to
hold employers responsible for employee injury as beyond the reach of Congress’
commerce power. In reaction to this trio ot opinions, particularly at the height
Friedman, “The Lesson of Lochner,” 1405.
86
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of Teddy Roosevelt's popularity, the Court was accused of man, testing a strong
bias against labor. The fact that the Sherman Act was applied to labor in
constraining trade was cynically viewed as evidence, if it were needed, of the
Court's anti-labor animus. This was compounded by the fact that Adair struck
down a section of the Erdman Act of 1898. which itself was passed by Congress
"in response to the Pullman Strike of 1 894 and was defended by its supporters as
a measure to secure labor peace.”
8
" In many minds, this link between the Court's
1908 opinions and its 1895 opinions was a testament to the fact that no matter
what Congress tried, the Court would have its say, siding with business against
labor, and thereby engaging in a sort of lawlessness, entering the putatively
neutral political arena on behalf of business against labor. And at the time, these
opinions were given far more play than Lochner, the case that came to symbolize
the era. The connection to Lochner
, though, is important in Adair
, not only in that
it drew on liberty ot contract," but in that Adair was authored by that other great
dissenter of Lochner—Justice Harlan. Critics of liberty of contract, both then and
now, have thought that Harlan s majority opinion in Adair was inconsistent with
his dissenting opinion in Lochner
, authored just three years earlier. In Lochner
Harlan had voted to uphold a New York maximum hours regulation for bakers as
a legitimate exercise of the state's interest in protecting the health of the worker.
In Adair
,
however, Harlan struck down Section 10 ot the Erdman Act, where
Congress prohibited railroad companies from blacklisting members of railroad
unions or requiring employees to sign “yellow dog” contracts, which promised
Fiss, Troubled Beginnings, 166
.
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that the employee would not join a labor union.* In doing so. Harlan relied on
liberty of contract and cited, even. Peckham's opinion in Lochner. This apparent
tension is easily reconciled. As revisionist scholars like Gillman and Barry
Cushman have shown, Harlan, even though dissenting in Lochner
, essentially
shared the majorities' framework
.
91
In Lochner, Harlan thought the maximum
hours law was a legitimate health regulation, clearly aimed at preserving the
health ol the worker and not tampering with one's liberty of contract for arbitrary
reasons. Congress' attempt to prohibit “yellow dog" contracts, on the other hand,
served no legitimate public interest: it was a mere prohibition against both the
employee and employer. Moreover, the standard for Congress was itself higher
than for the states, as Congress, given the constitutional thought of the time, had
only enumerated powers, not a general police power (like the states). Thus.
Congress' prohibition of “yellow dog" contracts would have to be tied neatly to a
regulation of interstate commerce—a claim that was difficult to make by the
standards of the day . 92
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Even it we may see the constitutional doctrine underlying Harlan's
opinions, revealing that they are not logically inconsistent, we can just as surely
see that disagreements over what was a “reasonable” regulation and what was
not—just as in antitrust and rate regulation—lead to charges of arbitrariness. This
judicial pricking ol lines—delineating what was a legitimate exercise of
governmental power and what was not—left constitutional doctrine in a shifting
state. The apparent disconnection between social demands and constitutional
thought only added to Progressive criticism of a shifting Court. Presidents
Roosevelt and Wilson began to articulate new constitutional standards, not only
viewing the president s constitutional authority tar more expansively, which
included a general call for constitutional adaptation. As Roosevelt suggested: the
Constitution "must be interpreted not as a straight jacket, not as laying the hand of
death upon our development, but as an instrument designed for the life and
healthy growth ol the Nation." Wilson echoed this thinking, calling for Darwinian
adaptation ol principles to changing social conditions, a call which was taken up
by the likes of Roscoe Pound. Dean of Harvard Law School, who began to recast
the law in ways that rejected the old constitutionalism by taking into account
social conditions. Writing immediately after the Adair decision in the Yale Law
Journal
, Pound asked: "Why do we find a great and learned court in 1908 taking
the long step into the past of dealing with the relation between employer and
employee in railway transportation, as if the parties were individuals—as if they
were farmers haggling over the sale of a horse."
93
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strongly with public sentiment, which refused to simply accept the Supreme
Court s reading ot the Constitution, urging new legislation and thinking that was
at odds with (some) Court opinions. But the Court's prominent role also stemmed
Irom the tact that Congress itselt often called upon such judicial intervention
(even it tacitly) and deferred to judicial determinations, making criticisms of
"judicial lawmaking" with the overturning of congressional legislation far more
difficult to sustain. We see both of these strains in the liberty of contract cases.
In Adair
,
Harlan struck down the prohibition of “yellow dog”
contracts, finding that Section 10 of the Erdman Act was not a proper
regulation ot interstate commerce: the end Congress was trying to reach
was not, in tact, aimed at interstate commerce, but at labor relations.
Harlan had, as we have seen, a broad conception of the Commerce Power
which was often at odds with his brethren's reading, but he saw Congress'
prohibition of yellow dog contracts as an attempt to encourage union
organization, which therefore favored one class over another. 94 Such a
move violated due process:
The right ot a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems
proper is, in essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor
to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor
from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the employee to
quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same
as the right of the employer, for w hatever reason, to dispense with
the services of such employee.
9>
Harlan then insisted that “any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify
>4
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in a tree land."% Justice McKenna agreed with Harlan's general framework, but
dissented, insisting that the Erdman Act was an acceptable regulation of interstate
commerce not a suspect species of class legislation—as it was essentially
passed, in the wake of the Pullman Strike, to promote labor peace as part of
preventing the disruption ot interstate commerce due to labor strife. The
difference between McKenna's dissent and Harlan's majority opinion-as they
share the same constitutional framework, much like Harlan's dissenting opinion
and Peckham s majority opinion in Luchner—points to two interrelated problems
that resulted in continual constitutional struggle rather than settlement. First, the
intent ol laws regulating labor as with other aspects of economic regulation
was not always clear. This resulted—in part—in continual disagreement on the
Court, and oft, in whether any particular enactment was within the accepted
bounds of constitutional propriety. Even if the justices were working out of a
coherent constitutional framework, each particular judicial determination of the
constitutionality ol legislation was open to charges ot being arbitrary. Most
importantly, for our purposes, this led to a continual enactment of legislation that
probed the boundaries ol constitutionality against unclear Court opinions. Even
while Court opinions often offered broad-based constitutional principles, the
Court itself was split on specific applications and, therefore, appeared to be
fluctuating, giving the legislature little guidance. This case-by-case approach
invited a sort of perpetual constitutional strife, requiring the Court to act on a
” Adair at 174-175.
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case-by-case basis—applying particular sets of facts to each case—than as a
Court of last resort settling broad based constitutional questions 97
Take Muller v. Oregon w Decided the very same term as Adair
,
in this
case the Court upheld an Oregon statute limiting women in factories, mechanical
work, or laundries, to a ten hour work day. What's more, the Court's opinion was
unanimous and written by Justice Brewer, a leading proponent of liberty of
contract and, though otten forgotten in our age, a leading proponent of women’s
equality (along with Justice Sutherland, another Court "reactionary”). Muller is
famous, in part, for the celebrated Brandeis Brief, where the future justice
compiled a mountain ol sociological data to show that long working hours had
deleterious effects upon women, the perpetuator of the species. Thus limiting
women's hours was an acceptable—that is, reasonable—regulation of health. It is
plausible that the Court—working from Lochner 's framework—found a direct
enough connection between the regulation of hours and women's health and thus
upheld the law. A few years later, in Coppage v. Kansas
,
the Court struck down a
state “yellow dog" contract regulation, relying squarely on Adair and Lochner
suggesting that both were still viewed as sound constitutional doctrine. More
puzzling is the Court's decision in Bunting v. Oregon in 1917, where it upheld a
general ten-hour work day.w The reasoning seemed at odds with Lochner. Yet,
even if it was a general law, applicable to all workers, distinguishing it from class
97
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based legislation, the Court itself later split on this logic. In the 1923 case of
Adkms v. ( hildren 's Hospital
,
the dissenting justices drew on the logic of
Bunting
,
arguing that it was not consistent with Lochner m This was not just
Holmes reiterating his dissenting opinion in Lochner
, it was Chief Justice Taft
who shared the Court's general framework, insisting that “It is impossible for me
to reconcile the Bunting Case and the Lochner Case and I have always supposed
that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio.,,m As Taft argued, if there
was a difference between Bunting and Adkins, it was that the latter regulated a
minimum wage while the former regulated maximum hours. A regulation of
wages—the very heart of liberty of contract, Sutherland reasoned in Adkins—was
thus a far more obtrusive regulation and not justified as a matter of health,
whereas hours regulation might plausibly be. But even it we accept this as sound
constitutional reasoning, it reveals the tact that Court opinions themselves invite
dispute as to their meaning, as they can usually be read to favor different
outcomes. Sutherland insisted that a minimum wage for women was a violation of
liberty of contract, because it was not a valid health regulation. He could either
distinguish the case from Lochner or rest it upon it—his opinion was actually not
clear on this, but either reading was plausible. Taft, on the other hand, saw the
regulation of hours and wages as the same thing: “one is the multiplier and the
other the multiplicand.”
102
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constitutional framework-Taft and Sutherland, Harlan and McKenna, Peckham
and Harlan—disagreed with its implementation in specific cases illustrates how
Court opinions themselves do not settle constitutional questions, but invite dispute
about past cases, constitutional power, and line drawing. These various judicial
responses to persistent legislative probing of the contours of constitutional
meaning were not easily of a piece.
This is not to reject revisionist accounts of the Lochner Era, which suggest
that the justices were motivated by jurisprudential rather than crass political
concerns. On the contrary, I find these accounts persuasive. This is not even to
reject the role taken up by the judiciary in this regard. Rather, it is to suggest that
the judiciary does not operate as the authoritative settler of constitutional meaning
even when we invite judicial determinations and call on the Court to flesh out
statutory and constitutional meaning. Congress often drafts legislation in an
ambiguous manner, or leaves difficult questions for the Court to flesh out. As
George Lovell persuasively argues in regarded to Section 10 of the Erdman Act,
even though the Act was ostensibly a legislative alternative to the system of
judicial control ol railroad strikes that had been expanded in connection with the
Pullman Strike, the law was not, as Karen Orren suggests, an attempt by Congress
to ‘assault' judicial power or to place the courts ‘under siege.' Rather, Congress
included provisions that expanded the powers of the courts by giving judges
important but vaguely defined oversight and enforcement responsibilities.” 103
Viewing the Congress in relation to the Court, the Court is not simply striking
103
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down a popular enactment of Congress. On the contrary, as Mark Graber
suggests, the Congress often defers to the Court, letting the Court sort out difficult
constitutional issues rather than taking them up itself, much as it did in the case of
both the ICC and antitrust.
Focusing our eye more closely on congressional intent, we get a better
understanding of the Court, revealing a dynamic where constitutional meaning
moves back and torth between the branches. As Lovell illustrates, the Erdman
Act was not as prolabor as it is made out to be and thus not as at odds with the
Court's ruling in Adair as it is usually made out to be. In fact, the bill was drafted
by Attorney General Richard Olney, who had vigorously argued for the
government's power to put down the Pullman Strike, which the Erdman Act was
in reaction to. At multiple points. Congress rejected provisions that would have
been much more clearly "prolabor, especially in explicitly removing the labor
injunction from courts, which was labor's most frequent demand . 104 But the Act
did not do this. Neither, though, were supporters of the Act happy with the
Court's reading. Even Olney wrote that “the inability of the Supreme Court to
find any connection between the membership of a labor union and the carrying on
of interstate commerce seems inexplicable." 10 ’ This helps account for the fact that
the constitutional issues in this area were often muddled, rather than clearly
settled (either against Congress or in favor of it).
This persistent back and forth, an attempt to draw lines that seemed ever
shifting, happened with state regulation as well, as we saw with the Court's
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upholding of a maximum hours law for women in Muller
, which was than
expanded in Bunting
,
and seemingly reversed in Adkins m The very year that
Adkms was handed down, former Secretary of State and New York Senator Elihu
Root, a trusted advisor to TR, but one who was often sympathetic to the Court,
said in an address at the American Law Institute that, "the confusion, the
uncertainty" that beset constitutional law "was growing from year to year" and
making it mere "guess work." 107 Root noted this unsettled state of affairs while
presenting the ALI's far Hung project of giving the law a coherent structure, the
particular report of which was aptly titled, "The Law’s Uncertainty and
Complexity." It the mid to late 1920s brought a respite from such conflict and
uncertainty, it was short lived.
Conclusion
In Constitutional Government in the United States, Woodrow Wilson
wrote that each generation ot statesmen looks to the Supreme Court to supply the
interpretation which will serve the needs of the day.” Yet Wilson did not call for
free wheeling adaptation, as he went on to say, "the safety and the purity of our
system depend on the wisdom and the good conscience of the Supreme Court.
Expanded and adapted by interpretation the powers granted in the Constitution
must be; but the manner and the motive of their expansion involve the integrity,
and therefore the permanence, or our entire system of government.” 108 In the
105
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midst ot this call for evolutionary adaptation, with Darwin as interlocutor, Wilson
even went on to embrace a narrow reading of the Congress' Commerce Power
that was at odds with the Keating-Owen child labor act passed under his
administration. Noting that "the real difficulty has been to draw the line where
the process of expansion and adaptation ceases to be legitimate and becomes a
mere act ot will on the part of the government, served by the courts .” 109 Turning
to the specifics of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce to illustrate
his point, Wilson asked, "May [Congress] also regulate the conditions under
which the merchandise is produced w'hich is presently to become the subject-
matter of interstate commerce? May it regulate the conditions of labor in the field
and factory? Clearly not, I should say; and I should think that any thoughtful
lawyer who felt himself at liberty to be frank would agree with me .” 110 Yet
Wilson not only signed into law the child labor act which, albeit ambivalently, did
just this, he forced it through the Senate. Wilson's ambivalence on this question
symbolizes the uncertainty of the age: an age fraught w ith constitutional
discontinuities, partial dialogues and a state that is best characterized as
constitutional drift.
Whereas the Congress of the Reconstruction era had a reasonably clear
constitutional vision (that it ultimately retreated from), the Congress of the
Progressive era was mired in constitutional and political uncertainty. Its
“patchwork” attempts at regulation often invited the Court to flesh out the larger
constitutional questions; on occasion, it was almost an invitation to judicial
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supremacy, as when one senator debating the Sherman Act argued: "I do not see
how we are ever going to know whether this bill is constitutional or not until it
has been referred to the Supreme Court." 1 1
1
But, just as surely. Court
pronouncements that were at odds with the political imperatives of the day were
not simply accepted. Rather, the unsettled and contested state of constitutional
meaning during this era mirrored the political struggles of the day—as disputes
about constitutional meaning are rooted in the concrete politics of the times
which has even been described as a “search for order.” 1 12 If the “Constitutional
Revolution ot 1937” finally brought order and settlement to the government's
power to regulate the economy, at least until President Ronald Reagan's attempt
to unsettle the New Deal, it opened up other areas in which the political struggle
over constitutional meaning persisted. The New Deal settlement and Reagan's
attempted unsettlement are, in turn, the subjects of the next two chapters.
110
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CHAPTER 4
DISCONTINUITIES IN THE “CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION OF 1937”
After the Supreme Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery
Act in Schechter Poultry Corporation v. the United States, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt delivered an extraordinary radio address in which he called Schechter
the most important decision “of my lifetime
. . .more important than any decision
probably since the Dred Scott case.” The Court would soon hand FDR a series of
defeats finding much of the legislation at the heart of the New Deal
unconstitutional. Roosevelt, though, was a staunch opponent of amending the
Constitution to clearly grant the national government power he thought it already
had. The problem for FDR was not with the Constitution, but with the Court's
interpretation of it. This was fundamentally a clash of constitutional visions. 1
1 o amend the Constitution, for Roosevelt, would be to concede that the
Court's interpretation was right. Fie pushed this in a “fireside chat”: “And
remember one more thing. Even if an amendment were passed, and even if in the
years to come it were to be ratified, its meaning would depend upon the kind of
Justices who would be sitting on the Supreme Court bench. An amendment, like
the rest of the Constitution, is what the Justices say it is rather than what its
framers or you might hope it is.”2 Roosevelt was only partly being sly: he refused
1
Howard Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the
'Living Constitution’ in the Course of American State-Building” Studies in American Political
Development
,
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to believe that the Constitution was really what the justices say it is, but he put his
finger squarely on the problem. For FDR, what was needed was a fundamental
shift in constitutional thinking, not a formal amendment to the Constitution that
would then be subject to judicial interpretation. As Roosevelt's Attorney General
Robert Jackson, later elevated to the Court, explained, “it may be possible by
more words to clarify more words, but it is not possible by words to change a
state of mind. 3 Thus Roosevelt refused to concede that the current Court should
determine constitutional meaning, insisting instead that the Court should adapt
itself to the Constitution properly understood.
The ensuing struggle between Roosevelt and the Court, the “Court-
packing plan," and the Court's abrupt shift remain the subject of intense scholarly
debate. 1 view this struggle over constitutional meaning through the lens of
constitutional settlement. The “Constitutional Revolution of 1937" is seen, by
and large, as an extraordinary constitutional moment, a rare instance of
constitutional politics, even while there is serious disagreement over what drove
constitutional change in this period. 4 Writing in the New Republic shortly after the
Court's famous switch, the redoubtable Edward Corwin argued that “American
constitutional law has first and last undergone a number of revolutions, but none
so radical, so swift, so altogether dramatic as that witnessed by the term of Court
just ended. 1 have in mind only the results so far recorded in the actual decisions;
when the logical possibilities for the future of these holdings are considered, the
3
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4
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impression left is, of course, still more striking.” 5 And, indeed, the
"Constitutional Revolution of 1937” has come to be seen as an extraordinary
constitutional moment, a rare instance of constitutional politics and
transformation, 6 that reordered our constitutional commitments by solidifying
expansive national power while simultaneously placing the Supreme Court in the
role of protecting civil liberties. 7 Scholars have thus situated the New Deal in a
way that frames twentieth century American constitutional development. 8 The
Court's protection of “fundamental rights” in the latter half of the twentieth
century from the initial sketch offered in Carulene Products footnote 4 to the
5
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,
Volume Two, edited by Richard Loss (Ithaca- Cornell University
Press, 1987) 369. 3
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Court s recent invalidation of a Texas statute that prohibited homosexual
sodomy—is seen to flow inexorably from the commitments of the New Deal
regime
.
9
This chapter argues that scholarship which treats the New Deal revolution
as a coherent "constitutional regime" is misleading. The politics of constitutional
meaning during this period are not so tar removed trom the ordinary course of
American constitutional development. Constitutional change during this period
may have been more radical, swift, and dramatic than other periods of
constitutional struggle and change, but the difference is one of degree, not of
kind .
10
The Court's constitutional jurisprudence prior to the New Deal was in an
unsteady state, as we saw in the last chapter, as it both adapted to emerging
constitutional thought and adhered to an older constitutional vision. While these
two strands were not always in outright contradiction prior to the New Deal, the
constitutional visions that each strand rested upon were fundamentally
irreconcilable.
f DR s constitutional vision drew heavily on progressive constitutional
thought, insisting that the Constitution must adapt to the times: "They [the
opponents of the New Deal] do not know or realize that the Constitution has
8 On this see, Ken Kersch, Discontinuous Development in American Constitutional Law: Civil
Liberties and Civil Rights in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming).
^United States v. Carolene Products
,
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(2003).
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changed with the times ... We revere it and have an affection for it because of the
principles which it reflects, but in its material applications it of necessity has
changed in keeping with the changing times and conditions.” 1
1
In offering an
adaptable view of the Constitution that would allow the national government to
regulate the economy in expansive ways, FDR was attempting to unsettle
inherited constitutional meaning as articulated by the Court (at least at times).
Given the economic crisis, the debate was much sharper than it had been in the
past (and the programs put forward more far reaching), but it was very much a
continuation of the constitutional debate that the country had been having for over
three decades. And the Court itself was seriously divided on the debate,
vacillating in its opinions and constitutional view as it struggled with the
expansion of national power, revealing the already eroding foundations of
constitutional meaning prior to 1937. The boldness of the Court in striking down
several waves of New Deal legislation in such a short period of time brought this
simmering constitutional debate to a head.
In the ensuing struggle over constitutional meaning, FDR and the
Congress partly modified their initials aims, suggesting a constitutional dialogue
of sorts between the Court and the political branches, as recent scholarship has
shown. 12 But there is a tendency to overplay this. The vision of an adaptable
Constitution, rooted in progressive thought, was fundamentally at odds with the
jural reasoning of a Justice Sutherland, who saw the Constitution's meaning as
11 Quoted in Howard Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the
Notion of the 'Living Constitution’ in the Course of American State-Building,” 23 1
.
12
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fixed.
13
There was little room for dialogue. As Attorney General, and soon to be
Supreme Court Justice. Robert Jackson put it in The Strugglefor Judicial
Supremacy
.
the New Dealers “knew that the constitutional doctrine on which they
were relying had theretofore won adherence from only a minority of the Court.
But they acted on it trom conviction as well as necessity.” 14 By 1941, this view
triumphed: the New Deal had resolved the basic questions of economic
control.”
1
' Constitutional meaning in the areas of federal-state relations and the
national government's reach under the Commerce Clause was settled when the
Court came into line with Congress's and the President’s constitutional views.
This has been aptly characterized in revisionist scholarship as a
constitutional transformation and the repudiation of “originalism” in the course
ot American state-building. Yet, while this settled one area of constitutional
meaning (at least for several decades), it opened up another area that remained
and indeed remains in a state ot constitutional flux. Rather than firmly situating
the Court at the center of a New Deal Constitution where it would protect civil
liberties, this constitutional transformation invited perpetual debate about the very
'
' As Sutherland noted in a vigorous dissent against the Chief Justice’s opinion : "A provision of
the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite
interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another
time.” Hume Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-449 ( 1 934).
Robert Jackson, The Strugglefor Judicial Supremacy: A Study in a Crisis in American Power
Politics (New York: Knopf, 1941)78.
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meaning and legitimacy of the constitutional order (and the Court's role
therein). 18
When the New Deal justices abandoned guardian review of the
Constitution by the Court, the central question became the proper scope of
judicial power in relation to constitutional rights. 14 This debate has dominated
constitutional law and jurisprudence for the last 60 years and remains as the
fundamentally contested jurisprudential issue in legal scholarship and on the
Court.
20
This chapter argues that this, too, is central to the Constitutional
Revolution of 1937, making it is very difficult to treat the New Deal revolution
as a coherent constitutional regime which solidifies the New American State
while carving out an area of "preferred freedoms" protected by the Court. 21 That
the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 removed the Court from deciding
economic questions, or patrolling the boundaries between the states and the
national government, while inviting the Court to take up the protection of civil
liberties has become a virtual truism in American constitutional and political
development. In this analysis, traditional and revisionist accounts of the New
18
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Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy” in Sotirios Barber and Robert P. George, eds..
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Deal merge: both agree that after 1937, the Court's job was to protect civil
liberties. The expansion ot state power and the immediate recognition of
judicial deference led to a serious reevaluation of the judicial role: state-building
and the search tor judicial protection ot rights are opposite sides of the same
coin. Yet, the reconstruction ot civil liberties in the course of American state
building is presumed more otten than detailed.'^ But this recasting of the
Court s role in articulating civil liberties is precisely where agreement about the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 ends.
It is not a coincidence that in the wake of this constitutional change
justices and legal scholars were fundamentally preoccupied with grounding
judicial power. Skepticism ofjudicial will was at the heart of the New Deal
critique of the Old Court; it fundamentally shaped the post 1937 search for
constitutional rights in a way that made it difficult to foster a firm foundation
for such rights. This is evident in the three most prominent attempts to ground
judicial discretion in constitutional interpretation, as initially put forward by
Justices Stone, Frankfurter, and Black. These attempts are united in that they all
begin with the question ofjudicial discretion and attempt to define
constitutional rights in a way that tethers judicial power, rather than providing
constitutional principles that guide judicial interpretation. This move, at the very
22
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22
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But even Gillman, as Kersch suggests, and as I argue below, essentially repeats the “progressive”
model of constitutional development, 86.
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core ot the New Deal constitutional revolution, remains the subject of
constitutional struggle, casting doubt on the reconstructive enterprise of
situating the Court as the guardian of civil liberties (as now distinguished from
economic rights).
I hus revisionist scholars of American constitutional development like
Howard Gillman cannot so easily cast the Court's protection of “unenumerated”
privacy rights as part ot the New' Deal Constitution, rejecting the putative
"double standard”—it Roe
,
then Lochner—as inapposite under the (New Deal)
Constitution.
‘
4
Indeed, this chapter claims that the New Deal revolution placed
the toundation ot "civil liberties” in an essentially contested state. Moreover, the
various jurisprudential strands that come out of the New Deal—as exemplified
by Stone, Frankfurter, and Black—are unlikely candidates for furnishing the
theoretical underpinnings of the Court's later privacy decisions. Thus scholarly
preoccupation with justitying the judicial protection of "unenumerated rights,”
or a more exacting level of protection for some rights rather than others,
including charges of “judicial lawmaking" and cries of a "double standard”
—
remain resonant as well as potent precisely because of the dilemmas at the heart
:4
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of New Deal constitutionalism.25 So when Gillman argues that disputes over
the source ot [fundamental] rights have been transparent surrogates for debates
over the nature and scope ofjudicial power,”26 this is a result of the
discontinuities brought forth by the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937.” In
tact, this chapter argues that the return ot “original intent,” as exemplified by
Judge Bork and Justice Scalia, with its critique ot “judicial activism and
lawmaking" aimed against the Court’s articulation of these very privacy rights,
has its roots firmly in the constitutionalism of 1937. 27 Original intent and its
preoccupation with cabining judicial will is a viable strand of the New Deal's
historical trajectory. Here the ghost of Lochner, and the critique of protecting
unenumerated or substantive rights, continues to remain powerful precisely
because of the thinking at the heart of New Deal constitutionalism. Tracing out
this unsettled inheritance of the New Deal revolution illustrates how
See Barry Friedman, “The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five.” Friedman gives a persuasive history of this academic
obsession, which, he argues, is rooted in the progressive critique of the Lochner Court. Friedman
argues, though, that this obsession is inapplicable to the constitutional debates, including the
public reaction to judicial decisions, which follows the New Deal era. It may well be that we
should get over this dilemma, as Friedman argues, but is advice to “liberals” at times seems to
suggest that they should stop worrying about justifying judicial review in such terms and focus on
the results—do you like the outcome? Elsewhere, “The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner,” 1390. Friedman argues that judicial review should
be justified more in terms of public acceptance ofjudicial outcomes than the “legal” reasoning
such decisions are based upon. But even this move would seem to take us back to debates about
Roe and Lochner. isn't Rue
,
perhaps, just as illegitimate under these terms as Lochner was? So if
this is the true “lesson of Lochner” then this old debate remains just as potent (at least in this area).
26
Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms,” 624.
192
constitutional debate works in fits and starts, revealing constitutional
discontinuities and conflicts in some areas even while other areas are settled,
thus placing the New Deal constitutional revolution in the flow of 20th Century
American constitutional development rather than at the center.
Ihe Court as Catalyst: Provoking Constitutional Conti in
On May 27, 1935, on what became known as Black Monday, the Court
unanimously invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Frazier-
Lemke Act on mortgage moratoria. Attention focused immediately on the
Schechter decision, striking down the NIRA in its entirety, as the Court's
reading of the delegation of powers and the Commerce Power would have
profound implications for future New Deal legislation. 28 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Hughes first found that the congressional delegation of power to
the President, allowing him to establish fair trade codes for a trade or industry,
was an unconstitutional delegation of power. In a concurring opinion, Cardozo
even went so far as to call it “delegation running riot.”29 The opinion was not an
immediate threat to congressional delegation, which was key to many New Deal
agencies, as the Court focused on the lack of guidelines in this particular
Robert Bork, The Tempting oj American: The Political Seduction ofthe Law (New York: Free
Press, 1990), Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment (Liberty Fund, 1998), second edition, and Antonin Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser
Evil” 57 University ofCincinnati Law Review 849 (1989). Keith Whittington, Constitutional
Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1999) offers a more principled argument for original intent, grounding it in the
principles of popular sovereignty and the nature of a written constitution, rather than as a way to
limit judicial will.
28
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delegation of power, which, presumably, could be easily overcome in future
legislation that was more carefully drafted. And the act itself was set to expire.
In tact, many in the administration were quietly happy to see it go . 30 The
opinion s true importance was found in its construction of the Commerce
C lause—particularly given that the Court was not compelled to reach this
constitutional question, as the act could have been held unconstitutional on
delegation-of-power grounds alone.
Rather than stop there, though. Hughes found that the Schechter Poultry
C orporation was a local operation engaged in production and therefore beyond
the reach of national power under the Commerce Clause. The regulation of
wages, hours and working conditions was part of the NIRA regulatory scheme,
so the corporatism of the NRA went, in its attempt to bring order to industrial
competition. To evade the regulatory scheme, as the Schechter brothers had.
would at feet interstate commerce as it would undercut the price of poultry in the
national market and, thereby, undercut the income of farmers. Hughes, however,
found that the Schechter Corporation was not engaged in interstate commerce.
While, no doubt, the poultry had come trom out ot state and moved in interstate
commerce, it “came to rest” in the borough of Manhattan, where it was
“commingled” with the other property of the State of New York and was
removed to Brooklyn where the chickens were slaughtered for local use . 31
“Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were transactions in
0
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mterstate commerce."’ 2 Hughes continued, “The undisputed facts thus afford no
warrant for the argument that the poultry handled by defendants at their
slaughterhouse markets was in a 'current' or ‘flow’ of interstate commerce, and
was thus subject to congressional regulation."” If Congress was not regulating
interstate commerce per se, or things that were part of the “current of
commerce,” the question was, how far does the commerce power reach to those
things that affect interstate commerce but are not of if?
Here Hughes drew on a distinction between those things that “directly”
affect interstate commerce and those things that only “indirectly” affect it, as
most famously articulated in the 1895 Sugar Trust Case by Chief Justice Fuller,
that I drew upon in the last chapter. 34 Under this rule. Congress, in regulating
those things that affect interstate commerce but are not themselves part of
interstate commerce, may only regulate those things which “directly” affect
interstate commerce. Wages and hours, which are part of local production, have
only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce and therefore fall under the
regulation of the states police powers, not Congress' commerce power. “If the
commerce clause were constructed to reach all enterprises and transactions
which would be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the
federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and
the authority of the state over its domestic concerns would exist only by
sufferance of the federal government
. . . Otherwise, as we have said, there
32
Ibid.
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would be virtually no limit to the federal power, and for all practical purposes
we should have a completely centralized government.”35 Hughes' construction
of the commerce power drew heavily on inherited modes of legal though, tha,
were being challenged by the New Deal lawyers. The distinctions between
direct and indirect effects and between commerce and manufacturing found
strong jurisprudential support in past cases like £. C. Knight and Hummer v.
Dagenhart and. as recent scholarship has shown, was very much a pan of the
structure of constitutional thought in the early 20"1 century. 3 '’ Yet. as an earlier
generation ot scholars like Corwin and Alpheus Mason argued, there were, in
this same period, competingjurisprudential strands that had been articulated by
none other than Hughes himself sitting as an associate justice (as argued in the
previous chapter). 37 In the Shreveport Rate Case, for example, Hughes'
opinions seemed to cut against the “direct/indirect" effects rule: Congress’
paramount authority always enables it to intervene at its discretion for the
complete and effective government of that which has been committed to its
care, and, lor this purpose and to this extent, in response to a conviction of
national need, to displace local laws by substituting laws of its own. The
United States v. E C. Knight, 156 U.S. I (1895).
Schechter at 546. Though Hughes did cite his opinion in the Minnesota Rate Cases noting that
local matters could be regulated if they had an impact on interstate commerce.
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successful working of our constitutional system has thus been made possible .”38
Moreover. Associate justice Hughes seemed to suggest that the necessity of
congressional regulation was a judgment that Congress must make: "In such
cases, Congress must be judge of the necessity of federal action."3 '' Hughes'
opinion in Schechter points in a different direction: "It is not the province of the
Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a
centralized system, it is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not
provide tor it
"40
And. Hughes left implicit, this was a determination to be
reached by the C ourt and not the Congress.
In making its case before the Court, the government lawyers were
attempting to build on this second strand of thinking by situating the Schechter
Poultry business within the “current” or “flow” of interstate commerce as
outlined in Swift
,
Shreveport
, and by Chief Justice Taft in Stafford v. Wallace.
Corwin insists that “the Court's application here [in Schechter] of the distinction
between ’direct' and 'indirect' effects upon interstate commerce represents an
attempt to revive a precedent forty years old, and one which subsequent
adjudication had almost completely discredited ”41 This overstates the case. The
period was one of constitutional and jurisprudential flux, which is reflected in
Supreme Court opinions that are often at odds with themselves. In the first
Houston. East and West Texas Railway Co. v. United States. 234 U.S. 342 (1914) and Texas and
Pacific Railway Company v. United States. 234 U.S. 342 (1914), (known as the Shreveport Cases)
which itself drew on Swift.
' sl
Shreveport at 35 1
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40
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decades of the 20* century, the Court was not giving clearly reasoned op.nions
.ha, lay ou, constitutional doctrine in such a way as gu.de lawmaking. Th.s
would only grow worse in the years 1935-1941. As Chief justice Taft had
argued in Stafford, a case which augured well for the "current” of commerce
theory. "This court will certainly not subst.tute its judgment for that of Congress
in such a matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its
effects upon it are clearly non-existent.”42 Was this the case in Schechter? Such
questions had to be puzzled out from the various strands of the Court's
opinions, pulling constitutional doctrine in different directions and allowing for
a variety of plausible readings depending upon the particular facts of the case
and which portions of a particular opinion one wanted to emphasize.
Cardozo's concurring opinion, joined by Stone, is suggestive in this light.
While he did not embrace the conceptual distinction between "direct" and
indirect eftects, he did suggest a serious limit to Congress' power even under
the notion of the "current of commerce.” Cardozo reasoned that: "There is a
view ot causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is national
and what is local in the activities of commerce.”43 Reasoning in such a fashion
would go beyond the limits of the commerce power: "The law is not indifferent
to considerations of degree. Activities local in their immediacy do not become
interstate and national because of distant repercussions.' 44 From here he turned
to the operation of the Schechter Poultry Co.: "To find immediacy or directness
42
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here is to find it almost everywhere. If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the
exclusion of the forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to
our federal system. Hughes pushed this argument further than Cardozo in
rejecting the notion that extraordinary conditions might allow for extraordinary
measures: “such assertions of extra-constitutional authority were anticipated and
precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment.”46 In this way, the
Tenth Amendment became a prohibition on national power, as was mostly fully
articulated in Hammer* 1 Such a reading was not easily reconciled with Hughes’
earlier readings of the commerce power, which seemed to preclude just such a
limit. The ensuing constitutional struggle was precisely about the limits of
constiutitonal power: the New Dealers were not claiming extra-constitutional
power; rather, they were claiming that the Constitution must be read in a
flexible manner, which had potentially grave implications for the traditional
distinction between the “police powers” of the states and the commerce power
ol the national government. In Schechter, the Court, including credentialed
liberals like Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone, was unwilling to abandon
altogether the distinction between federal and state authority in the regulation of
interstate commerce. Even while many New Deal lawyers were deeply skeptical
of Schechter—and some seemed happy to see the N1RA put to death—FDR
would not be governed by the Court's opinion. Indeed, after a few days of
44
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silence, he delivered an impassioned address to the nation, the peroration of
which insisted that in the wake ot the Court's opinion “we have been relegated
to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce.”48 The dispute that
had been percolating tor over three decades was coming to a head.
In the wake of the Schechter opinion, Ackerman suggests that Roosevelt
was forced to sharpen his constitutional vision and "put the country on notice
that the New/ Deal w/as seeking to dismantle the very framew/ork of traditional
constitutionalism. 1 his is partly reflected in the acts passed after Schechter
,
what became known as the second New Deal. As Barry Cushman argues, this
round ot legislation was far more carefully drafted and litigated than the earlier
acts, whose neglect ot legal craftsmanship helped result in their being found
unconstitutional.'
0
Still, the ensuing debate reflected profoundly different views
of the Constitution, partly reflected in the doctrinal tension between Court
opinions, making it doubtful that the outcome would turn on more carefully
crafted legislation. Thus, while the Wagner Act easily passed Congress in the
summer of 1935 (partly because many thought it was unconstitutional), the
Guffey Coal Act was much more contested in light of Schechter. The Guffey
Act fixed the price of coal and regulated wages and production in the coal
mining industry (although Congress provided that the provisions of the act were
4S
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separable: should the regulation of wages be found unconstitutional, the price
fixing provision need not be). The scheme itself was remarkably like the NIRA
in that it regulated an industry by allowing the trade associations themselves to
promulgate codes that would be met by those within the association, while those
who chose to remain outside of it would be subject to taxation. Given the
dilemma of delegating governmental power to private associations under this
regimen ol corporatism, as put forward unanimously by the Court in Schechter
many within Congress and the administration doubted the Guffey Act’s
constitutionality .' 1 Others were more sanguine. Schechter dealt with a
quintessential^ local industry, while the coal industry was of unquestioned
national scope, the subject ol intense labor disputes, and in clear need of
regulation, all ol which could justify Congress' reach in this particular case,
even while leaving Schechter wholly intact. Oddly, though, when Roosevelt’s
Attorney General Homer Cummings was called before Congress to testify on
the act, he demurred as to its constitutionality: “advising the subcommittee ‘to
push it through and leave the question to the courts .’” 52 Roosevelt himself sent
a letter to the committee urging it to resolve any doubts about the bill's
constitutionality in its lavor, "leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the
ultimate question of constitutionality .” 53
The Court lound the act unconstitutional—albeit in a much more divided
fashion than the Schechter case, revealing the constitutional gulf on the Court as
S|
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it touched on national power. Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland echoed
Hughes reading ol the Commerce Clause as put forward in Schechter
,
finding
that the regulation of wages and production was a local activity beyond the
reach of Congress’ commerce power: “The effect of the labor provisions of the
[act] primarily falls upon production and not upon commerce. [Production is a
purely local activity. It follows that none ot these essential antecedents of
production constitutes a transaction in or forms any part of interstate
commerce .”
54
Sutherland then spun out, far more thoroughly than Hughes had
in Schechter
, the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” affects as it bore on
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. “The word “direct',”
Sutherland reasoned,
implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed
shall operate proximately—not mediately, remotely, or
collaterally—to produce the effect. It connotes the absence
ot an efficient intervening agency or condition. And the
extent of the effect bears no logical relation to its character.
I he distinction between a direct and an indirect effect
turns, not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the
effect, but entirely u^on the manner in which the effect has
been brought about. 5
The distinction Sutherland was offering up was a formal distinction, which was
indifferent to actual economic consequences. But for Sutherland, a constitutional
principle could not change in relation to a different set of economic facts. The
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economic crisis the country was facing, a point noted again and again in (he New
Deal's sweeping legislation, did not, in any way. change the principles underlying
the government's power. Sutherland had noted just this in a vigorous dissent
against the Chief Justice's opinion in BlaisMI two years before: "A provision of
the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say. does not admit of two distinctly
opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely
different thing at another time.'06 This was just as true for the regulation of
commerce. The tact that Congress was attempting to regulate a small industry of
little national consequence in Schechter and was now, in Carter, attempting to
regulate a large-scale national industry did not alter the fact that in each case
Congress was attempting to reach an area traditionally anchored within the local
sphere, to wit
—
production. Such regulation was properly the province of the
states and not the national government. “[ 1 Jhe conclusive answer is that the evils
are all local evils over which the federal government has no legislative control
.
Such effect as they may have upon commerce, however extensive it may be, is
secondary and indirect. An increase in the greatness of the effect adds to its
importance. It does not alter its character.” 57 This dashed the slim hopes of some
New Dealers that the reach of Schechter would prove limited. Sutherland’s
opinion, moreover, distinguished Carter and Schechter from the “current of
commerce” doctrine as put forward in Swift. “In the Schechter case the flow had
ceased. Here [Carter] it had not yet begun. The difference is not one of substance.
56 Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448-449 (1934).
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The applicable principle is the same ."58 Sutherland's opinion did not contradict
the "current of commerce" doctrine, but. as Corwin argues, it is in tension with it.
As Taft had put it earlier. ‘‘The application of the commerce clause of the
Constitution in the Swift Case was the result of the natural development of
interstate commerce under modern conditions..
. . it refused to permit local
incidents of great interstate movement, which taken alone were intrastate, to
characterize the movement as such. I he Swift Case merely fitted the commerce
clause to the real and practical essence of modern business growth .""''9 The current
of commerce cases suggested a flexibility that would not be bound by
Sutherland's more formal distinction between "direct" and "indirect” effects.
While many of the current of commerce opinions are littered with references to
direct and indirect regulations of commerce, their collective thrust points
toward Congress' ability to regulate those things that have an impact on national
commerce, thus putting them at odds with the logic of Schechter and Carter Coal
(as well as Hammer and E. C. Knight).
Cardozo seized upon this in a dissenting opinion. Cardozo did not
explicitly reach the question of Congress' regulation of production, as he found
that the price-fixing provisions were well within the reach of Congress' power,
and he did not, given the question before the Court, need to reach the question
of the constitutionality of wages and hours regulations in this case. Still, his
opinion reads as a virtual dissent on this issue as it takes explicit aim at
58
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Sutherland s analysis and lays out a rudimentary reading of the Commerce
Clause that became central to the New Dealers' constitutional vision, as well the
Court's initial articulation of constitutional change.
Mining and agriculture and manufacture are not
interstate commerce considered by themselves, yet their
relation to that commerce may be such that for the
protection ot the one there is need to regulate the other.
Sometimes it is said that the relation must be ‘direct’ to
bring that power into play. In many circumstances such
a description will be sufficiently precise to meet the
needs of the occasion. But a great principle of
constitutional law is not susceptible ol comprehensive
statement in an adjective. The underlying thought is
merely this, that the Taw is not indifferent to
considerations of degree . 60
Cardozo, drawing on a theme that was at the heart of FDR's constitutional
vision, insisted that circumstances must matter and that circumstances may then,
pace Sutherland, influence our reading of the Constitution. Fie insisted that this
was based on past readings of the Constitution as he, too, drew on the Court's
“current of commerce” cases:
A survey of the cases shows that the words have been
interpreted with suppleness of adaptation and flexibility
of meaning. The power is as broad as the need that
invokes it. . . What the cases really mean is that the
causal relation in such circumstances is so close and
intimate and obvious as to permit it to be called direct
without subjecting the word to an unfair or excessive
strain. There is a like immediacy here. Within rulings
the most orthodox, the prices for intrastate sales of coal
have so inescapable a relation to those for interstate
sales that a system of regulation of the one class is
60
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necessary to give adequate protection to the system of
regulation adopted for the other . 61
Cardozo s opinion is redolent of the uneasy state of constiutitonal law in this
period. As much as Sutherland, he is drawing on past Court opinions, even
while offering an alternate reading of the Constitution. This same conflict was
evident in United States v. Butler, handed down months before Carter
, which
struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act in its entirety.
I he AAA was part ol the early New Deal's novel attempt to bring order
to the national economy. In this scheme, processors of agricultural products
were subject to a national tax unless they agreed to purchase the products at
government set rates, which were higher, in an effort to maintain the farming
communities' purchasing parity with manufacturing products. The question
before the Court was whether such a scheme of taxation was consistent with
congressional power to “lay and collect taxes for the general welfare.” First,
was this seemingly open-ended clause limited to the subsequently enumerated
power of Congress, which said not a word about agriculture? Second, even if
Congress' spending power was broader than its clearly enumerated powers, was
this scheme for the general welfare, or was it, rather, a tax aimed at the benefit
of a particular class (which might be a troublesome species of class-based
legislation)? Justice Owen Roberts' opinion for the Court, much ridiculed over
the years, held that Congress' power to tax and spend was not limited to matters
within the scope of its clearly enumerated powers; yet he still managed to find
61
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that the processing tax was beyond the reach of Congress' power. In not
limiting Congress ability to tax and spend tor the general welfare to those
specifically enumerated powers, the Court was putting forth a Hamiltonian over
a Madisonian reading of the clause in this long-standing constiutitonal debate.
But Roberts then declined to address the issue of spending for the general
welfare: “But the adoption of the broader construction [Hamiltonian] leaves the
power to spend subject to limitations .”62 Roberts then continued, “We are not
now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase 'general welfare of the United
States' or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls
within it. I his was so tor the Court, Roberts argued, because this particular
scheme ol taxation tor the benefit ot agriculture violated the Tenth Amendment.
“The act invades the reserved rights of the states. It is a statutory plan to
regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers
delegated to the federal government .”64 Reading the Tenth Amendment as a
limitation on federal power, much as Hughes had in Schechter
,
Roberts drew on
Hammer v. Dagenhart
, which, as we have seen, limited the congressional reach
of power to prohibit child labor because the Tenth Amendment reserved the
regulation of production to the states. This reading of the Tenth Amendment is
crucial, not simply because it was already the subject of contentious debate, but
because, so read, it was a substantive limit on federal power. While this was not
62
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made explicit in Butler
, it was in Hammer : even where Congress had the
authority to act—regulating interstate commerce, for example—it could not
reach those things that were reserved to the states; thus the amendment was in
tact a substantive limitation even on explicitly enumerated powers.
Stone's famous dissent is remembered most vividly for its discussion of
judicial power, which is perhaps appropriate, in that Stone's dissent identified
what would become the central preoccupation in criticism of the New Deal
Court: the proper scope ot judicial power. As I will take up in part two of this
chapter, this question came to dominate constitutional discourse once the
expansive reach of national power was settled. Rather than focusing on the
Tenth Amendment, Stone insists that if Congress has the power to lay and
collect taxes tor the general welfare, as the majority opinion seemingly
concedes, then that power must also include the power to impose conditions
therein. “It is a contradiction in terms to say that there is a power to spend for
the national welfare, while rejecting any power to impose conditions reasonably
adapted to the attainment of the end which alone would justify the
expenditure."
6
^ The Tenth Amendment argument would reappear, as would
Stone's dissent in the coming confrontation between the political branches and
the Court. In the meantime, it was the Court's decision striking down a New
York state minimum wage law in Morehead v. Tipaldo that drew the most ire.
64
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creating, FDR said, a no-man's land were neither the states nor the national
government could regulate the economy. Stone's dissent is particularly
illuminating in touching on the Court s fluctuation as he reiterated his suspicion
ofjudicial will: “Unless we are now to construe and apply the Fourteenth
Amendment without regard to our decisions since the Adkins case, we could not
rightly avoid its reconsideration even if it were not asked. We should follow our
decision in the Nebbia case and leave the selection of the method of solution of
the problems to which the statute is addressed where it seems to me the
Constitution has left them, to the legislative branch of the government .”66 Stone
insisted that Nebbia v. New York
, which upheld a state regulation of the price of
milk, redefined the public/private distinction in such a way that made it
inconsistent with the Court's earlier minimum wage opinions. These earlier
opinions—most notably Adkins— adhered to a distinction between public and
private that the Court had rejected in Nebbia. Thus, following Nebbia
,
the Court
should uphold the current minimum wage case and. thereby, explicitly reject its
(now bygone) precedents. For Stone, Tipaldo and Butler both revealed the
problems ofjudicial power. It was not just that the Court was making decisions
that were properly vested with the legislature, but that the Court's own actions
were not always consistent. Cushman persuasively suggests that Nebbia ,
authored by Justice Roberts, was inconsistent with Tipaldo , but that the Court
was not considering the broad constitutional question—as Stone called for—but
only the narrow question of whether the New York law could be distinguished
66 Quoted in Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft to Burger , 107.
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from the Court's earlier precedent in Adkins. Roberts, thinking it could not,
voted with the majority on this narrow question, even if it pulled against the
thrust ot his reasoning in Nebbia. This may rescue Roberts from charges of
inconsistency, but for our purposes it illustrates the unsettled nature of
constitutional law in this period. And the Court only adds to the confusion.
While the Court was surprisingly not an explicit issue in the 1936 election, its
opinions were actively debated as Congress continued to legislate on the
issues
67
and the broader constitutional debate continued. 68
Constitutional Revolution as Evolution
Congressional Interlude
Recent scholarship has suggested that the second wave ofNew Deal
legislation, which would be upheld by the Supreme Court in a second round of
cases, was informed by these early cases and thus attempted to avoid their
shortcomings. As Peter Irons notes, “all of the Wagner Act draftsmen were
lawyers. In this regard, the drafting process differed sharply from those which
produced the NIRA and AAA, in which lawyers took a back seat to politicians,
bureaucrats, and lobbyists."
69
This has led Cushman to suggest that many of the
problems that beset early New Deal legislation were a result of poorly crafted
legislation and a sloppy legal strategy in pursuing and arguing cases before the
67
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Court .
70
In contrast, in drafting the Wagner Act (the centerpiece of the second
New Deal), Leon Keyserling, a young Harvard Law' graduate working on
Senator Wagner's staff, carefully laid out a “Findings and Policy" explaining
the purpose ot the legislation and squarely rooting it in the “current of
commerce theory. This itself was in reaction to the Schechter decision, which
was handed down while the legislation was being crafted. Even while many
members of Congress were deeply skeptical of the Act's constitutionality given
Schechter
,
the legal craftsmen drafting the bill attempted to distinguish it from
the logic of Schechter. In defending the legislation. Senator Wagner himself
drew on Hughes' earlier opinions permitting the regulation of unfair labor
practices that created a burden on interstate commerce .
71
Wagner even quoted
Chief Justice I alt: "It Congress deems certain recurring practices, although not
really part of interstate commerce, likely to obstruct, restrain, or burden it, it has
the power to subject them to national supervision or restraint ." 72 In attempting
to distinguish this second round of legislation from the first round, the lawyers
drafting and then arguing the NLRA's constitutionality before the courts were
certainly more careful than the NRA lawyers arguing the first round of
legislation, of which many in the NRA itself were deeply skeptical. Still, no
matter how the legislation was drafted, it is difficult to imagine the Court
upholding the likes of the Wagner Act if it adhered to its reasoning in Carter.
We should not overlook the fact that the administration was, in essence.
" Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court
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drawing on a line of constitutional thought that would give justices like Stone.
Brandeis, Cardozo. and Hughes (and perhaps Roberts) a reason to uphold the
legislation by rejecting the Court's immediate precedents. So even while the
government was tar more caretul in making its case, the constitutional ground it
was staking out was not easily reconciled with the Court's earlier New Deal
opinions, however careful the government would be to draw such fine
distinctions. 1 he constitutional divide was widening, not narrowing.
Round Two
Unlike in Schechter, the NLRB had carefully selected test cases on
which to defend the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. the central case being
the NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp , 73 Jones and Laughlin was a large
industrial enterprise with holdings in numerous states. As the NLRB lawyers
framed the case, Jones and Laughlin was an integrated steel manufacture with
raw materials and transportation holdings in various states. Materials were
shipped into a Pennsylvania plant where they were processed and then (more
than 75%) shipped out of the state as part of interstate commerce. Under the
terms of the Wagner Act, the NLRB regulated production and working
conditions as part o/ interstate commerce. The regulation of working conditions
was central, the government contended, to preventing labor strife and strikes,
which would disrupt the flow of interstate commerce in a direct way. This was
72
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all put forward as an appropriate exercise of Congress’ commerce power. In
arguing the case before the Supreme Court, the government's greatest problem
was overcoming Schechter and Carter
,
the latter handed down while the various
NLRB cases were moving through the courts. In both Schechter and Carter
,
the
Court had insisted upon the distinction between commerce and manufacturing:
Congress may regulate commerce and those things that directly affect it, but it
may not reach production. Plausibly, Junes and Laughlin offered a factual
distinction. While the movement of goods had come to a rest in Schechter and
had not yet begun in Carter
,
the goods here were part of the "current of
commerce and thus were within Congress' reach. 1 hus "the government was
not seeking a full retreat from the direct-indirect effects formula and the
doctrine of dual federalism, but rather a shifting emphasis by the Court from
those principles to the principles embodied in the stream of commerce cases." 74
Yet even if these two strands of Commerce Clause jurisprudence were not flatly
contradictory, they were surely in tension with one another, as Hughes' opinion
for the Court would illustrate.
Just before the Court handed down its opinion in Jones
,
the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 had already begun, when the Court handed
down West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish. The opinion by the Chief Justice
explicitly overturned the line of cases upholding "liberty of contract." Parrish
was handed down in the wake of FDR's Court packing plan and landslide
reelection in 1936. Even if the case was in fact decided prior to the
74
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announcement of the Court-packing plan, it looked like a dramatic reversal for
the Court in the lace ot politics—all the more so, as the Court had just
reaffirmed the doctrine of “liberty of contract” the year before in Tipaldo.
resting its decision squarely on the Adkins case, which was now explicitly
overruled. The switch has led to great arguments between so-called externalists
and internalists: the former insisting that the Court reversed itself in the face of
political pressure, the latter arguing that the constitutional change had its roots
in legal thought and not mere politics. The distinction is too sharply drawn. For
our purposes the point is the essentially contested and fluctuating nature of
constitutional meaning at this time, between members of the bench as well as
between the Court and the political branches. 75 While legal thought was in the
midst ot change, this change itself was based on the political imperatives of the
day. It is unlikely that FDR's Court-packing plan was the immediate cause of
the Court's shift and, in fact, the Court's shift very likely drained the plan of its
public support.
76
Still, after the election of 1936, FDR was even more
committed to his constitutional vision and determined to move the Court into
line. As FDR himself later confessed, “1 made one major mistake when I first
presented the plan. I did not place enough emphasis on the real mischief—the
kind of decisions which, as a studied and continued policy, had been coming
s
This is not to reject the fact that the Court is very much driven by legal thought and not mere
politics. I find the revisionist accounts offered by Gillman, Cushman, and White, to name but a
few, persuasive on this question. I’m emphasizing the fact that even if the Justices are driven by
law, the Court does not act as the authoritative settler of constitutional meaning, particularly when
its constitutional vision is under siege. As Gillman suggests, the Court abandoned a corroding
legal formula that was proving unworkable.
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down from the Supreme Court.” 77 Yet, even if Court packing itself failed,
Sheldon Goldman notes that policy considerations drove most of FDR's judicial
appointees after 1937 in a deliberate attempt to remake the courts in line with
his New Deal constitutional vision. 78 So while constitutional change and
solidification did not occur at one moment in 1937, it was the Court, ultimately,
that came into line with Roosevelt's constitutionalism. The beginnings of the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 point us toward a settlement of government
regulation ol the economy, the very nature of this settlement, as it nods to
expansive governmental power, opens up new constitutional terrain with more
questions than answers. We see the beginnings of this in Hughes' opinion in
Parrish, especially as it is combined with his opinion in Jonas and Laughlin.
In rejecting the line of cases in Lochner
,
Adair
,
Coppage
, Adkins , and
the recently decided Tipaldpo
, Hughes insisted, “The Constitution does not
speak of freedom of contract.” 79 Liberty, Hughes said, drawing on Holmes'
famous dissenting opinions in Lochner and Adkins
, was necessarily subject to
the “restraints of due process” and then posited that “regulation which is
reasonable in relation to its subjects and is adopted in the interests of the
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community is due process.”80 In this, Hughes cleared the way for governmental
regulation of working conditions at the state level and very likely at the national
level as well, as he signaled (following Stone's dissent in Tipaldo) that
governmental intervention would not longer be subject to a rigorous
private/public distinction. Thus one of the arguments against the NLRB's
regulation ol working conditions, that it was an intrusion on liberty of contract
by subjecting private industry to regulation without a public purpose, was a
constitutional nonstarter in the wake of Parrish. Whether Hughes' opinion was
a complete break with liberty of contract and substantive due process is the
subject ol much scholarly debate. But whatever the specifics, it began a debate
about the proper scope ol judicial power as it signaled a retreat from guardian
review, a point that becomes more vivid when drawn together with Hughes'
opinion in Jones and Laughlin. Writing for the Court two weeks after Parrish
,
Hughes' opinion began the second front of the constitutional revolution of 1937
by altering the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Again, as with liberty
of contract in Parrish
, it is open to question how far-reaching Hughes' Jones
and Laughlin opinion was; it is best seen, like Parrish
, as the beginning of
revolutionary change and not the end. Hughes found that the activities of Jones
and Laughlin clearly fell under the scope of the Wagner Act, insisting that “it is
a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate or
foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of congressional
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power."*2 Even the casual reader of Hughes' opinion can clearly see the reliance
on the "current ot commerce theory." Drawing on the specifics of production.
he continually places them as part of a larger process. Yet Hughes does not bind
congressional regulation to the “current of commerce theory” alone.
We do not find it necessary to determine whether these
features ot defendant s business dispose of the asserted
analogy to the ‘stream of commerce' cases. The
instances in which that metaphor has been used are but
particular, and not exclusive, illustrations of the
protective power which the Government invokes in
support of the present Act. The congressional authority
to protect interstate commerce from burdens and
obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be
deemed to be an essential part of the flow of interstate
or foreign commerce
.
83
Hughes then continued, in what appears to be a specific rejection of Schechter
and ( arler C oal. The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate
commerce is the power to enact ‘all appropriate legislation' for ‘its protection
and advancement." 84 And that power, Hughes insisted, “is plenary and may be
exerted to protect interstate commerce ‘no matter w hat the source of the dangers
which threaten it .”’85
Cushman argues that given the particular facts of the case and the “current
of commerce theory,'' Hughes could have simply distinguished Jones and
81
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Lau%hlin from Schechter and Carter Coal and left it there. And Hughes does in
fact flirt with this option, leading Cushman and others to suggest that even in
the wake of Hughes' opinion, many thought both Schechter and Carter Coal
were still good law
.
86
Rather than overturning these cases, Hughes simply found
them not controlling. What is more, after stating this broad recasting of the
commerce power and insisting upon its plenary nature, Hughes then began a
move to limit such an expansive reading, noting: “the scope of this power must
be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government ." 87 This insistence itself, while nodding to
Schechter and ( arter C oal
,
was a manifest departure insofar as it abandoned the
formal distinction between direct and indirect affects and between
manufacturing and commerce, which sat uneasily alongside the “current of
commerce" theory. Here, Hughes' opinion drew on the logic of Cardozo’s
dissent in Carter Coal. “We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of
our national life and deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an
intellectual vacuum.
88 No more, the Court said. But even this opinion would be
short lived, as the Court began to spin out the scope of national power that was
very much in line with Congress' and FDR's early assertions of national power;
s<
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indeed, under the Court's cases after 1937 much that
in 1935-37 was now constitutional.
Round Three
was once unconstitutional
The emerging scope of national power became much clearer in Justice
Stone's opinion in United States v. Darby and Justice Jackson's opinion in
IVu kard v Filburn. Amidst the Court's opinions in 1937. Congress and the
administration passed laws that were of questionable constitutional validity if
the early New Deal cases were still good law—and they had not explicitly been
repudiated in 1 937. While in some cases Congress was careful to tailor the law
so as to distinguish it from earlier laws that were struck down, in other
instances, such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 89 and the
Bituminous Coal Act of 1937,90 it virtually repassed the existing legislation. The
difference after 1937 was that the Court was moving into line with
congressional and executive views of national power, particularly as FDR was
able to appoint justices who shared his constitutional vision. The real revolution
took place after 1937, drawing heavily on one line of past constitutional cases,
fissured though it was, but fashioning these cases in such a way as to
dramatically increase the scope of national power and outline the contours of
New Deal constitutionalism. 1 hus the Court situated revolutionary adaptation as
no more than evolutionary change. The real revolution on the Court took place
88
Ibid at 41.
81
The 1938 Act was based on Congress' commerce power, not its power to tax and spend, but it
wasn't clear at the time how far reaching the commerce power was. The new AAA was upheld in
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as the Court reworked. soUo voce, prior decisions in such a way as to
dramatically expand the scope of national power. Furthermore, this reworking
Ot past cases was presented as an evolutionary adaptation rather than a
revolutionary change.
In Darby, the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. which
directly regulated working conditions in the form of hours and wages and
prohibited the shipment of products in interstate commerce that violated the set
standards. I his was clearly a sweeping regulation of production, giving
Congress the power to regulate production directly as part of its power to
regulate commerce. Stone's opinion drew in part on Hughes' in Jones and
Laughlin, arguing that Congress' power over commerce was plenary:
Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not
infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred
on Congress by the Commerce Clause."91 In taking up the question of whether
Congress may prohibit the shipment of goods manufactured under substandard
labor conditions. Stone offered a more expansive view of the Commerce Clause
that went beyond Jones and Laughlin, insisting that these “principles of
constitutional interpretation have been so long and repeatedly recognized by this
Court as applicable to the Commerce Clause, that there would be little occasion
for repeating them now were it not for the decision of this Court twenty-two
Which was upheld in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company v. Adkins (1940)
United States v. Darby
,
3 1 2 U.S. 100, I 1 5 ( 1 94 1 ).
years ago in Hammer v. Dagenhart.”92 There, as we have seen, the Court
insisted on the distinction between commerce and manufacturing, allowing
congressional regulation of manufacturing only if it had a direct effect on
interstate commerce. It was the logic the Court drew on in both Schechter and
( arter Coal. What’s more, in Hammer the Court had insisted that the Tenth
Amendment could be read as a direct limitation on national power, so as to limit
even Congress enumerated power under the Commerce Clause if it touched
upon things—namely production-that were left to the states. This logic was
partly drawn on in Robert’s opinion in Butler. Here Stone dismissed this logic,
asserting that the Tenth Amendment was but a truism and not a substantive
limitation on national power. Stone then squarely overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart. While he did not explicitly overrule Schechter and Carter Coal, it
could scarcely be doubted that they now lacked all constitutional footing. There
is simply no way to reconcile Darby 's constitutional logic with these earlier
cases. Stone even insisted that the logic of Hammer, which both these cases had
partly drawn upon, ‘'has long since been abandoned .”93 But its logic was only
truly abandoned in this very case! In fact. Darby sits uneasily both with
Cardozo's dissent in Carter Coal
, which allowed for congressional regulation of
those things that have a significant impact on interstate commerce, and with
Hughes' Jones and Laughlin opinion which reiterated that logic (both breaking
with the direct/indirect affects rule). Indeed, Stone's break from Jones and
92
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Laughlin was clearest in asserting that there is no real judicial limitation upon
Congress' Commerce Power. Whereas Hughes made a nod to the "dual nature
oi'our system" and held out that it was still the responsibility of the Court to
police that line. Stone insisted that "the motive and purpose of a regulation of
interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise
ol which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are
given no control.”VJ Darby made clear that the Court would no longer exercise
guardian review. A point, if it needed reaffirmation at all. that was made
exquisitely clear in Wickard
,
95
Justice Jackson, Roosevelt's former Solicitor General and the author of the
StruggleJor Judicial Supremacy
, confirmed the judicial retreat, explicitly
acknowledging, against the backdrop of this struggle, the Court's acquiescence
to national power. Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, an act
extraordinarily similar to the 1935 Act struck down in Butler, Congress gave the
Secretary ot Agriculture the power to institute quotas on crops % The twist,
here, was the Roscoe Filburn had exceeded this quota by sowing more wheat
than he was allotted, but used it to feed livestock on his farm, not shipping the
excess wheat in interstate commerce. Nothing had moved in interstate
commerce. Yet Jackson insisted that this did not matter. Jackson’s logic
permitted Congress to regulate what was once a purely local matter. The line to
Ibid at 115.
;5
Wickard v. Filburn, 3 1 7 U.S. I I I (1942).
I he constitutional footing was altered, but still invaded the notion of powers reserved to the
states by way of the Tenth Amendment.
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be drawn here, Jackson insisted, was a line for Congress to draw and not the
Court. This was far removed from even Cardozo's insistence in Schechter that
“to find proximity here is to find it everywhere." It was to do just this, bringing
an end to the middle New Deal years and those cases that permitted expansive
national control, but still insisted upon outer limits, which the Court would
patrol. Wickard abandoned the field. But this retreat raised a profound question
about judicial review: when was it proper to exercise such a power? The
question seemed all the more pressing as the constitutional arguments of 1934-
1 93? testified to an extraordinarily powerful national government. But were
there limits and constitutional boundaries the Court should continue to
maintain? While these questions were settled in the culmination of the New
Deal cases in 1941 and 1942—when the Court moved into line with FDR's
vision so tar as they touched upon governmental power to regulate the
economy and the constitutional balance of power between the states and the
national government, this was only part of the picture. Indeed, as I take up in the
following section, the settlement ot these questions provoked a growing
constitutional debate about constitutional limits and judicial power as they
touched on individual rights (now distinguished from economic rights) that
would be contested for the next several decades. Not only were such
constitutional questions not settled by the Constitutional Revolution of 1937, the
quest to outline such rights and ground them in some manner was itself a
product of this constitutional transformation. 47
n
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The Court in Search of a RoIp
The Court's retreat from economic issues raised a central question about
the Court's role. Stone's criticism ofjudicial power in his dissenting opinions
amounted to a plea for judicial restraint. As Stone eloquently put it in his Butler
dissent, "the only check upon [the Court's] exercise of power is our own sense
of sell-restraint. For the removal of unwise laws from the statute books appeal
lies not to the courts but to the ballot and to the process of democratic
government ."98 Stone took square aim at the majority ofjustices and accused
them ol sitting in judgment of the wisdom of government policy, not its
constitutionality. The Court. Stone insisted, must reject any such role, deferring
to the legislative branches, knowing that they may be misguided, but knowing.
too. that the Court itself could be. Stone went further and rejected any notion
that the Court was the peculiar guardian of constitutional limits:
But interpretation ot our great eharter of government
which proceeds on any assumption that the
responsibility for the preservation of our institutions is
the exclusive concern ot any one ot the three branches
of government, or that it alone can save them from
destruction is far more likely, in the long run, to
'obliterate the constituent members' of 'an
indestructible union of indestructible states [.]' 99
Stone’s plea for judicial restraint was rooted in his view of a flexible
Constitution that must grant the government power to actually govern. In this
Stone saw the Constitution as a living law that could not be cabined by rigid
Butler at 79.
99
Ibid at 87-88.
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formula, but must make accommodation to the “felt necessities of the times .” 100
Judicial restraint was also a tacit acknowledgment to the legal realism and
pragmatism of the day: Stone's plea was in part driven by a frank recognition
that judges were inevitably influenced by their personal predilections, as he
termed them elsewhere, which should make a judge all the more conscious and
restrained in the exercise ofjudicial power . 101
Revisionist scholarship on the constitutional thought of the New Deal
years helps us situate Stone s critique of judicial power and the emergence of a
new role for the Court in the course of American constitutional development.
Gillman s scholarship has shown how American state-building in the early
twentieth century, culminating in the New Deal years, led to a dramatic
restructuring of our constitutionalism.
10
' Throughout the nineteenth century and
into the twentieth century, Gillman characterizes the Constitution as one of
“limited power—residual freedoms.” 103 National power was limited by way of
enumeration, while rights were what remained after the legitimate use of power.
Corwin famously described this understanding as an island of power in a sea of
rights. I raditionally, then, the burden was not on the rights bearer, but on the
government: why was the state exercising its power? Limiting governmental
power would turn on whether such a use of power was legitimate and not
100
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individual rights per se. Rights were not, in the modern idiom, trumps
.
105
Yet
there was a presumption that one had the right, unless the government was
engaged in legitimate regulation. Enumerated powers, by implication, implied
unenumerated rights. Under this constitutional vision, the Court acted as the
guardian ot constitutional limits, which called upon it to continually scan
governmental exercises of power (whether at the national or state level), probing
them as legitimate or illegitimate. What would later by dubbed substantive due
process for example, Edward White argues, was orthodox guardian review, "that
of searching for the boundary between permissible legislative restrictions and
impermissible legislative usurpations .” 106 The dramatic expansion of
governmental power culminating in the New Deal era challenged traditional
constitutionalism by moving beyond a limited view of enumerated powers (and
by implication, unenumerated rights). Indeed, Stone's plea for judicial restraint
was a frank recognition of sweeping governmental power. Yet, if the
government's power was expansive, would there be any judicially enforceable
limits or was the judiciary to stay its hand in all cases?
It is in this context that Stone developed what Gillman calls the “general
powers-preferred freedoms” model . 107 If the task ofjudges was once to limit the
scope of governmental power by examining the purpose of legislation, with the
removal of these limitations on legislative power, the task ofjudges would now be
the development of individual rights that governmental power could not reach.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
106
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Thus while state power was once the preoccupation of courts, the courts would
now be concerned with civil rights and liberties. Stone's development of preferred
treedoms during this era is well known. Revisionist accounts like Gillman's sit
easily with traditional accounts ot civil liberties and rights after 1937-41
. In the
development ot civil rights and liberties arguments, revisionist accounts amount
to a traditional and progressive retelling of constitutional history, as \i Carotene
Products footnote 4 was the unquestioned foundation of New Deal
constitutionalism, which easily incorporates substantive rights of “privacy” and
"personhood.” 108 Traditionalists insist that the Court, after 1937, was restoring
John Marshall's jurisprudence from a thirty-plus year aberration of laissez-faire
constitutionalism. Alpheus Thomas Mason captures this sentiment, “Dictated by
political-economic dogma rather than by the Constitution, the commerce clause
decisions marked a shrinking departure from Chief Justice Marshall's bold
concept of the commerce power, a gratuitous betrayal of the grand design of the
Constitution he extolled and enforced.” 109 While revisionists might disagree with
Mason's reading of the Marshall Court and the characterization of the Court as
motivated by laissez-faire dogma—especially w ith the “demonization” of these
justices—they would be immediately sympathetic to Mason’s insistence that
Stone “was beginning to claim for the Court a special responsibility for
safeguarding the political processes. For unless it stepped in, interferences with
this primary mechanism for obliging government to control itself might render
107
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free government a sham." 110 The corollary of expansive state power was the
construction ot preferred freedoms that were judicially protected. Thus both
traditionalists and revisionists root the modern protection of civil rights and
liberties with the Court's bifurcated standard of review in the Constitutional
Revolution ot 1937 first sketched in Carotene Products footnote 4. And while a
Gillman or an Ackerman might not demonize a Justice Sutherland, 1 1
1
they readily
go along with the canonization of a Brandeis as part of the legitimate
constitutional change of 1937-41. 112 Revisionist accounts of the emerging
judicial role as rooted in the constitutional change of this period are difficult to
distinguish from traditionalist accounts. I hus Barry Friedman's insistence that
from the debate over FDR s [court packing] plan came a new vision of the role
of the courts. Tremendous power having been ceded to the national government,
the plan was the point at which the country balked. The accretion of government
power threatened judicial independence, which at the time referred to the
emergent role of the Court as the defender of individual liberty." 1 13 Friedman's
account sits easily with a traditional account like William Leuchtenburg's, which
sees the Court's extension of the Bill of Rights in the decades after 1941 as rooted
109
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in the Constitutional Revolution of 1937. 114 The settlement of the government's
power to regulate the economy, this view suggests, entails the intimately related
settlement ofjudicial power: henceforth, the Court shall act as the protector of
civil liberties. My argument questions this constitutional settlement. Settlement of
the first issue did not settle the second issue, but opened it up. It is not a
coincidence, I argue below, that the most vexing constitutional question in the
wake of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 was how to legitimately ground
judicial power—even in the protection of individual rights. This itself is typified
by the scholarship ot Herbert Wechsler, a one-time law clerk to Stone, and his
search for "Neutral Principles” in constitutional adjudication. Wechsler captured
the central dilemma that is rooted to the historical development of American
constitutionalism in the wake of 1937: "The problem for all of us became: How
can we defend a judicial veto in areas where we thought it helpful in American
life—civil liberties area, personal freedom. First Amendment, and at the same
time condemn it in the areas where we considered it unhelpful?” 1 15
The ghost of Lochner, as it is often called, has long haunted legal scholars.
Having digested the New Deal's telling of history, with the Lochner Court cast as
illegitimately basing its jurisprudence on economic preferences rather than the
Constitution, legal scholars were forced to wrestle with "how objective judicial
1 14
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234. See also, Friedman, “The Birth of
an Academic Obsession.” Again, Friedman points to the historical contingency of this dilemma,
but that itself hardly makes it less powerful if it was the preoccupation at the heart of New Deal
constitutionalism, other than to suggest that we should forge a new understanding ofjudicial
review, leaving the preoccupations of the New Dealer’s behind us. But this opens the possibility,
surely, for a return to older understandings of the Constitution as well.
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decisions should be reached." 1 16 If substantive due process as embraced by the
L°chner Court was bad, how does one justify the so-called privacy cases of
Griswold v. Connecticut or Roe v. Wade? Scholars in American political and
constitutional development have linked this development to the constitutional
transformation of the New Deal years. The earlier generation of legal scholars
treated the Lochner Court as an historical aberration and was therefore compelled
to confront seeming inconsistencies between the progressive critique of Lochner
and the modern Court's active use ofjudicial power in cases like Roe. Focusing
on the historical development of the Constitution, scholars of American
constitutional development resolve Wechsler's dilemma by explicitly recognizing
the constitutional change of 1937, which is taken to legitimate the retreat from
Lochner while simultaneously embracing Griswold and Roe as part of the Court’s
new role of protecting civil liberties in the New Deal constitutional regime. As
Gillman puts it: “The eventual collapse of this constitutional tradition signaled the
rise of a new American Republic organized around a different understanding of
the proper use of legislative power."
1 17
Drawing on this constitutional change,
Stephen Griffin explicitly rejects Wechsler's dilemma.
Although the approach of the majority in Lochner was
abandoned after the New Deal, this does not mean that the
return of substantive due process in Griswold and Roe was
the return of Lochner. The new substantive due process
doctrine was used for different purposes and operated in
fundamentally different political, legal, and social contexts.
To ask how Roe can be justified if Lochner was unjustified
Laura Kalman, The Strange Career uj Legal Liberalism (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1996 ) 5 .
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thus makes the anachronistic assumption that the normative
standards and relevant background did not change between
1905 and 1973. 118
Ackerman too focuses on constitutional change to unravel the traditionalist's legal
dilemma. For Ackerman, Lochner was rejected in the Constitutional Revolution
of 1937 whereby the people ultimately ratified a new Constitution. This (New
Deal) Constitution, according to Ackerman's synthesis, is broad enough to
encompass Griswold and Roe. So simply put: Roe is grounded in the
Constitution, Lochner is not. This gives Roe and the like solid constitutional
looting in the Constitutional Revolution ol 1937." T his is made evident in
Ackerman's curious discussion of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where the Court
upheld Roe. In upholding Roe, Ackerman says, the Court staved off President
Reagan’s attempt at constitutional transformation and maintained our (New Deal)
Constitution. Yet, Ackerman says very little about how the Constitutional
Revolution ol 1937 justifies Roe. Rather, Ackerman argues that Griswold (and
thus presumably Roe) was a synthesis of the Founding's concern with personal
liberty in a "post New Deal world of economic and social regulation.” 1 19 To arrive
seamlessly at this conclusion, Ackerman ignores the very reasoning put forward
in Justice Douglas' Griswold opinion, which was preoccupied by the very
118
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dilemma Ackerman seeks to dissolve. 120 These attempts to root the judicial
detense ot civil liberties, and particularly “privacy,” in constitutional change
amount “to a sophisticated refinement” of the “progressive model of
constitutional development.” 121 Moreover, rather than settling such questions
about rights in a way that easily tlows trom Carotene Products footnote 4, as
these scholars suggest, the New Deal revolution itself offered contrasting modes
ot constitutional thought that sought, in dramatically different ways, to ground
judicial power. Here, we might even say that the equation of Roe with Lochner is
not so easily resolved by pointing to constitutional revolution. After all, a
powerful part of this constitutional revolution was just such a critique ofjudicial
power, which could be leveled at the likes of Roe', indeed, as we will see, it is
difficult to fit this privacy decision into any of the central lines ofjurisprudential
thought that emerged from the New Deal revolution.
Searching for Solid Ground
In the wake of the constitutional shift, retreating from economic issues, the
New Deal justices quickly divided amongst themselves over the proper scope of
judicial power. C. Herman Pritchett went so far as to call it a “quest for
uncertainty."
1
" While the New Deal justices agreed on judicial retreat from one
120
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sphere, the reconstruction and regrounding of the legitimate scope ofjudicial
power was a far more divisive question. 1 suggest that in the formative years after
1937-1941, there were essentially three clear alternatives to grounding judicial
power, which would dominate constitutional thought for the next several decades.
These three central attempts to recast judicial power might be described as
democracy-reinforcing," identified most closely with Justice Stone; “jural
reasoning,’ identified with Justice Frankfurter; and “rights based textualism.”
identified with Justice Black. 123 1 offer but a sketch of each solution, but want to
draw out how each set about to resolve the problem ofjudicial will against the
backdrop of constitutional change. Each attempt to ground judicial power must be
understood against the historical development of our Constitution, even as each
answer played an important part in subsequent constitutional development. The
point is that these very different answers all had their feet in the Constitutional
Revolution of 1937, while their fundamental disagreements with one another
suggests the essentially contested and fluctuating nature of constitutional
development over these years. The New Deal did not provide a foundation from
which our post 1937 civil liberties naturally evolved; rather it called forth
perpetual and discontinuous development. 124
123
Frankfurter’s jurisprudence as often been identified as “ordered-liberty.” While I accept this
characterization, I suggest that ordered-liberty is something to be identified by a discreet judicial
mind—so it is the proper state of mind that is key to limiting judicial discretion.
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Stone: Reinforcing Representation
The most famous statement auguring a recasting ot judicial power came
in United Stales v. Carotene Products, although it was rather obliquely tucked
away in the now famous footnote 4 by Stone. Carotene Products is usually taken
to be an insignificant case, now heralded only because of footnote 4. Yet the case
is interesting as it profoundly reveals the Court's retreat from economic issues. At
stake was a congressional statute that prohibited the movement of filled milk (a
milk product enriched with vegetable fat) in interstate commerce, as it was
deemed by Congress to be an unhealthy product (compared to whole milk). Under
traditional guardian review, which dominated the Court until the previous year.
the Court may well have questioned the reasonableness of this enactment, probing
to discover it this was in lact a valid health regulation ora species of regulation
aimed to protect some groups over others (which, arguably, is exactly what the
legislation was). 1 ' 5 Under the new regime, though, the Court would not subject
the legislation to such a critical eye. As Stone put it in the body of the opinion
There is no need to consider [the law] here as more than
a declaration ot legislative findings deemed to support
and justify the action taken as a constitutional exertion
of the legislative power, aiding informed judicial
review, as to the reports of legislative committees, by
revealing the rationale of the legislation. Even in the
absence ot such aids the existence ot facts supporting
the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in light ot the tacts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
~ See Geoffrey P. Miller, “The True Story ofCarolene Products" The Supreme Court Review
I9H7 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
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assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within
the knowledge and experience of the legislators. 126
Here Stone inserted footnote 4 to potentially qualify the Court's deferential
attitude and its presumption of constitutionality when reviewing economic
legislation. Stone offered three essential qualifications where there would be a
"narrower scope for the operation of the presumption of constitutionality": (1)
When legislation appears to violate a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
especially the Bill of Rights. (2) When legislation
“restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation.” And (3) when legislation impinges upon a “discrete and insular
minorities" that cannot be expected to appeal effectively to the democratic
process. At root. Stone's logic developed a two-tier theory to guide and ground
the use ot judicial power. In ordinary circumstances, when the legislation before
the Court touched on economic issues, the Court would defer to the legislature
and apply the rationality test. The question for the Court was not whether this
legislation was wise policy, the criticism Stone and others had leveled at Justice
Sutherland and his colleagues, but whether the legislature could, conceivably,
have a rational reason tor pursuing such legislation. Once the legislation had
passed this relaxed standard ot review that was the end of the question for the
Court. In a much smaller group ot cases, the Court would subject the legislation to
a more exacting judicial scrutiny,” what became known as strict scrutiny. Stone
marked out these areas in footnote 4 where the Court would demand that the
1-6
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legislation meet a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to
that interest. The Court would be generally deferential—an important claim in
1938 that should not simply be taken for granted-unless the legislation interfered
with the democratic process or directly implicated the Bill of Rights (although, as
1 will note below. Stone seemed to have reservations about this area). The critical
basis of Carotene Products was that it recast judicial power as supplementing the
democratic process: the Court's role was not to second guess the legislature, but
to police the system in such a way that kept the democratic process open. If, as
Stone had insisted in numerous dissents, we think the legislation before us
unwise, the proper recourse is to appeal to the democratic process, not to the
Court. It, however, the democratic process was closed, or if a “discrete and
insular minority" could not trust the protection of their rights to the democratic
process (as they were always outnumbered), then the judiciary was compelled to
act to ensure that the democratic process remained open and fair. Moreover, as
John Hart Ely has argued, the Court's taking on the maintenance of process fit
neatly with its retreat from weighing in on substantive values. 127 If the Court had
rendered substantive judgments about the proper scope of legislation, and had
addressed, as well, the substance of such legislation as part of guardian review,
reinforcing the democratic process would not implicate the Court in such areas
(now deemed fraught with value judgments). Instead, the Court was concerned
with process alone, making it tar less likely that the justices might substitute their
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust A Theory oj Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980).
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substantive judgments for the legislature's (as they were not concerned with the
legislature s substantive judgments). Part of preserving the democratic process
would also entail the preservation of rights intimately connected to the democratic
process, what would become known in the years 1938-1941 as the preferred
freedoms. These freedoms—tree speech in particular—occupied a preferred
position because, unlike other rights, especially liberty of contract, they were
intimately connected to the “core of free government.” In an ordering of
constitutional values, they required special judicial solicitude. But they did so in a
way that limited judicial power to reinforcing democracy; the emphasis on
process rather than substance was key to limiting judicial will for Stone.
Frankfurter: The Jural Mind
Frankfurter rejected both Stone's footnote 4 and Black's textualism
(especially as it applied to incorporation). Yet Frankfurter's own attempt to
ground judicial discretion is elusive. 12 * In the wake of the “Constitutional
Revolution of 1937," Frankfurter pleaded for judicial restraint, so much so, that at
times he seemed to call for a complete judicial retreat in the face of
democratically enacted legislation. For Frankfurter, restraint is grounded in a
peculiar judicial temperament that is necessary to protect those values that are
central to our conception of “ordered liberty,” even while giving due process of
law the flexibility it needs. 1 '
9
Confronted with the problem ofjudicial discretion
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as forcefully articulated in Stone's Butler dissent. Frankfurter did not attempt to
take retuge in grounding the Court's judgment in process over substance (as Stone
does) or in textualism (as Black does). Rather. Frankfurter is ever aware that
justices must exercise discretion as part of their judicial duty. The answer to
limiting such discretion must be found in just this conscious recognition: a
recognition cultivated by the proper judicial temperament
.
130 On the one hand.
this led Frankfurter to be exceedingly deferential to the democratic process.
suggesting that so long as that process was open, the Court should stay its hand.
But to the legislature no less than to courts is committed the
guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties. Where all the
effective means of inducing political changes are left free
from interference, education in the abandonment of foolish
legislation is itself a training in liberty. To fight out the
wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public
opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to
transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to
vindicate the self-confidence of a free people
.
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When the Court reversed Frankfurter's opinion a few years later, he went even
further, insisting that a sense of judicial self-restraint was the only thing that could
prevent a return to the judicial hubris of the past:
Judicial self-restraint is equally necessary whenever an
exercise of political or legislative power is challenged.
There is no warrant in the constitutional basis of this
Court's authority for attributing different roles to it
depending upon the nature of the challenge to the
legislation. Our power does not vary according to the
particular provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked.
The right not to have property taken without just
compensation has, so far as the scope ofjudicial power is
Mark Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths: Felix Frankfurter, Hugo Black, and the Process of
Judicial Decision Making (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) 128.
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concerned, the same constitutional dignity as the right to be
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
the latter has no less claim than freedom of the press or
freedom of speech or religious freedom. In no instance is
this Court the primary protector of the particular liberty that
is invoked.
Here Frankfurter rejects both Stone's and Black's insistence that certain rights are
entitled to more judicial protection than other rights. The lesson of 1937, for
Frankfurter, prohibited any application of a double standard and demanded
judicial deference to legislatures no matter what liberties were at stake.
frankfurter pushed this line of thinking in two free speeches cases, taking further
aim at footnote 4.
Above all we must remember that this Court's power of
judicial review is not “an exercise of the powers of a super-
legislature.’ Some members of the Court—and at times a
majority—have done more. They have suggested that our
function in reviewing statutes restricting freedom of
expression differs sharply from our normal duty in sitting
in judgment on legislation.
. . It has been suggested, with
the casualness of a footnote, that such legislation is not
presumptively valid and it has been weightily reiterated that
freedom of speech has a 'preferred position among
constitutional safeguards.
33
Whether legislation impinged upon rights that were fundamental to the
democratic process or rights that were textually enumerated made no difference.
Yet, just as Frankfurter himself was rejecting this notion, he seemed to pull back:
“Those liberties of the individual which history has attested as the indispensable
conditions of an open as against a closed society come to this Court with a
momentum and respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
n
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239
from shifting economic arrangements." 134 Frankfurter went on to say that, even
so, "these are matters for the legislative judgment controlled by public
opinion " l 35 The deeper point is that Frankfurter rejects the notion of "preferred
freedoms" as a sort of mechanical jurisprudence, illustrating his insistence that a
discerning and attuned jural mind, weighing context and history, is the only way
to get at these rights.
136
Frankfurter turned to notions of "ordered liberty" to draw
these rights out.
As H.N. Hirsch has noted, “Frankfurter thus believed simultaneously in
both self-restraint and in fundamental values." 137 Yet. as Gary Jacobsohn notes,
we can perceive once again the tension between Frankfurter's adherence to
fundamental principles and his policy of self-restraint.” 138 This is so because
frankfurter s solution to the problem of judicial will was based primarily upon the
proper judicial temperament. It was the justice's proper furnishing of mind that
would overcome the dilemma of 1937. This required self-restraint in most
instances, but also the flexible articulation of fundamental values, the very
drawing out of which was part of Frankfurter's notion of the jural mind, when
necessary. Thus, as Flirsch argues. Frankfurter would often claim to be
disinterested, that as a justice “he was capable of divorcing his personal
opinions from a necessary action." This was simply part of the judicial
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526-527 ( 195 1 ).
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temperament. Franklurter drew this out in his opinions: “The vague contours of
the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large. We may not draw on our
merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in
their judicial function." 139 But rather than grounding judicial will in textual
interpretation, or the democratic process. Frankfurter mitigated the central
problem by insisting that justices must be conscious of the problem:
To believe that this judicial exercise ofjudgment could be
avoided by freezing ‘due process of law' at some fixed
stage ol time or thought is to suggest that the most
important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function
for inanimate machines and not forjudges ... To practice
the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient
objectivity no doubt demands ofjudges the habit of self-
discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that one's own
views are incontestable and alert to tolerance toward views
not shared. But these are precisely ... the qualities society
has a right to expect from those entrusted with ultimate
judicial power. 0
For Frankfurter the flexible discovery of and articulation of fundamental values,
balanced against the needs of society, was the very art ofjudging. He was not so
far removed, in this, from a Justice Sutherland. The key distinction, for
Frankfurter, would be that Sutherland was too inflexible and, thereby, wasn't
detached enough. Sutherland was a mechanical jurisprude. This points us to the
fact that Frankfurter, unlike Stone and Black, sought to overcome the lessons of
1937 not so much by recasting the role of the Court, but by recasting the jural
mind. Jacobsohn hits at this just so: whereas the Old Court “referred to natural
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right; [Frankfurter] spoke of ‘notions of justice,’ of ‘civilized canon of decency,'
and of the ‘concept of ordered liberty.’ But in point of fact, their perspective
standards were not too dissimilar.” 141 And so Frankfurter would overcome his
restraint if, given standards of due process, the state's action “shocks the
conscience. At other times, however. Frankfurter would insist that the justices
must defer, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears
the conscience of the people s representatives. 14 Knowing when to do what was
part of the proper furnishings of mind of a justice. For Frankfurter, it was this
understanding that separated him from a Sutherland.
Black 's Textualism
Carotene Products was handed down Black's first year on the Court and
while Black joined the opinion, he wrote a brief concurrence for the sole purpose
of rejecting Stone's footnote 4. 144 This move helps illuminate Black's subsequent
attempt to ground the judicial protection of rights. While Black is often associated
with the short-lived era of preferred freedoms as articulated by Stone, this doesn't
quite capture his thinking and threatens to obscure his fundamental disagreement
with Stone. For Black, the search for preferred freedoms that should be robustly
protected by the Court was not so elusive: The Court was obligated to robustly
protect those rights that had been marked off for protection when they were
clearly enumerated in the Bill of Rights. These were preferred freedoms, not
141
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because they were central to the democratic process, not because they were
fundamental to a conception of ordered liberty, but because they were singled out
for protection by a democratically ratified constitutional text
.
145
As Black put it in
a later concurring opinion, taking particular aim at Frankfurter's majority opinion
in Rochin v. California
, “I believe that faithful adherence to the specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection of individual
liberty than that which can be afforded by the nebulous standards stated by the
majority [ot the Court]
. What the majority hold is that the Due Process Clause
empowers this Court to nullify any state law if its application ‘shocks the
conscience, offends ‘a sense ofjustice' or runs counter to the ‘decencies of
civilized conduct .’” 146 For Black this gloss on due process, much like the Court's
special solicitude for the democratic process, was no different than earlier
attempts to protect liberty of contract; it risked equating the values of the New
Deal justices with the Constitution
.
14
"For we are told that ‘we may not draw on
our merely personal and private notions’” and “we are told that the discovery
must be made by an evaluation based on disinterested inquiry pursued in the
spirit of science and on a balanced order of facts .”' 148 Yet, when Frankfurter
found that certain conduct offended notions of due process because it “shocked
144
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the conscience,” Black insisted that such pleas were meaningless. Justice
Sutherland, too, insisted that he was merely following constitutional command
and not basing his decision on personal motives. Black no more believed
frankfurter than he believed Sutherland. Fully digesting Professor Frankfurter's
critique of Sutherland, Black insisted that the only way to ground judicial
discretion, to get around the personal preferences of the justices, was to root
oneself in constitutional text .
144
This was key to Black's defense of the Bill of
Rights and his insistence that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated these
rights, making them applicable to the states . 150 Thus liberty in the Fourteenth
Amendment was neatly defined by the Bill of Rights itself, which grounded
notions of due process by tethering judicial discretion to constitutional text and
not the vague contours of due process" that allowed justices to roam at large.
This move also led Black to get around questions of the “double
standard”: why should some rights be subject to a more exacting judicial scrutiny
than others? I o turn to the democratic process or fundamental notions of ordered
liberty, as Stone and Frankfurter did, was to open oneself to the same criticism
that these j ustices had leveled against substantive due process." It was a criticism
that Black himself would level against his fellow justices in Griswold v.
Connecticut
,
the contraception case that evoked memories of “substantive due
process" from the Court's earlier jurisprudence, when the Court held that
148
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forbidding the use of contraceptives and the dissemination of information about
contraception was unconstitutional (but on rather vague grounds of privacy):
The due process argument
. . . here is based on the premise that
this Court is vested with the power to invalidate all state laws that
it considers to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive,
or this Court s belie! that a particular state law under scrutiny has
no ‘rational or justifying' purpose, or is offensive to ‘a sense of
tairness and justice.' If these formulas based on 'natural justice,’ or
others which mean the same thing are to prevail, they require
judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of
their own appraisal ot what laws are unwise of unnecessary. 151
Black insisted that this was no different than what the Court had done prior to
1937 and it was just as illegitimate here, as it gave justices discretion to choose
those values they preferred, leading them to determine whether such legislation
was reasonable or not. And Black continually insisted that such a reading, making
what constitutes a reasonable regulation a judicial judgment, might just as easily
slight constitutional rights. As he put it in an earlier case: “So long as this Court
exercises the power ofjudicial review . . .1 cannot agree that the First Amendment
permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of
Congress or our own notions o! mere 'reasonableness. Such a doctrine waters
down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to
Congress."
1-' 2
Allowing justices to gloss notions of due process and fundamental
tairness was of a piece with allowing justices to determine the reasonableness of
state or congressional regulation of textual rights: both put us at the mercy of
justices by leaving judicial will untethered.
151
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I he Ghost of Lochner
The attempt to ground judicial discretion continues to preoccupy
constitutional interpretation. And while scholars of American constitutional
development tocus on the fundamental changes wrought by the New Deal, the
usual insistence that Lochner was part of an earlier era that no longer applies, is
more difficult to maintain. 1
" 3
The central jurisprudential lines that emerge from
the New Deal—in Stone, Frankfurter and Black—must be understood against the
backdrop of Lochner. This does not suggest a return to the jurisprudential vision
of the Lochner Court. Gillman seems right that the course of American political
development has rendered that constitutional vision inadequate. Rather, 1 want to
suggest that Lochner remains potent in the search for grounding judicial
discretion. It haunts the “painstaking and politically-charged task of articulating,
for the first time in American constitutional history, precisely what kinds of
freedoms deserved to be characterized as truly fundamental.” 154 And it does this
precisely because the New Deal critique of Lochner is bound up with the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 making it a part of the New Deal's
constitutional trajectory. Revisionist scholarship has rescued the New Deal Court
from its ignominious place in history, but it has not been as successful in
wrestling with our constitutionalism post 1937. And this is because the New' Deal
did not only leave such questions unsettled, it made the very nature ofjudicial
power the central question, thereby insuring that the search for constitutional
151
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grounding would remain contested and unsettled. Let me draw on a rather lengthy
quote trom Professor Jacobsohn. who eloquently hits at the central problem:
A situation may demand self-restraint or it may demand
activism the actual choice is to be determined by
whatever appears necessary to affirm constitutional
principle and purpose. With this understanding, the mental
gymnastics, tor example, ot those who were advocates of
judicial self-restraint prior to 1937 and then suddenly found
themselves detending judicial activism (while concurrently
groping tor a principled way in which to explain the abrupt
reversal ot their judicial philosophy), might have been
avoided. Much of the embarrassment and hypocrisy that
developed refected the inability and unwillingness of
scholars and judges to confront the essential role of the
Court. Constitutional principles (such as, for example,
“preferred freedoms”) were usually derived from the
approach to judicial power that required a defense. The
reverse process, however, should have occurred. Any
particular approach to judicial power ought to be derived
trom a constitutional principle (which, more than the
approach, requires defense), and the approach must
therefore vary according to the circumstances surrounding
the application of such principles. 155
By focusing on the question ofjudicial power and discretion as the
primary question, the New Deal Constitution did not, at least on these issues, give
us firm constitutional footing so much as a perpetual constitutional debate. This is
evident, as Ken Kersch argues, in the Black-Frankfurter debate over incorporation
that we saw above. 1 he debate between these justices over incorporation was a
debate about how best to cabin judicial will, which lead both of them to slight and
mischaracterize the earlier jurisprudence of John Marshall Flarlan. While Flarlan
argued for incorporation, as Black draws upon and as Frankfurter dubs
247
eccentric, he did not limit himself to incorporating the Bill of Rights by way of
the 14
th
Amendment. Rather, he drew as well on notions of natural rights and the
Anglo-American tradition. Harlan was preoccupied by constitutional principle
and let the judicial role flow from such precepts. 156 The New Deal justices
reversed this order: constitutional interpretation was first and foremost about
grounding judicial will. Thus it is difficult to speak of the New Deal Constitution
as a regime that gives us constitutional guidance. Or, perhaps more aptly, at the
heart ot this regime lay an unsettled question about the proper scope ofjudicial
power that became the essentially contested constitutional question for the next
several decades. The point is important insofar as it suggests that subsequent
constitutional developments. Roe v. Wade for instance, 157 are not easily rooted in
the Constitutional Revolution of 1937. Revisionist attempts to elide the old
equation ot it Roe
,
then Lochner
, remain troublesome if we take the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 seriously. Ihere may well be no going back to
Lochner—whose foundations are long since gone—but that doesn't make for an
easy fit between Roe and the New Deal. 1 8 Justice Black's firm equation of
Griswold and Lochner
,
which is the precursor to just this argument, has its feet
Jacobsohn, Pragmatism, Statesmanship, and the Supreme Court, 171-172. In a similar fashion
Whittington’s argument for originalism begins from constitutional principle and is thus quite
different than conservative arguments for originalism like Bork and Scalia’s, Constitutional
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solidly in New Deal constitutionalism. 159 This is also true, I want to suggest, of
the rise (or return) of original intent. On this issue, originalism is very much a
product ot 1937 as it is driven by the need to ground judicial will.
Griswold, if we let it stand in for a general debate, highlights the
discontinuities at the heart of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937. In the wake
ot Griswold (and Roe), we see the reemergence of fundamental rights
jurisprudence that moves beyond constitutional text, but this emergence is
precisely what brings back questions of natural rights (including liberty of
contract) and draws us back to Lochner
. And it is precisely this, drawing on part
ot the constitutionalism ot the New Deal, which inspires the originalism of a
Judge Bork. 160
In his opinion tor the Court, Justice Douglas posits a right to privacy
against governmental intrusion, but attempts to ground that right in the
“penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees” in the Bill of
Rights.
161
Douglas' move is symbolic of the New Deal's constitutional change:
rather than placing the burden on state regulation—what is the basis for the state's
prohibition of contraception between married couples?—he assumes the
legitimacy of regulation unless it violates a specific right. Douglas engages in a
159
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tortured construction of penumbral rights to meet this challenge. His refusal to
draw on the due process clause is a direct result of the New Deal criticism of
Lochner. he is all too aware that any move in that direction will be open to the
challenge that he is glossing the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment to
align with his own political preferences, leaving his judicial will untethered. Thus
he seeks—albeit unpersuasively—to ground privacy in the emanations from the
text of the Bill of Rights, insulating him from the charge of Lochnerizing. Indeed.
Douglas opened his opinion with just this in mind: “We are met with a wide range
of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York should be our
guide. But we decline that invitation [.]’’ 162 Given this, it’s not a coincidence that
Justice Black’s scathing dissent virtually ignores Douglas’ opinion and saves its
ire for the concurring opinions of Goldberg, White, and Harlan, who draw on the
Ninth Amendment notion of unenumerated rights (Goldberg) and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (White and Harlan) to find the law
unconstitutional. For Black, Douglas' opinion might be a poor interpretation of
the Bill of Rights, but at least it had the virtue of attempting to ground the right to
privacy in constitutional text, thus disciplining judicial will. The concurring
opinions, on the other hand, let judicial will roam at large: “If these formulas
based on ‘natural justice,’ or others which mean the same thing are to prevail,
they require judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of
162
Ibid. at481-482.
250
their own appraisal ot what laws are unwise or unnecessary.” 163 Black explicitly
accuses these justices ot Lochnerizing:
The Due Process Clause with an 'arbitrary and capricious'
or 'shocking the conscience' formula was liberally used by
this Court to strike down economic legislation in the early
decades ot this century, threatening, many people thought,
the tranquility and stability of the Nation. See, e.g.
Lochner. That tormula, based on subjective considerations
ot natural justice, is no less dangerous when used to
entorce this Court's views about personal rights than those
about economic rights. 1 had thought that we had laid that
formula, as a means for striking down state legislation, to
rest once and for all in cases like West Coast Hotel Co. 164
Justice Harlan levels a similar charge, it more subtly and indirectly, at
Douglas and Black as well. Harlan notes that the common link between Douglas'
majority opinion and Black's dissent is a belief that by limiting the due process
clause's meaning to the Bill of Rights,
judges will thus be confined to 'interpretation' of specific
constitutional provisions, and will thereby be restrained
from introducing their own notions of constitutional right
and wrong into the 'vague contours of the Due Process
Clause. While I could not more heartily agree that judicial
'sell-restraint' is an indispensable ingredient of sound
constitutional adjudication, I do submit that the formula for
achieving it is more hollow than real. 'Specific' provisions
of the Constitution, no less than 'due process,' lend
themselves as readily to 'personal' interpretations^] 165
One need look no further than Douglas' opinion to confirm this point. Harlan then
went on to make a point reminiscent of Frankfurter, "Judicial self-restraint will
not, I suggest, be brought about in the 'due process' area by the historically
Ibid, at 51 1-512.
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unfounded incorporation formula. It will be achieved in this area, as in other
constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of
history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie society, and wise
appreciation of the great role that the doctrines of federalism and separation of
powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms .” 166 For
Harlan, as tor Frankfurter, judicial will is more likely to be disciplined by judicial
temperament, than by textual interpretation, which gives his approach a gloss of
“substantive due process.”
All of the opinions in Griswold are preoccupied by the need to discipline
judicial will in light of this critique
.
167
Yet it is precisely this skepticism about
untethered judicial will that inhibits the development of a consensus regarding the
protection of fundamental rights. As Gillman argues, “ I he same skepticism that
called into question the ability of judges to discern true public purposes has been
deployed against judges who struggle to identify fundamental rights .” 168 Gillman
chastises critics of the Court, especially conservative critics, who “use the lore of
Lochner as a weapon in their struggle against the modern Court's use of
fundamental rights as a trump on government power .” 164 This conservative
100
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critique, however, is rooted in the Constitutional Revolution ofl937. 170 That
revolution, with the dramatic expansion of state power, made the search for
lundamental rights essential, but given its professed skepticism ofjudicial power,
it made this very search tor any kind of grounding uneasy at best. The emergence
ot original intent in the wake of Grisw old and Roe
, and its search for solid
constitutional tooting, is intormed by the putative lessons of 1937. While a
leading legal scholar finds it odd that a conservative like Bork would expresses
concern about the countermajoritarian nature ofjudicial review, 171 this is not
particularly perplexing. Bork was weaned on the post 1937 critique of the
Lochner Court: having fully digested that critique he was more than ready to
aPP |y h 1° the modern Court s privacy decisions. 17- The primary defense of
originalism for leading exponents like Bork and Raoul Berger, after all, is that it
grounds judicial discretion. Originalism is the best theory ot interpretation, not
in its own right, but because it is the only theory for these proponents that
successfully grounds judicial will by providing the judge with a neutral basis for
interpretation. The construction of constitutional meaning, here, is being driven
by the dilemma ofjudicial will. Indeed, the current Court's most powerful
1 0
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articulator of original intent. Justice Scalia, defends originalism in precisely these
terms. "Now the main danger injudicial interpretation of the Constitution-^or.
tor that matter, injudicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will
mistake their own predilections tor the law. Avoiding this error is the hardest part
ot being a conscientious judge; perhaps no conscientious judge ever succeeds
entirely.”
174
Originalism. while not perfect, is the best method of interpretation
because it "does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system [judicial
discretion], tor it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite
separate from the preferences of the judge himself.” 175 Scalia even goes so far as
to call originalism the lesser evil. It too suiters, as all theories must, from the
dilemma ot judicial will, but, all things considered, it is more likely to overcome
this very dilemma. It these originalists draw on the ghost ot Loehner to criticize
Roe, it is because they have digested a central tenet of the “Constitutional
Revolution of 1937.”
In doing so, their originalism may well owe more to the legal positivism of
Oliver Wendell Holmes than to the jurisprudence of John Marshall, but this only
reaffirms the notion that they are firmly planted within New' Deal
constitutionalism. Those who argue that the conservative insistence upon original
intent, as it pleads for judicial restraint and deference to democratic majorities.
174
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has little grounding in the Founding may be on solid ground. 176 These concerns
stem not trom the notion of limited governmental powers and unenumerated
rights ol the Founding, but from the New Deal critique of the Old Court. Thus
Gillman is especially persuasive in arguing that the attempt by contemporary
conservatives to enlist Marshall as a proponent ofjudicial restraint and
democratic deference won t wash with the historical record. 177 In this Marshall's
originalism is better exemplified by a Justice Sutherland than a Judge Bork. 178
And this is so because Bork has digested the central jurisprudential problem post
1937. The deep skepticism almost closet nihilism—that any attempt to go
beyond the Constitution to articulate its values, is to impose judicial values upon
the Constitution, is precisely the argument leveled at Sutherland's gloss on liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment by Frankfurter, Stone, and Black. In this, Bork
moves in stride with these justices—his jurisprudence is reared on their central
critique of judicial power. I7y Gillman insists that this conservative critique of
judicial activism is unfounded, as the judicial articulation and defense of rights
has a deep foundation in American constitutionalism, rather than being the
creation of the modern Court (as Bork would have it). Again, as a matter of
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history, Gillman is persuasive. Yet, given the constitutional changes wrought by
1937, this new torm ot originalism may be even more resonant.
It s ironic, no doubt, that the new originalists might not be good
originalists, but, in a way, this may make their criticism of Griswold and Roe
more powerful, not less so. If 1937 was truly the collapse of constitutional
originalism, rejecting the judicial limitation of governmental power, then the
jurisprudence of a Bork is one plausible outcome of that change. Bork's
insistence, for example, that the judiciary should defer to governmental power
unless an individual has a textually enumerated right that trumps governmental
power is a product ol the New Deal constitution, which recognizes unlimited
governmental power and limited individual rights. If the New Deal is seen as a
constitutional revolution that embraced a change in constitutional regimes, as
Ackerman argues, this is even more so. While Ackerman tries to rescue Griswold
and Roe by insisting that they are part of the New Deal constitutional “synthesis,”
he doesn't tie them to the New Deal's constitutional change in a persuasive way.
The difficulty is that very little that was settled in this constitutional shift justifies
either opinion, while there is much at the heart of that revolution that squarely
rejects such thinking. Gillman is on far more solid ground in suggesting that this
constitutional change made the quest for the judicial articulation of fundamental
rights necessary—if, that is, we are to rescue the individual from overarching state
power. But the New Deal did not settle this question. It left us, rather, with a
variety of possibilities that we have continued to argue over and contest in the
absence of a constitutional consensus. If this requires conservatives to give a more
256
thorough political justification for their view ofjudicial power, this is just as true
of progressives. If conservatives cannot simply call “original intent” in their
critique of Roe, neither can progressives call “Carolene Products” in its defense. It
is my contention that the deep skepticism ofjudicial discretion at the heart of the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 exacerbated this problem. By making judicial
will the central question ot constitutional interpretation, the constitutional change
ot this period made it unlikely that such a consensus could develop. The unsettled
nature of fundamental rights in the post 1937 era. and the continued acrimonious
debate with charges ot judicial “law making,” are as much a part of the New Deal
inheritance as is the dramatic expansion of governmental power.
Conclusion
Viewed through the lens ot constitutional settlement, we might see the
Constitutional Revolution ot 1937" as part of an ongoing struggle. Facing
backward, the New Deal may well be seen as the culmination of decades of
constitutional struggle over governmental power to regulate the economy. Here
traditional accounts might blend with revisionist accounts to recapture the
essentially contested nature of constitutional meaning during this period, with the
Court itself offering conflicting opinions. Revisionists reveal the power of legal
thought during this era (even if the foundations of that thought were crumbling),
while traditionalists remind us of fluctuating Court opinions that were very often
at odds with one another. This conflict came to an end as the Court moved into
line with the political branches and cleared the way for the expansion of state
power. Although here, too, this struggle would resume with the return of
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constitutional federalism in the Reagan years. Still, this constitutional question
was settled tor decades. Yet, facing forward, it is this very settlement that leaves
the nature of the Court's role in relation to constitutional rights in an essentially
contested and unsettled state. The New Deal regime-if it can even be called
that—does not settle such questions, even if it forces us to take them up.
I o come to a constitutional settlement or consensus on constitutional
rights, the ghost of Lochner may need to be overcome. As Gillman argues, in
forging our own definition of constitutional rights we cannot simply draw on the
past. Yet Gillman himself, and other revisionists, echo a progressive view of
rights that, albeit tacitly, reinforces the traditionalist critique of the Old Court that
continues to give Lochner ’s ghost resonance. As these tensions at the heart of the
New Deal come to a head with the return of “substantive due process,”
onginalists are deeply connected to this historically trajectory. The ensuing
struggle is in many ways a replay of the constitutional debates of 1937. Not only
did Justice Scalia's dissent in the most recent “substantive due process” case
accuse the Court of abdicating its neutral role in constitutional interpretation, it
accused the Court of usurping the democratic process by creating new rights.
Turning to the question of fundamental rights, Scalia argued, “We have held
repeatedly
. . . that only fundamental rights qualify for this so-called heightened
scrutiny protection—that is, ‘rights which are deeply rooted in this nation's
history and tradition.'” 180 We hear not just the faint echoes of New Deal
jurisprudence in Scalia's reasoning, but as 1 argue more fully in the next chapter, a
1 80
Lawrence v. Texas.
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hearty-synthesis oi Justices Black and Frankfurter which is fundamentally
preoccupied by tethering judicial will to text and tradition as originalism draws
deeply on the putative lesson of the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937 ”
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CHAPTER 5
UNSETTLING THE NEW DEAL-
REAGAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
Ronald Reagan consciously drew parallels between himself and Franklin
Delano Roosevelt. So much so, in fact, that after his acceptance speech at the
1980 Republican Convention, the New York Times lead editorial ran under the
title: Franklin Delano Reagan.” 1 But as William Leuchtenburg writes, “Reagan
presented himself as Rooseveltian
... not in order to perpetuate FDR's political
tradition but for exactly the opposite purpose: to dismantle the Roosevelt
coalition.'" Indeed, we might push this even further: Reagan did not simply seek
to break the New Deal coalition to create one of his own, as the New Deal party
system was already under stress. Far more ambitiously, Reagan sought to unsettle
the "Constitutional Revolution of 1 937” 3 and reconstruct our constitutionalism.
Or, as Reagan himself put it, much like FDR before him had, he sought a return to
constitutional first principles, which the New Deal had fallen away from and the
Supreme Court had sorely distorted beyond recognition. Here the parallel between
Reagan and FDR is striking. Reagan was the first president since FDR to insist
that he had the authority to interpret the Constitution in his own right and was not
bound by Supreme Court opinions. Much like FDR, in articulating his own
constitutional vision Reagan was prepared to wrestle with the Supreme Court for
Quoted in Sidney Milkis, The President and the Parlies: The Transformation ofthe American
Party System Since the New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 263.
' William Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow ofFDR: From Harry Truman to Bill Clinton (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1993) 225.
William Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn The Constitutional Revolution in the Aye of
Roosevelt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 213.
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constitutional authority as he flatly rejected the notion that he was bound by the
Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution as handed down in its opinions.
This chapter takes up Reagan's attempted constitutional reconstruction.
While Reagan has been treated as a “reconstructive" president,4 a president who
attempted to “engage the nation in a struggle for its constitutional soul," 5 the so-
called Reagan Revolution is by and large seen as a stalled constitutional
revolution because it did not bring about the kind of constitutional reconstruction
or transformation that FDR's New Deal wrought. Even if true, this overlooks an
important point. The recognition that presidents play a profound role in
constructing constitutional meaning is an important one that supplements our
locus on the Court. Too olten this is seen as great presidents transforming the
Constitution in extraordinary moments of constitutional politics;6 yet Reagan
unsettled the existing order without bringing on a lull-scale constitutional
transformation. As we have seen in the last several chapters, constitutional change
and discontinuities come in more subtle forms. Constitutional politics plays out
through the ordinary political process without leading to grand constitutional
transformation.
On federalism and the enumerated powers of the national government,
Reagan articulated a constitutional vision that was at odds with the
“Constitutional Revolution of 1937," and one that, after a lag, the Rehnquist
4
Stephen Skowronek, The Polities Presidents Make: Leadershipfrom John Adams to George
Bush (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993)416.
5
Marc Landy and Sidney Milkis, Presidential Greatness (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2000) 198.
''
See especially Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1998).
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C ourt began to articulate. Here, this chapter seeks to connect judicial
appointments to questions ot constitutional interpretation and development, what
Bruce Ackerman has called “transformative judicial appointments .’' 7 Judicial
appointments may not only serve as a way lor the President to put forth his
constitutional vision, but may, it successfully pursued, become the mechanism
whereby he alters or overturns past Supreme Court opinions. The literature on
judicial appointments is rarely integrated into larger questions of constitutional
theory and development
.
8
But the evidence is at least suggestive that Reagan's
determination to overturn longstanding Supreme Court interpretations of the
Constitution—and thereby articulate a “constitutional reconstruction”—has been
partly accomplished by his Rehnquist Court appointees.
How judicial appointments are connected to questions of constitutional
interpretation is a neglected area ol study in the debate about judicial supremacy.
It we look only at Supreme Court opinions, we are likely to see the judiciary
settling constitutional issues (if the other branches remain silent). But this misses
the larger background. The Court's opinions may be based on the President's
constitutional vision. So even il we have the appearance ofjudicial supremacy,
the political branches may be behind it. It is not without irony that the Reagan
Justices have been the most vocal articulators ofjudicial supremacy in recent
years, despite the fact that the President who appointed them rejected this very
7
Ackerman, We the People
,
26.
* In pursuit of what Sheldon Goldman calls a president’s “policy agenda.” Goldman, Picking
Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection From Roosevelt to Reagan (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997) 3. See also Terri Perreti, In Defense ofa Political Court (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999) who makes this connection explicit.
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notion. Even so, Reagan's constitutional vision has found acceptance by the
justices who have revived a judicial defense of constitutional federalism. This
suggests that the executive may play a central role in determining constitutional
meaning even in the absence of a great "constitutional moment."
While the Rehnquist Court has begun articulating Reagan's view of
federalism, and thereby reopened constitutional questions that have been settled
since the New Deal, it is not clear that Congress has accepted the Court's
limitations on its power under the guise of federalism, or, for that matter, the
Court s claims to judicial supremacy. Reagan unsettled these meanings. They
remain, though, in state ot constitutional flux revealing how constitutional politics
play out on a smaller scale, with constitutional meaning in an unsettled state.
Presidential Reconstruction and Constitutional Politics
The President s connection with constitutional maintenance has long been
recognized by presidential scholars, even it it has not been fully integrated into
much ot public law scholarship. y In Ihe Federalist Papers
, Alexander Hamilton
insists on the necessity of executive independence as a way to preserve the
Constitution against the transient whims of the public as well as legislative
aggrandizement. 10 This comes from the man who insisted in Federalist 7H that
"the complete independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential in a
Keith Whittington, “The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy" in Sotirios Barber and
Robert P. George, eds., C onstitutional Politics: Essays on Constitutional Making Maintenance,
and Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001) is one such attempt. Earlier studies, like
Robert Scigliano’s The President and the Supreme Court (New York: Free Press, 1971) drew on
the special connection, but largely deferred to judicial supremacy.
Alexander Flamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor,
1999) No. 7 I and 73, 400 and 410. See also, Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986) 39-40.
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limited Constitution.” 11 Public law scholars-and especially legal scholars-
remain fixated on Federalist 78, insisting that the judiciary is the final arbiter of
constitutional meaning. Indeed, when Reagan's Attorney General Edwin Meese
announced that the President could interpret the Constitution in his own right and
was not, therefore, bound by judicial opinions in the broad sense of adhering to
them as a matter of constitutional principle, 12 many in the legal academy acted as
if Meese was out to subvert—rather than maintain—constitutional government. 13
Yet Meese s claim on Reagan s behalf was consistent with the claims of past
presidents and part of a robust lineage in constitutional interpretation. It shouldn't
escape notice that all of the agreed upon "great presidents ' were departmentalists
when it came to constitutional interpretation. Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and
FDR all claimed the power to interpret the Constitution independently of Supreme
Court opinions. Jackson, Lincoln, and f DR confronted the Supreme Court
directly, arguing that they were not bound by specific Supreme Court opinions.
It's not just that they ventured—as a matter of constitutional theory—that they
were capable of independent constitutional interpretation; rather, they struggled
with the Court for constitutional authority. And, not coincidentally, such struggles
“reconstructed" our constitutionalism.
14
Stephen Skowronek's reconstructive
presidents “reset the very terms and conditions of constitutional government”;
11
Federalist 78
,
434.
12
Edwin Meese III, “Perspective on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decision: The Law
of the Constitution" Tulane Law Review 6 1 : 979 ( 1 987).
11
Ronald Dworkin, Freedom 's Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) (essays that
originally appeared in the New York Review of Books); Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Choices
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
14
Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, 39.
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Mark Landy and Sidney Milkis's great presidents “taught the citizenry about the
need tor great change but also about how to reconcile such change with American
constitutional traditions and purposes.” 1 ' Bruce Ackerman has connected such
presidential struggles with dramatic constitutional change leading to the creation
of new constitutional regimes
.
16
In a similar vein, Keith Whittington has
suggested that reconstructive presidents have a unique capacity to challenge
judicial supremacy and "play the role of constitutional prophet .” 17 While
Skowronek and Landy and Milkis only touch on the Court incidentally, Ackerman
and Whittington see the inherited Court, committed to the old regime, as the
principal challenger to a president's ability to remake our fundamental
constitutional commitments. Such moments ol presidential reconstruction are
extraordinary moments, after which the Supreme Court once again takes the
primary responsibility for maintaining the Constitution. The cyclical unfolding of
founding, decay, and regeneration places great presidents in the role of
“perpetuator” of our "republican institutions.” The common theme of the
narrative is presidential interpretation as an extraordinary moment of
constitutional politics, after which we return to a more ordinary politics. There is
a good deal ot truth to this, especially the recognition of punctuated moments of
constitutional change, but it misses the way significant constitutional change can
come incrementally, absent extraordinary transformation or clear-cut political
realignment, as we have seen in the last several chapters.
15
Landy and Milkis, Presidential Greatness
,
4.
10
Although Ackerman focuses only on Lincoln and FDR, neglecting Jefferson and Jackson, and
explicitly arguing that Reagan’s attempted transformation failed. We the People
,
390-403.
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Reagan is frequently placed along Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and FDR
as a departmental^ president who sought to refound our constitutionalism, but
most view his attempt as tailing short of past presidential re-orderings: “For all
that the New Beginning changed the terms and conditions of national politics, it
proved tar less successful than the New Deal in reconstructing American
government. As Milkis and Landy put it, “Reagan’s emphasis on presidential
politics and executive administration relegated his administration to the task of
managing even reinforcing the state apparatus it was committed to
dismantling.” 19 Ackerman speaks specifically of Reagan's “failed” constitutional
transformation.'" Concurrent with pronouncements of Reagan's failed
constitutional reconstruction, legal scholars began speaking of the “Rehnquist
Court s federalism revolution as auguring a post-New Deal jurisprudence. Some
directly accused the Court of “unconstitutionally" rejecting the New Deal's
constitutional settlement, of reopening settled constitutional questions. 21 Others
praised the Court for returning to the constitutional scheme of federalism. 22 In the
1995 case of United States v. Lopez, the Court did reject a congressional act as
beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause for the first time since the New Deal
17
Whittington, “The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy,’' 274.
18
Skowronek, The Polities Presidents Make
,
428.
19
Landy and Milkis, Presidential Greatness
,
225.
Ackerman, We the People
,
39 1
.
Stephen Gottlieb, Morality Imposed (New York: New York University Press). Arguably, this is
the message of Ackerman’s We the People as well.
Steven Calabresi, “Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense” The Annals of
the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science 574: 24 (200 1
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revolution ot 1937. 23 Are we living in a constitutional moment?24 Just how far the
Court s revival ot federalism will reach remains to be seen, but since Lopez the
Court has continued down this path. Nearly all agree that we are in a transitory
period, even while disagreeing on whether it is a major constitutional shift or a
mild departure, a mere corrective that leaves the New Deal essentially intact. 25
More importantly, there seems to be a consensus that the emerging constitutional
debate must be measured against the backdrop of the New Deal, the last great
constitutional moment in our history. Debates about the legitimacy of the Court’s
new federalism serve as a proxy, in some ways, for debates about the legitimacy
of the New Deal state. If rather obviously, there is a connection between Reagan's
As an isolated case, which I take up below, Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in National
League oj Cities v. Usery ( 1976) held out limitations on Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause, but did so indirectly by way ot state sovereignty. Moreover, it was overturned nine years
later by Garcia. Although, as I argue below, this was surely an initial probing that laid out
Rehnquist’s view of federalism, which the Court would start to fully and consistently articulate
after Lopez.
24
Mark Tushnet, “Living in a Constitutional Moment? Lopez and Constitutional Theory” Case
Western Reserve Law Review 46: 845 (1996) and The New Constitutional Order (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003).
:s
To name but a few. Dean Alfange, Jr., “The Supreme Court and Federalism: Yesterday and
I oday" Robert Spitzer, ed.. Politics and Constitutionalism: The Louis Fisher Connection (Albany:
SUNY Press, 2000); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000); John Dinan, “The Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions in
Perspective” Journal ofLaw and Politics , Spring 1999; Timothy Conlan and Francois Vergniolle
de Chantal, "The Rehnquist Court and Contemporary American Federalism” Political Science
Quarterly Volume 1 16 Number 2 (2001); Richard Fallon, “The ‘Conservative’ Paths of the
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions” University ofChicago Law Review 69: 429 (2002); J.
Mitchell Pickerill and Cornell Clayton, “Politics and the Safeguards of Federalism During the
Rehnquist Court” paper delivered at the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA,
2002; Thomas Keck, The Supreme Court and Modern Constitutional Conservatism. I <137-2002
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming); Christopher Schroeder, “Causes of the
Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation” Duke Law Journal 51: 307 (2001); Neal Devins,
“Congress as Culprit: How Law Makers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade” Duke
Law Journal 5 1 : 435 (200 1 ); Keith Whittington, “Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the
Court's Federalism Offensive” Duke Law Journal 5 1 : 477 (200 1 ), all see the see the shift as
significant, even while disagreeing profoundly over particulars. For an interesting demurer, see
Robert Nagel, The Implosion ofAmerican Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001
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who argues that nationalism reigns supreme and that the recent move to federalism is minor at
best.
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attempted constitutional reconstruction and the revival of federalism on the
Rehnquist Court: tour ot the five justices behind the revival were appointed by
Reagan and the fifth was appointed by George Bush senior, “faithful son" of the
Reagan Revolution. 26
Reagan's Reconstruction
Reagan was the first president living in the shadow of FDR who squarely
rejected the New Deal state. Flipping FDR on his head, in his first inaugural
address Reagan insisted that “In the present crisis, government is not the solution
to our problem; government is the problem.” The election of 1980 brought
federalism and the notion of a limited government of enumerated powers back to
the political agenda in a way that challenged the continuing validity of the New
Deal administrative state; it looked like the long-awaited political realignment.
The first full year of the Reagan administration seemed to fulfill this promise as
Reagan pushed through sizeable tax cuts and a reduction in government
expenditures, aiming specifically at rolling back the New Deal state. Comparisons
to FDR and the 100 Days Congress were inevitable. Yet the Reagan Revolution
seemed to stall in the election of 1984. Reagan won a landslide victory, but the
Republicans failed to gain control of the House of Representatives. Reagan's
personal victory was not translated into a constitutional transformation that
dramatically rejected New Deal constitutionalism. In 1986, Democrats won back
26 Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Moke, 429.
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control ol the Senate and the Reagan Revolution fizzled out in the scandal of Iran-
Contra.
27
Reagan was able to challenge the New Deal Constitution in part because it
was already showing signs of strain. Indeed, as 1 argued in the last chapter, the
New Deal Constitutional order was perplexed by deep incongruities at its heart,
which was made evident in the constitutional debates over Grisw old and Roe that
I will take up more fully below. The New Deal order appeared to be
degenerating, as the administrative state seemed unwieldy and the political
coalition that sustained FDR began to disintegrate, which made reconstructive
efforts timely. Some scholars of political realignment pronounced the New Deal
coalition dead in 1968, if not earlier. Nevertheless, even Nixon, who insisted upon
a “strict construction” of the Constitution and spoke more actively of federalism
than any president until Reagan, never questioned the fundamentals of the New
Deal constitutional order in terms of governmental power. It has even been
suggested that Nixon was the last New Deal president. 28 Thus the New Deal order
remained coherent in terms of governmental power, but was beset with tension
from the outset in the realm of “civil liberties.”
In this way it is difficult to merge the Warren Court with the New Deal
order; rather, the Warren Court brought out the tensions in New Deal
constitutionalism and revealed how Lyndon Johnson's Great Society followed the
path of the New Deal in one area (national regulation) and inherited its
II
Reagan’s election may look more like 1896 than 1932 if it ushers in a period of constitutional
uncertainty much like 1895-1925, rather than the sharp change of 1935-1941.
Milkis, The President and the Parties , 228.
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discontinuities in another (the role of the Court in relation to civil liberties). Thus,
the so-called New Deal Constitution was already revealing unsettled
constitutional issues in some areas with consensus in others.
20
Against this
backdrop of discontent with the New Deal order Reagan offered a limited
constitutional vision, which required less from government; indeed, as 1 have
already noted, he wanted to “get the government off the people's backs.” In this,
he was more like Jefferson and Jackson than FDR. Accomplishing this
constitutional change required an alteration in public expectations: the people
must demand less of the national government; they must be weaned away from
national administrative programs. In some ways, such a project seemed well
suited to Reagan's rhetorical leadership, itself an outgrowth of the modern
presidency, rather than the earlier style of Calvin Coolidge whom Reagan often
trumpeted as an ideal president. And to a degree Reagan succeeded. 30 It was the
Democratic President Bill Clinton, after all. who pronounced the “the era of big
government is over” and ended welfare as we know it, while his greatest failure as
president was the New Deal-style attempt at government-mandated universal
health care. If Reagan didn't bring about a Republican realignment, he seems to
have changed the ideological dimension of both parties in a more conservative
29
Tushnet attempts to merge the Great Society and New Deal as a single constitutional order,
which neglects the way in which ordinary political change—even simple judicial appointments—
helped bring in constitutional change that revealed the tensions at the heart of the New Deal. See
his The New Constitutional Order. On judicial appointments and the Great Society, see Goldman,
Picking Federal Judges , 1 54- 1 97.
30
Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency , 181, goes so far as to say that "Democrats now talk like
Republicans.” While this was certainly true of New Democrat presidential contenders, it is
arguably less so of Congressional Democrats, or those seeking to run as president after Bill
Clinton.
270
direction .
31
At the same time, using the tools of the New Deal—a reliance on
administration and the courts to bring about constitutional change—Reagan
seemed trapped by the old order and unable to reconstitute the government’s
fundamental commitments
.
32
Here Reagan failed to bring about his whole
constitutional vision in an immediate way. Still, the Reagan Revolution succeeded
in reopening a debate about the terms of our constitutionalism and placed the
legitimacy ot the New Deal Constitution squarely at the center of this debate—
a
debate that is very much alive.
In this, Reagan did instigate a constitutional revolution of sorts. Or,
perhaps more aptly, he succeeded in unsettling fundamental constitutional
questions that had been settled by the politics of the New Deal. Whether he is a
“reconstructive” president may remain to be seen, but he surely disrupted the old
order, leaving the contours of our constitutionalism the subject of intense debate
(which is true of FDR as well on many constitutional issues). Reagan did this,
moreover, in an area that cut to the heart of the New Deal: federalism. And, what
is more, he did it in a peculiarly New Deal style: by way of transformative judicial
appointments. Ackerman himself argues that one of the fundamental changes
wrought by the New Deal was the “self-conscious use of transformative judicial
appointments as a central tool for constitutional change .”
33
Yet Ackerman paints
Reagan's attempted constitutional transformation as a failure. Unlike Roosevelt,
31
At least at the presidential level, though this is not true at the congressional level and it remains
to be seen if it will hold, as Al Gore ran to the left of Clinton in 2000.
32 Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, 416-429 and Landy and Milkis, Presidential
Greatness, 2 19-226.
'
' Ackerman, We the People: Transformations, 26 (italics in original).
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Reagan did not win a solid Republican majority in the Congress in the 1984
election, and in 1986 the Republicans lost the Senate, which very likely resulted
in the defeat of Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court.
Bork s confirmation, tor Ackerman, combined with Reagan's earlier elevation of
William Rehnquist to the Chief Justiceship and the appointment of Antonin Scalia
to the Court, may well have culminated in a series of transformative constitutional
opinions—namely the overruling of Roe v. Wade, 34 the Supreme Court's
controversial 1973 opinion recognizing a woman's constitutional right to have an
abortion. Instead, tailing to win wide-spread support for his constitutional vision,
Reagan was forced to appoint the more moderate Anthony Kennedy to the Court,
who brought constitutional politics to a crashing halt when he joined Justice
O'Connor, another Reagan appointee, and Justice Souter, a Bush appointee, in a
plurality opinion upholding Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey—or so
Ackerman suggests. 3
^
What is odd about Ackerman's argument is that he sees the failure to
overturn Roe as a rejection of Reagan's constitutional vision. The New Deal
Constitution stands because the Reagan Revolution failed. But Roe itself is hard
to reconcile with the New Deal constitutional regime. If anything. Roe highlights
the discontinuities in New Deal constitutionalism making it difficult, as the last
chapter suggested, to speak meaningfully of a New Deal constitutional regime.
Nothing in the New Deal constitutional revolution justified the Court's opinion in
Roe, which embraced the very substantive due process arguments that the Court
Roe v. Wade. A 10 U.S. 113 (1973)
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had rejected in 1 937, clearing the way for the New Deal. 3" Indeed, at the center of
the New Deal was a need to tether judicial power against the kind of reasoning (so
to speak) we see in Roe. Dissenting in Roe, Justice Rehnquist drew attention to
this tact: "while the Court's opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Lochner. the result it reaches is more closely attuned to the major,ty
opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case.”37 Rehnquisfs dissent echoed
Justice Hugo Black's Griswold dissent that I discussed in the last chapter. Let me
quote Black again:
The Due Process Clause with an "arbitrary and capricious'
or "shocking the conscience’ formula was liberally used by
this Court to strike down economic legislation in the early
decades ol this century, threatening, many people thought,
the tranquility and stability of the Nation. See, e.g.
Lochner. That formula, based on subjective considerations
ol ‘natural justice,' is no less dangerous when used to
enforce this Court's views about personal rights than those
about economic rights. I had thought that we had laid that
formula, as a means for striking down state legislation, to
rest once and for all in cases like West Coast Hotel Co. 38
The return of substantive due process in Roe highlighted the fractured
state of New Deal jurisprudence and provoked many legal scholars who had been
weaned on the New Dealer's critique of the old court—on the ghost of Lochner—
to cry foul.
39
For New Dealers, Lochner—with its embrace of substantive due
35
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
M
' West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
37
Roe at 174.
Griswold v. C onneclicut 38 1 U.S. 479, 522 ( 1965) (J. Black dissenting).
19
Most notably John Hart Ely, who spun out Harlan Fiske Stone’s famous Carotene Products
footnote four into a full-fledged theory ofjudicial review in Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of
Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), objected to Roe. Ely argued that
Roe was not just bad constitutional law, but not constitutional law at all. “The Wages of Crying
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process-was synonymous with judicial lawmaking and a political Court. For all
the tensions within New Deal jurisprudence, for all that it left unsettled, the retreat
from substantive due process was a unifying theme. 40 Reagan's call for a return
to a jurisprudence of "original intent” highlighted the tension between rejecting
Luchner and embracing Roe, drawing heavily upon the condemnation ofLochner
as handed down by the New Dealers themselves. As expounded upon by Bork
and Scalia, originalism rejected the very notion of substantive due process
whether of the Lochner or Roe variety, and in this way digested a central tenet of
New Deal constitutionalism. For originalists, these decisions were of a piece,
which placed these jurists squarely with the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 on
this issue; that is, on the need to tether judicial will. 41 The preoccupation with
reconciling judicial review with democratic government and the suggestion that
any attempt to define substantive rights beyond constitutional text was all politics,
were inheritances from the New Deal critique of the Old Court. 42 Having
criticized the Court s use of judicial review as illegitimate. New Dealers became
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade" 82 Yale Law Journal 920 ( 1973). See also. Laura Kalman.
The Strange C areer oj Legal Liberalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996) 1-10.
40
Although this argument repeatedly flared up between Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black. See
Mark Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths: Felix Frankfurter, Hugo Black, and the Process of
Judicial Decision-Making (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) and C. Herman Pritchet. The
Roosevelt Court: A Stud
'y in Judicial Politics and Values. IV37-IV47 (Chicago: The Universitv
Press, 1948).
41
Robert Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica (New York: Free Press, 1990) 57. “In my history-book,
the Court was covered with dishonor and deprived of legitimacy by Dred Scott v. Sandford
( 1 857), an erroneous (and widely opposed) opinion that it did not abandon, rather than by West
Coast Hotel ( 1937), which produced the famous ‘switch in time from the Court's erroneous (and
widely opposed) constitutional opposition to the social measures of the New Deal.” Scalia’s
originalism is a bit different than Bork s insofar as he has shown a willingness to draw on
unenumerated rights that are clearly part of our history and tradition. See, e.g., Scalia’s opinion in
Michael H v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. I 10(1989).
4
’ See Holmes’ dissenting opinion in Adkins v. Children 's Hospital 26 1 U.S. 525 (1923).
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preoccupied with grounding judicial review in a way that clearly limited judicial
power. Let us recall Professor Herbert Wechsler's dilemma from the last chapter.
The problem tor all ot us became: How can we defend a judicial veto in areas
where we thought it helpful in American life ... and at the same time condemn it
in the areas where we considered it unhelpful'?”43 Originalism's preoccupation
with the legitimacy ot judicial review—viewing it in countermajoritarian terms
and its attempt to ground judicial will in “original intent” draws squarely on this
New Deal inheritance. Whether or not this is accurate constitutional history
insotar as original intent itself is concerned, it was a forceful critique of Roe that
illuminated its tensions with the New Deal regime—illuminated, in fact, the
tension at the heart of the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937.”44 The New Deal
constitutional order was coming apart, as the Court had already instituted
constitutional change that fell away from its foundations (in part because those
foundations were essentially contested from the beginning). Reagan's originalism
was in part an attempt to recover constitutional foundations—albeit an attempt of
a very different sort.
Reagan's originalism traveled easily with the New Deal's critique of
Lochner, but it posed a challenge to the New Deal Constitution when it came to
federalism. While the New Deal court abandoned substantive due process, it also
embraced a far-reaching view of Congress' power to regulate interstate
4
’ Quoted in Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn
,
234.
44
For an interesting take on constitutional Originalism and the rise of the New Deal see Howard
Gillman, “The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the ‘Living
Constitution’ in the Course of American State-Building” Studies in American Political
Development 11:1 49- 1 89 ( 1 997).
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commerce, rejecting arguments that federalism or the Tenth Amendment were
limitations on national power/' On these issues, Reagan's constitutional vision
squarely challenged the New Deal Constitution and its institutional arrangements.
As Bork described it, "The [New Deal] Court's refusal to enforce limits of any
kind simply abandoned this aspect of the Constitution. That worked a revolution
in the relationship of the federal government to the state governments and to the
people, and the revolution did not have to await a constitutional amendment ."46
By focusing on Roe and Casey, while neglecting the Reagan Court's
federalism decisions, Ackerman is able to claim that the Reagan Revolution failed
to legitimate constitutional change and, from there, claim that we are still living
under the New Deal Constitution. This is troublesome because the link between
Roe and the New Deal is specious. But more importantly, the resurgence of
federahsm represents a challenge to the New Deal order and shows signs that
Reagan s challenge to that order was at least partly successful. In fact.
Ackerman s scholarship in and of itself seems to reflect the potency of Reagan's
challenge: by rooting our current Constitution in the New Deal. Ackerman
protters a sort of "New Deal Onginalism” as a preemptive strike against Reagan's
call for original intent, which rejected New Deal foundations when it came to
federalism and limited government
.
47
Reagan's failure to overturn Roe amounts.
4
' See especially. United States v. Darby 3 1 2 U.S. 1 00 ( 1 94 1 ).
46
Bork, The Tempting ofAmerica, 57. See also, Raoul Berger. Federalism: The Founder's Desien(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987).
4
George Thomas, “New Deal ’Originalism”’ Polity Vol. XXXIII, No. I, Fall 2000. See also G.
Ldward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000)
27. Indeed, Reagan’s turn to original intent could be seen as widely successful in that it has"
reshaped the debate about constitutional interpretation. When the Reagan Administration brought
original intent back to the table, the debate was often described as a debate between
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then, to a failure to ratify his constitutional vision, which then makes the
Rehnquist Court's departure from New Deal foundations
“unconstitutional."
Ackerman is surely right that Reagan failed on this count. But he makes too much
ot the failure. Reagan spoke often about overturning Roe and frequently criticized
what he called judicial lawmaking. He insisted, again and again, that he would put
men and women on the bench who would interpret the law rather than legislate
a clear criticism of Roe. Even so, such moves were largely rhetorical. Castigating
the Court s judicial lawmaking was a sure and easy way to affirm Reagan's
commitment to pro-liters and religious groups. And while numerous scholars
focus on this aspect of Reagan s constitutional vision, there is a danger of
overplaying it .
48
As Landy and Milkis argue, “Reagan the divorce', the TV
huckster, the casual churchgoer, the signer of the California abortion bill
coexisted uneasily with Reagan the Savonarola. As long as the Democrats kept
control of at least one house of Congress, he did not need to resolve his
ambivalence. He could continue to rhetorically support a whole host of
conservative initiatives without having to actually put them into practice ."49
“interpretivists” and “noninterpretivists.” But in the wake of Reagan, we are all interpretivists
now. Once powerful critics of Originalism like Ronald Dworkin now speak its very language. In a
way the argument is over who has the better form of “Originalism." See Dworkin's Freedom 's
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). See also. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights:
Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Ackerman’s scholarship
itself should be placed in the context of American constitutional development, as his argument can
only be understood against its trajectory.
48
Donald Grier Stephenson, Campaigns and the Court (New York: Columbia University Press,
1999) focuses almost exclusively on the Court and abortion. James Simon's The Center Holds
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) speaks about the failure of the conservative revolution,
but doesn’t even have a chapter on federalism!
44
Landy and Milkis, Presidential Greatness
,
224. Which is not to say that Reagan wasn’t
committed to these socially conservative issues, but he seemed unwilling to spend political capital
to achieve them.
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Reagan s commitment to limited government and federalism, on the other hand,
were at the very core of his political vision. Reagan and Meese's vision of
originalism brings this out. What was most egregious about decisions like Roe
was not that they allowed abortion; it was the fact that they removed the decisions
from where they properly belonged: in the hands of the states. The states
themselves might choose to allow abortion, but constitutional principles of
federalism commanded that the issue be decided there and not by the Supreme
Court .
50
In the wake of Casey, Ackerman says, “we have returned to normal
politics. But this isn t true. Or, to vary the formula, ordinary politics itself
contains constitutional politics, which we see in the realm of civil liberties under
the New Deal regime, so it’s not clear that we ever left such politics behind.
Reagan and the Rehnquist Court are more likely just a particularly vivid and
potent form of constitutional politics in an area that had been settled. The very
same year that Casey was handed down, the Court reopened a debate on the
meaning of the Tenth Amendment that had been settled since the New Deal . 52
Three years later the Court, in Lopez
,
clearly struck down a law as beyond the
scope of Congress' Commerce Clause power for the first time since the New
s
" David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1 776-1995
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 19%), argues that Reagan supported many conservative
amendments for the same kind of rhetorical purposes, 447-455.
This isn't even true for abortion. In the 2000 partial birth abortion case, Carhart v. Stenberg
,
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor argued with one another over the very meaning of Casey. And
the Congress passed the “Born Alive Infants Act" in July of 2002, which may well have dramatic
ramifications for abortion.
New York v. United States 505 U.S. 144 (1992). O'Connor’s majority opinion on the Tenth
Amendment does not easily square with Darby. Again, Usery foreshadows these opinions, but
placed in context it seems an isolated case.
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Deal. Since that time the Court has shown that i, is willing t0 pollce the
boundaries between the states and the national government: limiting Congress-
power under the commerce clause
.
53
breathing life into the Tenth Amendment «
and recognizing the sovereign immunity of the states
.
55
Just how far the Reagan
Justices of the Rehnquis, Court will go is an open question, as is whether this line
of federalism decisions will be solidified over time.
Reagan s Transformative Appointments
Much like Roosevelt before him. Sheldon Goldman argues that Reagan
“self-consciously attempted to use the power ofjudicial appointments to place on
the bench judges who shared [hisj general philosophy ."56 In fact. Reagan saw a
transformation of the judiciary as key to his political agenda and. in Goldman's
terms, policy considerations drove his judicial appointments. Unlike Roosevelt,
the Court did not play spoiler to Reagan directly. To return to a more limited
vision ot government, the administration could cut government spending and
taxes and let the states and local governments take up their more traditional roles.
As long as the government acted in such a fashion, it could bring about significant
change without confronting the Court. So while Reagan articulated a
departmental ist vision, he was not forced to act on it directly. Yet absent a
significant change in our constitutional vision or a fundamental change on the
Lope: and United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
4 New York v. United States and Print: v. United States 52 I U.S. 898 (1997),
” Seminole Tnhe ofFlorida v. Florida 5 1 7 U. S. 44 (1996); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank 527 U.S. 627 (1999); College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board 527 U.S. 666 (1999); A lden v. Maine
527 U.S. 706 (1999); Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Trustees ofthe
University ofAlabama v. Garrett 53 1 U.S. 356 (2001 );
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Court. Reagan's return to limited government would be transitory rather than
foundational. To solidify a return to "dual sovereignty." he turned to judicial
appointments. His quarrel with the Court was largely rhetorical, insisting tha, i, le,
states and local governments return to their traditional functions. The Supreme
Court opintons he was most critical of-those forcing school busing, forbidding
prayer ,n public schools, and nationalizing abortion and criminal rights—
prevented the states from making choices he thought they were constitutionally
vested with the power to make. This required a change in judtcial philosophy:
getting justices to police the boundaries of federalism in a way that hadn't been
done since the pre-New Deal years. The rhetoric, much like Roosevelt's before,
was an insistence on judicial restraint: let state legislatures make these decisions,
not federal courts. Judicial restraint, though, was only part of the picture. At the
national level a constitutionally mandated return to federalism might require a
much more active judiciary. If the national government had a broader vision of its
constitutional power than the Reagan administration did. it would very likely
come into conflict with a Court dedicated to federalism. Perhaps more than any
administration since FDR's, Reagan was committed to this jurisprudential shift;
indeed, the administration started vetting candidates for the Supreme Court before
there were even any vacancies
.
77
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Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 285.
' 7
David Yaiof, Pursuit ofJustices: Presidential Politics and the Selection ofSupreme Court
Nominees (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) 143. David O'Brien suggest that the
Reagan judges may well be his most enduring legacy, “The Reagan Judges: His Most Enduring
Legacy. Charles O. Jones, ed„ The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance (Chatham:
Chatham House Publishers, 1988). See also Goldman, Picking Federal Judges, 285-345
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Reagan's reliance on judicial appointments to bring about constitutional
change was in par, due to the fact that he was no. in direct conflict with the Court.
But i, also reveals the degree to which Reagan was working within an inherited
institutional order even while attempting to change that very order. To alter the
existing constitutional order. Reagan worked primarily through the instruments of
the modern executive: through administration and presidential rhetoric, no. large-
scale legislative change. These instruments are part of the most profound
constitutional change of the twentieth century and Reagan's use of them to foment
constitutional change reflected just how rooted FDR's administrative executive
was. Through judicial appointments, the Department of J ustice. Office of Legal
Policy, and by way of executive orders and presidential signing statements.
Reagan attempted to shift constitutional thinking in legal terms
.
59
And while
Reagan criticized a "political" Court, most of the action was contained in the legal
arena—the stuff of lawyers and courts, not high-level constitutional politics . 60
Reagan s rhetorical eltorts seemed to promise more.
Here again, Reagan embraced the modern presidency: he was the
rhetorical president. But there was a twist. Reagan's rhetoric, unlike many
modern presidents, raised “important constitutional concerns .”62 Of course.
Reagan also used rhetoric to mobilize and flatter his political supporters. (One
58
Milkis, President and the Parties.
See Kenneth Mayer, With the Stroke oj a Pen; Executive Orders and Presidential Power
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
60 What Cowell Clayton calls the “judicialization of politics.” The Politics ofJustice: The Attorney
General and the Making ofLegal Policy (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) 146-155.
(>l
Tulis, The Rhetorical President
,
189-202
62
Ibid. 192.
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wonders, even, if much of his constitutional rhetoric on abortion and the like was
of this nature.) Reagan's rhetoric provoked a constitutional debate that freed his
administration from the Court monopoly of constitutional norms. Much of
Reagan's rhetoric in this regard seemed to be precisely so that the administration
could offer its own constitutional views independently of what the Court had said
or done. Most famously, Reagan insisted that he was not bound by Court opinions
on constitutional questions and could-in fact, must-interpret the Constitution
independently of Supreme Court opinions.
Like Lincoln before him, Reagan did not reject Court opinions as binding
on the parties to the case, but he rejected the broader rule that the Court had
articulated most forcefully in Cooper v. Aaron
,
that once the Court has spoken on
a constitutional issue, it definitively settled that issue for all the branches of
government. I his line of reasoning was explicitly rejected by Attorney General
Meese, who set off a maelstrom by rather innocuously arguing that the duty to
interpret the Constitution is a duty of all the branches of government and not just
a duty of the Court. Meese went on to say that, given this. Cooper v. Aaron “was,
and is, at war with the Constitution, at war with the basic principles of democratic
government, and at war with the very meaning of the rule of law.”64 The very
rhetoric of originalism suggested that the Court had fallen away from the
Constitution and that the president was thereby better positioned to speak for the
Constitution than the Court, to return to constitutional first principles. Reagan
brought this to light in speeches on federalism, insisting that the states had created
63 Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S. 1,18 (1958).
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the national government, not the other way around. Reagan even invoked Alexis
de Tocqueville in a 1981 television address, suggesting that federalism was key to
American democracy. 6 " Meese, once again, echoed this thinking by directly
taking on the Supreme Court's opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority
, where the Court, reversing the only significant federalism
opinion ot the last years, held that Congress could reach state employees by way
ol its power to regulate interstate commerce. Moreover, the Tenth Amendment
was rejected as a limitation on national power and the Court, per Justice
Blackmun, went so tar as to say that the judiciary was ill-equipped to police the
boundaries ot state and national power. It was an affirmation of the New Deal
Constitution. Meese insisted that in Garcia “the Court displayed—in the view of
the administration—an inaccurate reading of the text of the Constitution and a
disregard for the Framers intention that state and local governments be a buffer
against the centralizing tendencies of the national leviathan.” Pushing this
further, Meese noted that the administration s view is that Federalism is one of
the most basic principles of our Constitution,” and added “we hope for a day
when the Court returns to the basic principles of the Constitution as expressed in
Usery
In National League of Cities v. Usery
, a case out of line with the New
Deal view of federalism, Rehnquist argued that the Tenth Amendment limited
congressional power. The very year that Garcia overturned Usery
,
Reagan
elevated Rehnquist to the Chief Justiceship. And dissenting in Garcia
.
Rehnquist
64
Edwin Meese, “The Law of the Constitution,” 987.
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turgidly noted that “I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell
out further the fine points of a principle that will, 1 am confident, in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court.”66 Rehnquist has led just such a
resurgence that has its roots in Reagan's constitutional vision. And while
Reagan's rhetorical efforts are important, they seem to supplement his more
concerted effort through administrative and legal channels. It is in this manner
that Reagan brought about his most fruitful constitutional change.
Whither the Current Regime?
We might see the Rehnquist Court as part of Reagan's national governing
coalition. Federalism emerged as a political and constitutional issue on the
national agenda, addressed by both the political parties, long before the Rehnquist
Court's revival of it. It is not clear “that the Court has led a ‘federalism
revolution,”' so much as “followed national political trends.”67 Submerged in the
Reagan years, however, was the possibility of an active Court. A return of the
Court s policing state-federal boundaries would almost surely require judicial
activism if the national government did not restrain itself and recognize a wide
arena lor state autonomy. 68 In the last decade the Court has taken on this role,
striking down an unprecedented number of congressional acts in the arena of
65
Congressional Quarterly, 3 October 1981, 1922.
<>0 (Junta v. Sun Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1986), (J. Rehnquist
dissenting).
67
J- Mitchell Pickerill and Cornell Clayton, “Politics and the Safeguards of Federalism During the
Rehnquist Court." Pickerill and Clayton examine the party platforms of both parties noting
federalism issues. This is especially true of the Republican Party platforms, which speak “a
decentralization of the federal government and efforts to return decision making power to state and
local elected officials.”
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federalism. Critics have been quick to point to the Court's judicial activism, of
whtch Reagan was so critical-’ So is the Court thwarting congressional will?
1 his question should draw our eye to a central point: the foundations ofjudicial
power are political. While the Court has taken up the role of enforcer of
federalism in the constitutional order—with rather dramatic claims to judicial
supremacy-this was brought about, after a lag. by Reagan and has strong
political support (even if we do not think of it as a coherent regime). Much like
the New Dealers before them, those who criticized judicial power in the 1980s
have grown comfortable with it in the 1990s. while past supporters have suddenly
started invoking notions ofjudicial restraint and accusing the Court of second
guessing the political branches. It is. no doubt, ironic that the President who
brought forth the current Court was an advocate of departmentalism, while the
Court itself has rejected anything short ofjudicial supremacy. Still, how solid the
current foundation is. including the Court's claims to judicial supremacy, remains
to be seen. The fact that so many ol these decisions are 5-4 symbolizes the
tensions within our constitutionalism and the difficulty, once more, of speaking of
constitutional regimes.
Constitutional change rarely emerges all at once as in Ackerman's great
constitutional moments; nor does it untold in a neat evolutionary manner with
On this aspect ot conservative jurisprudence see Thomas Keck, "Activism and Restraint on the
Rehnquist Court: Timing, Sequence, and Conjuncture in Constitutional Development" Polity Vol
XXXV, No. 1 (2002).
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Writing in The New Republic Our Discriminating Court: Federal Offensive” April 9, 2001),
Jeffrey Rosen insisted that the Court’s federalism opinions put the “New Deal legacy of a
powerful federal government” at stake. Rosen has gone on to suggest that “the resurrection of a
tradition of liberal judicial restraint
. . . seems more relevant today than at any time since the New
Deal.” “Breyer Restraint: A Modest Proposal” The New Republic
, January 14, 2002. Linda
Greenhouse The High Court s Target: Congress" The New York Times February 25, 2001.
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subtle changes injudicial doctrine. The recognition that presidents-^specially
great presidents—may remake the constitutional order, and often against the
Court, is an important one. Even so, this recognition mirrors some of the problems
with conventional notions ofjudicial supremacy. Indeed, to some degree
presidential reconstructions supplement judicial supremacy. In remaking the
constitutional order, great presidents engage in departmentalist constitutional
rhetoric, displace the current constitutional understandings as articulated by the
Supreme Court, and restructure our constitutional views and institutions. The
Court, by and large, then returns to its role as the articulator of the new
constitutional order
.
70
So judicial supremacy is the norm, with moments of
constitutional politics as extraordinary events. While surely a more accurate
rendering ot our constitutional history than simple judicial supremacy, this
narrative also misses moments of constitutional dialogue, conflict, discontinuity
,
unsettlement, and innovation that bring about significant constitutional change.
Indeed, the ebb and How ot constitutional meaning may capture the ordinary
functioning of our system far more aptly than grand presidential reconstructions
or simple judicial enforcement
.
71
Constitutional disjunctions may break with the
past order without bringing about full-scale constiutitonal change. While Reagan
did not overturn Roe, it is difficult to say that Roe was part ot the existing
constitutional order in the first place, or that the question of a constitutional right
70
Ackerman, Whittington, Skowronek, and Landy and Milkis all go with this narrative to varying
degrees.
71
Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988). See also Politics and Constitutionalism: The Louis Fisher
Connection (collected essay in tribute to Fisher).
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to abortion has truly been settled. 72 We see this with Reagan's revival of
federalism: the Rehnquist Court has broken with the New Deal, but in doing so
has continued, rather than settled, a constitutional debate.
Undoing the New Deal
The 5-4 federalism decisions in recent years have often amounted to a
debate about the New Deal between the majority and dissenting justices. In
Lopez, when the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,
Justice Souter, writing in dissent, raised the specter that the Court may be
returning to a pre-1937 reading of the Commerce Clause. He even accused the
majority of “ignoring the painful lesson learned in 1937.” 73 And Justice Breyer’s
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, insisted
that Rehnquist s opinion for the majority “runs contrary to modern Supreme
Court cases" with particular emphasis on Wickard v. Filhurn, which solidified the
New Deal understanding ot the commerce power. It's appropriate that Wickard
was written by Justice Robert Jackson, who as Roosevelt's Solicitor General had
articulated the New Deal constitutional vision to a usually hostile Court. Now on
the bench, Jackson solidified this constitutional vision, symbolized all the more
by the fact that there was not a single dissenting opinion. In Wickard
.
the Court
upheld a congressional regulation that limited the amount of wheat a farmer could
grow for home consumption even though it did not move in interstate commerce.
77
“ Not only is there continued and vehement constitutional debate on the issues, with large sections
ot the pol itical community refusing to view Rue as legitimate, the Court itself continues to dispute
the meaning ot Rue. The is evident Casey itself and, most recently, with Justices Kennedy and
O Connor disputing the meaning of Casey in relation to Rue in Stenberv v Carharl 530 U S 914
(2000 ).
71
Lupe: at 609 (J. Souter dissenting).
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In doing so, the Court held that it must look at the totality of effects, so even
purely local matters might, taken cumulatively, have an effect on interstate
commerce. Therefore, such local activities were within the reach of the
Commerce Power. Rehnquist’s opinion slyly evades the logic of Wickard, noting
that at least it purported to regulate commercial activity while Lopez was not
regulating commercial activity at all. But as Justice Breyer pointed out: “the
Wickard Court expressly held that Wickard's consumption of home grown wheat.
though it may not be regarded as commerce: could nevertheless be regulated—
whatever its nature’ so long as ‘it exerts a substantial effect on interstate
commerce .’”
74
Lopez does not sit easily with Wickard and looks like a departure. That is
surely why Rehnquist, although speaking of Wickard
,
rested Lopez on the logic of
an earlier New Deal case: Jones & Laughlin Steel. This watershed case upheld the
National Labor Relations Act (the Wagner Act) against a Commerce Clause
challenge, thus allowing a key piece of New Deal legislation to go forward, even
while reminding the Congress that
the scope of this power [the interstate commerce power]
must be considered in the light of our dual system of
government and may not be extended so as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote
that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.
7 ^
4
Lope: at 628 (J. Breyer dissenting, italics in original).
7
' Jones and Laughlin at 37.
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This is just what Wickard did four years later. In returning to the login of Jones
und Laughlin Steel, the Rehnquist Court may not have been returning fully to pre
1937 understandings of the Commerce Power, but it was just as surely rejecting
the lull truit ot the New Deal as put forward in Wickard.^
The Court had opened up another such departure in New York v. The
United States, where it held that the Congress may not
-commandeer" the states
by forcing them to take action to implement a federal program. For our purposes.
New York is significant in that its reading of the Tenth Amendment revived the
notion of "dual sovereignty” all but buried in the Constitutional Revolution of
1937. O'Connor explained that
The Tenth Amendment
. . . restrains the power of
Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the
Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is
essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment
confirms that the power ol the Federal Government is
subject to limits that may, in any given instance, reserve
power to the States. The 1 enth Amendment thus directs us
to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I
power.
Much like the Chief Justice would later do in Lopez
, O'Connor held that this was
consistent with New Deal precedent, quoting Stone's opinion in United States v.
Darby: “The Tenth Amendment 'states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered. O Connor uses this truism, though, to breathe life into
the Tenth Amendment as a substantive limit on congressional power by restoring
’ Justice Thomas concurring opinion helps draw this out, as he urges a complete repudiation of
the New Deal cases and a return to pre 1937 understanding of the Commerce Power. Lope
:
at 585
(J. Thomas concurring).
77 New York at 156-157.
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the notion of dual sovereignty. This is exactly what Stone was rejecting: Darby
was meant to bury the notion that dual sovereignty placed any substantive limits
on congressional power and place such a reading of the Tenth Amendment in the
dustbin of history. Again, while not necessarily returning to a pre-New Deal
jurisprudence, the five Reagan/Bush appointees were signaling a significant
departure from the New Deal Constitution—and on the very issues it had in fact
settled .
79
The Court s break became evident in United States v. Morrison when it
struck down the Violence Against Women Act even though Congress had offered
substantial findings “that gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce.”
This was something Congress had not done in Lopez. The Court made apparent
the meaning of Lopez when Rehnquist insisted that "whether particular operations
atlect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative
question. In its Commerce Clause opinions since Wickard. the Court had
always insisted that there was—theoretically—a limit on what Congress could
regulate under the guise of its commerce power, but the reasoning of the Court's
opinions had suggested that Congress' power was plenary. By itself Lopez might
Darby at 124.
v
In New York v. United States, Justice Souter supplied the firth vote and Clarence Thomas was
not yet on the Court. In subsequent opinions, Souter would change his vote and become a leading
critic of the Court’s federalism decisions, while Thomas supplied the fifth vote. The sovereign
immunity cases are perhaps the Court’s most novel departure, but I don’t take them up as they are
less central to the New Deal Constitution and Reagan’s attempted reconstruction.
80
Morrison at 614. Ronald Rotunda, “The Commerce Clause, the Political Questions Doctrine,
and Morrison’’ Constitutional Commentary 18:303 (2001), argues that, in fact, the dissenting
opinions in these cases represent the significant departure from past cases insofar as they argue for
a complete judicial abdication in this area.
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have been a simple recognition of this outer limit. But Morrison made clear that
the Court would police the “distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local.” This gave federalism a bite that while possible in the Court's earlier
opinions, was simply not there in practice, a point Rehnquist made explicit:
Although JUSTICE BREYER argues that acceptance of the
government s rationales would not authorize a general
federal police power, he is unable to identify any activity
that the States may regulate but Congress may not.
JUST ICE BREYER posits that there might be some
limitations on Congress' commerce power
. .
.
[but] these
suggested limitations, when viewed in light of the dissent's
expansive analysis, are devoid of substance. 81
1 he so-called lederalist five made clear that they would give substance to these
limitations on congressional power and, even if sub silentio
, broke from the New
Deal.
82
Morrison solidified the Court's federalism on another front as well. In
addition to the Commerce C lause analysis, Rehnquist s opinion rejected the idea
that Congress may federalize traditional state matters, such as violence against
women, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Federalism was held to
limit Congress' power to enforce the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Flere
federalism bled into the Court's stunning insistence upon judicial supremacy in
City of Boerne v. Flores , which Morrison rested squarely upon. In Boerne
, Justice
Kennedy, appointed by a president who insisted that he could interpret the
81
Lope: at 564-565.
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Dean Alfange, Jr., “The Supreme Court and Federalism: Yesterday and Today” and Tinsley E.
Yarbrough, The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution see the New Deal as restoring John
Marshall’s view of the Constitution, much like Edward Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd.
(Claremont: Claremont Colleges, 1941 ) and Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar
ofthe Law (New York: Viking Press, 1956). While originalists like Bork and Raoul Berger see the
New Deal as a departure from Marshall’s Constitution on federalism issues.
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Constitution independently of what the Court had said, insisted that constitutional
interpretation was a job for the Court alone. “Congress,” Justice Kennedy
lectured, “has been given the power 'to enforce,’ not the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so. what Congress would be
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the 'provisions of [the
Fourteenth Amendment .]”83 As I've noted in several chapters, for Justice
Kennedy the Constitution is what the Court says it is. Congress, then, can enforce
the Court's reading of the Constitution, but not its own. This is surely at odds with
Meese, who had a heavy hand in appointing Kennedy, insisting that “once we
understand the distinction between constitutional law and the Constitution, once
we see that constitutional decisions need not be seen as the last words in
constitutional construction ... we can grasp a correlative point: constitutional
interpretation is not the business of the Court alone, but also properly the business
of all branches of government.” The majority, though, has been quite insistent
upon the Court as the definitive interpreter of constitutional meaning. Does this
a return to judicial supremacy, solidifying a departmental ist president's
constitutional vision?
Congress and Court
Many scholars suggest we seem to have entered a new constitutional
regime, but one whose foundation is remarkably tenuous . 84 We might better
understand these developments as consistent with ordinary political change—the
Hi
City ofBuerne v. Flores 52 1 U.S. 507, 535-536 (1997).
s4
Tushnet suggests this new constitutional regime is not a radical departure, but one where
constitutional aspiration remains chastened. The New Constitutional Order.
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political Constitution a, work-which itself is par, or our constitutional
development. The perststence of the 5-4 decisions on federalism issues highlights
this fact. The four dissenting justices make as coherent a bloc as the Reagan/Bush
appointees and are convinced that the Court is wrong. As justice Breyer put it
squarely in dissent a. the end of the Court's 2002 term, in yet another 5-4
federalism decision: "[the majority opmion] reaffirms the need for continued
dissent."8 ’ Both sides have solid political support within the political system and
the path of federalism will depend on far more than the Court. Indeed, while the
Supreme Court played a limited role in the last presidential election, when it was
discussed federalism was not the key issue. 86 Rather, the Court factored in. yet
again, as a way for both sides to Hatter supporters and gain their votes by
highlighting Roe v. Wade. The rhetorical presidency persists. But this may also
say something about the Court's conflict with Congress over the last decade.
I he C ongress appears reluctant to simply accept the Court's recent
decisions, but is appears just as reluctant to boldly challenge the Court. After the
Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez and RFRA in
Boerne. Congress refused to simply let the Court settle the issue. In passing the
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority (2002)
(Justjce Breyer dissenting ) Breyer againinvoked he New Deal: “An overly restrictive judicial interpretation of the Constitution's
structural constraints (unlike its protections of certain basic liberties) will undermine the
onstitution s own efforts to achieve its far more basic structural aim, the creation of a
representative form of government capable of translating the people's will into effective public
action. This understanding, underlying constitutional interpretation since the New Deal reflects
the Constitution's demands for structural flexibility sufficient to adapt substantive laws’and
institutions to rapidly changing social, economic, and technological conditions ”
Other than deeding it in Bushy. Core (2000)! 1 mean during the election and not in the
a termath. While critics have insisted that Bush v. Core is not consistent with the Court’s
commitment to federalism, this need not be so. Even these justices argue that national questions
rooted in the Constitution will trump state actions. But most importantly, however one comesdown on Bush v. Core
,
the federalism revolution of the Court has continued.
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Violence Against Women Act in 1999. the Congress touched on both of these
cases. The Act rested upon both Congress' Commerce Power and its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Lopez, the Court had rejected the
federal regulation of guns in a school zone as far too tenuously linked to the
regulation ot interstate commerce. So in passing the VAWA. Congress compiled
a "mountain of data" to show "the effects of violence against women on interstate
commerce." Here. Congress was engaging the Court and attempting to work
within the contours of its opinion. The Court, as we have seen, rejected Congress-
attempt to do this and signaled how serious it was about the limits of Congress'
Commerce Power. Whether Congress will accept this remains to be seen. In the
same act, though. Congress did challenge the Court's recent opinion in Boerne.
By also resting the VAWA on its Section 5 power. Congress was attempting to
define substantive rights under the amendment, which the Court, in Boerne.
insisted C ongress could not do. But even here Congress attempted to engage the
Court, it tried to show that these rights were not being preserved in the states.
which therefore justified congressional action (something it did not clearly show
in the RFRA).
Congress itselt has been ambivalent about the Court s power, and has even
tacitly indulged it. In passing legislation that is constitutionally controversial.
Congress often defers to the Court's ultimate judgment by enacting “fast-track"
provisions that allow tor direct appeal to the Supreme Court so that it may settle
the constitutional question. Its reluctance to work out controversial constitutional
questions by deferring to the Court for political cover neglects its role as an
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independent interpreter of the Constitution. Perhaps most importantly, much of
the legislation the Rehnquist Court has struck down is “symbolic" or “message
politics ."87 This is particularly evident in the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Here
Congress was responding to a perceived national problem to get credit for “doing
something. In passing such legislation—which in many cases simply mirrors
state legislation—Congress gets political credit. When the Court strikes down
such legislation. Congress is not held accountable for the failure; indeed,
members of Congress have already received the biggest benefit; recognition from
interest groups and their constituents for addressing the issue. Nor, though, are
members of Congress necessarily troubled by the Court's decisions, as such
decisions don't truly keep congressional members from responding to constituent
demands. In fact, many members of Congress may well support the Court's
general turn to federalism even while supporting legislation they think the Court
very likely to strike down, so as to reap the benefits for responding to interest
groups and constituents. This is perhaps why the Court has drawn far more fire
from interest groups and Court watchers than from members of Congress. And
this says something important about the actions of the Rehnquist Court.
The Rehnquist Court, in contrast to the New Deal Court, has not yet
prevented political actors from achieving significant political goals. The Court is
not consistently thwarting a powerful national agenda supported by Congress (or
the public and the President). Particular political groups may be miffed at the
Court, and thus Congress may be reluctant to simply accept the Court's path, but
87
Devins, “Congress as Culprit” and Whittington, “"Taking What They Give Us.”
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neither has it mounted a serious challenge to the Court's authority. (And many
members are quite content with the Court.) Congress, much like the President
with signing statements, engages in a sort of independent constitutional
interpretation on the cheap. It asserts this power on occasion, and refuses to
simply follow Court opinions (often flatly ignoring them), but it does not flatly
reject the Court's claims to judicial supremacy. But this also indicates a sort of
judicial supremacy on the cheap. While the Court has insisted upon its unique role
in settling constitutional questions, the foundations of such a role are not
necessarily solid. We may indulge the Court, so long as it is generally in line with
a political consensus, or not directly thwarting the President and Congress’
political will. How long this will hold may depend on how far the Court pushes,
but it will almost certainly depend upon external political developments. As the
four dissenting justices have continually warned, the “consequences of the court’s
approach [may] prove anodyne.''88 But, depending upon events, the Court's
approach may also prove destructive. Justice Souter, the lone outlier of the
Reagan/Bush appointees on federalism issues, reiterated this warning in his
dissenting opinion in Morrison:
All of this convinces me that today's ebb of the commerce
power rests on error, and at the same time leads me to
doubt that the majority s view will prove to be enduring
law. There is yet one more reason for doubt. Although we
sense the presence of [pre-New Deal decisions] once again,
the majority embraces them only at arm's-length
. . . Cases
standing for the sufficiency of substantial effects are not
overruled; cases overruled since 1937 are not quite revived.
The Court's thinking betokens less clearly a return to
88
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority (2002).
http://supct.law.cornell.edU/supct/litml/01
-46./DI.html. (J. Breyer dissenting.)
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conceptual straightjackets
. . . than to something
unsteady, a period in which the failure to provide a
workable definition left this Court to review each case ad
hoc. As our predecessors learned then, the practice of such
ad hoc review cannot preserve the distinction between the
judicial and the legislative, and this Court, in any event,
lacks the institutional capacity to maintain such a regime
for very long.
The dissenting justices persist in insisting the Court's federalism jurisprudence is
not tenable and that it may, once again, have to relearn the lessons of 1937. Yet.
depending on the trajectory of current politics, the Rehnquist Court's federalism
may prove a constitutional moment that leaves the lessons of 1937 as a remnant of
the New Deal. 1 he outcome will depend on the constitutional politics of the next
tew years. We are, in the meantime, in a state of constitutional drift, but such a
state is far more familiar in American constitutional history then we often
suppose; it is not a stretch to suggest this is politics as usual.
Conclusion
Reagan's counterrevolution against the New Deal—playing FDR in
reverse did not bring on the kind of sweeping constitutional and political change
that Roosevelt himself did. Partly this is a result of circumstance. The gradual
disintegration of the New Deal coalition in the 1970 s was very different from the
sharp political crisis of the early 1 930' s. In fact, Reagan's movement from
enthusiastic New Dealer to outspoken critic of the New- Deal state over the course
of four decades mirrored many Americans' growing frustrations with national
centralization. Reagan sought to dismantle New Deal institutions by turning away
from Washington D.C. and returning political responsibility back to local and
8y
Morrison at 654-655 (J. Souter dissenting).
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state governments. Most importantly, he saw this as no, just smart politics, but as
constitutionally mandated. The Reagan Revolution has succeeded in this far more
modest task: it has brought federalism back to the table as a constitutionally
robust principle. Bu, this is a work in progress-with the distinct possibility of
failure.
In this way. Reagan's constitut.onal reconstruction reflects the ebb and
flow of constitutional change, rather than the dramatic politics of constitutional
translormation. Here we see Reagan's break with the New Deal as well as his
indirect affirmation of its legacy. The Rehnquist Court's federalism opinions have
broken with the New Deal Constitution on the enumerated powers of the national
government and the meaning of the Tenth Amendment. Yet. the fact that the most
significant aspects of Reagan's constitutional reconstruction worked through the
legalistic and administrative realm attests to the continuing presence of New Deal
institutions-and reveals, in fact, the institutional and constitutional overlap of
ditterent "orders."* The Reagan Court, as we might properly call the Rehnquist
Court when it comes to federalism, has taken up the role of policer of the federal
system and. in doing so, has unsettled the New Deal Constitution, Leuchtenburg
concluded "The Constitutional Revolution of 1937" by noting that "'When the
extreme negativist position ot 1935-36 was forsaken, as it had to be, the Court
could find no stopping place short of abdication.’ In 1937 the Supreme Court
began a revolution in jurisprudence that ended, it appeared forever, the reign of
Karren Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a ’New
Institutionalism’" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds„ The Dynamics ofAmerican
Politics: Approaches and Interpretations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).
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laissez-taire and legitimated the arrival of the Leviathan State."" 1 In American
constitutional development things rarely last forever."3 A return to laissez-faire
seems unlikely (particularly as it never existed), but the Rehnquist Court is once
again attempting to draw a line between national and state authority and. thereby,
rejecting the Leviathan state. The fragility of this constitutional shift is
highlighted by the fact that it seems to turn on the vote of a single Supreme Court
justice. Although the Court is in the forefront of this constitutional development,
this should not blind us to the politics that underlie the Court. For far more than a
single Supreme Court justice, the fate of the current federalism revival will
depend on the course of American politics more generally.
91
Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn
,
236.
And Leuchtenburg himself is too sanguine about the Court’s view of its role in the wake of this
constitutional transformation, suggesting the Warren Court comes easily out of the New Deal
Revolution in "The Birth of America's Second Bill of Rights" in The Supreme Court Reborn 237-
258.
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CONCLUSION:
THE tout,cal coh»t,t=a» the mvth of
Alex,s de Tocqueville's Democracy in Africa remains the preeminent
work on its subject and scholars of all stripes draw on i, to ilium,nate the
workings of American democracy. So much so. in fact, that public law scholars
have nearly reduced one of Tocqueville's great observations-'-,ha, nearly all
polittcal questions in the United States ultimately find expression as legal
questions” to a staid recitation. Thts is all the more remarkable because this of,
quoted expression is treated as a truism: yet i, has only tenuous historical support
Though Tocqueville's own understandmg of the judiciary's peculiar role in
American democracy is illuminating, history has not always borne out his
judgments. In speaking of maintaining our Constitution, for example, he insists
that:
n the hands of seven federal judges rests ceaselessly the
peace, the prosperity, the very existence of the Union.
Without them, the Constitution is a dead letter; to them the
executive power appeals to resist the encroachments of the
legislative body; the legislature, to defend itself against the
undertakings of the executive power; Union, to have itself
obeyed by the states; the states, to repel the exaggerated
pretensions ot the Union; the public interest against private
interest; the spirit of conservation against democratic
instability. Their power is immense; but it is a power of
opinion. They are omnipotent as long as the people consent
to obey the law; they can do nothing when they scorn it. 1
As I have labored to show in this dissertation, this understanding of the
Court as the lone protector of constitutional government has little historical
ur
*
tu'
S d
!Jl
0cqueville
’
Democracy in America
, translated by Harvey Mansfield and Delba
Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 142.
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grounding. Tocqueville's own analysis compounds this problem, ins,sling that
when the Court refuses to enforce an
-unconstitutional” law.
-one of two thtngs
happen: the people change their constitution or the legislature rescinds the law ."2
This. too. has precious little historical support. Many of the great constitut.onal
Changes wrought the twentieth century have taken place outside the courts and
without formal constitut.onal amendment. In more ordinary terms, as we have
seen again and again, the Congress often passes laws that challenge the Court's
constitutional opinions, rather than "rescinding the law." and the Court adapts to
the political branches reading of the Constitution. Tocqueville does pu, his finger
on the deeper issue a, the end of the lengthy quote above, when he says that the
Court's power is the "power of opinion.” This power is omnipotent when the
people obey, but impotent otherwise. On this dynamic rests the political basis of
judicial power: the Court is powerful when we go along with it. Yet. the political
branches (and the public) are unlikely to be controlled by Court opinions they
disagree with: they are fully capable of contesting constitutional meaning and
forcing adjustment by the Court. This is not. in itself, reason to despair, for the
Court is not the sole protector of the Constitution. Contests over constitutional
meaning demonstrate the functioning of the Madisonian Constitution, revealing
how maintaining the Constitution is a task for all of the branches of government.
Putting it in this light should not only lead us to reevaluate the notion that the
Court is the great protector of constitutional government, it should lead us to
2
Ibid. 96.
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aluate the so-called countermajoritarian dilemma that is at the heart of so
much constitutional theory.
In his most recent book. How Democratic is the American Constitution ’,
Robert Dahl picks up a variant of this theme. I, is no surprise, given Dahl's
vartous works on democratic theory, that he finds our Constitution, as measured
aga.nst democratic ideals, wanting. While Dahl insists that his purpose "is not s<
much to suggest changes in the existing constitution as to encourage us to change
the way we think about it.”5 his analysis is a stunning and harsh critique of the
Constitution, very much in line with Progressive critiques of American
constitutionalism throughout the twentieth century. Dahl has long preferred, as
political scientists since Woodrow Wilson have, a more parliamentary system of
government which is less concerned with structural formality, more amenable to
popular will, and so more democratic
.
4
Indeed. Dahl's work, like Wilson's before
htm. reads as an extended argument with Madison and his Constitution, arguing
that our system "compared with the political system of the other advanced
democratic countries,
. . .is among the most opaque, complex, confusing, and
difficult to understand." It is. in short, undemocratic
—witness the Senate as it
lets institutional structures stand in the way of "national majorities." making the
Constitution on outdated and unworkable structure of government
.
5
Alas. Dahl, an
p
“'- H"" Democratic is the American Constitution? (New Haven: Yale University
Although later progressives, unlike their predecessors, want to keep the Bill of Rights' formal
imitations and have little complaint as to how such limitations thwart democratic will.
5
Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? See also, Gordon Wood, “Rambunctious
American Democracy” New York Review ofBooks, May 9, 2002.
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extraordinarily accomplished empirical political seen, is,
, does no, ,ake seriously
the t'ac, that the Madisonian system seems to have worked reasonably well,
providing a structure in whteh political and constitutional questions are worked
ou, as par, of the political process. Looking a, the history of constitutional
disputes as I have done here, suggests that the Constitution has in fact proven
"adaptable- and accommodating in meeting the needs of the current generation.
True, the constitutional structure does no, allow any one side-or branch of
government-to single-handedly insist upon its will, or reading of the
Cons,itution-in an immedtate way. On the contrary, the very constitut.onal
framework calls forth serious and contentious debate about fundamental
constitutional (and political, issues when there is serious disagreement; when, tha,
IS, such tssues are contested." One the one hand, this reveals the limitations of
Tocqueville's heavily digested notion of the Court's acting against the political
branches. On the other, it shows how the political branches (the democratic
branches) are central to working out constitutional questions, revealing the
constitutional framework to be more democratic than Dahl's analysis suggests.
It is interesting, in this light, that two extraordinarily influential political
scientists, whose political theorizing is deeply informed by empirical evidence,
manage to view the Constitution—and theorize about it—in ways that have little
regard for the historical functioning of our constitutionalism. Tocqueville and
Dahl represent the twin polls of constitutional theory that I wish to dissolve by
seeing the Constitution in more political terms.
Which is arguably to foster a more serious form of democracy.
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mentConstitu
Dahl's own pioneering study of the Court has suggested tha, no branch of
government is iong abie to resist a nationa, majority, as each branch usualiy fa„s
into line with the "governing coalition's" politics (constitutional or otherwise ).
7
Dahl's real complaint, then, is tha, our constitutional structure makes the
construction of such national majorities difficult and complicated, as its multiple
institutional structures are not always easy to negotiate. Here, I suggest, we see
Ihe limitations of Dahl's earlier work which views the Court as part of the
national governing coalition and serves as the basis for a regimes understanding
ot constitutional development.
I he Madisonian Constitution, as I've argued, provides for continued
constitutional dispute. The fact that it has multiple institutional actors, which are
not always aligned with one another, no, only allows for different institutional
orders, but creates a space in which political actors can dispute, raise, or revisit
questions of constitutional meaning, precluding an easy constitutional settlement
.
8
In this way. the Madisonian Constitution may well leave different constitutional
questions at different levels of settlement, depending upon the political
circumstances of the time.'' Constitutional theory and constitutional law. which
are often preoccupied by bringing order to the constitutional universe, neglect the
fact that the Madisonian Constitution-rather than the legal Constitution-is open
See generally Robert Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Policy-Maker” Journal ofPublic Law ( 1 959) 279-295
Supreme Court as a National
Which, again, might suggest a more democratic form of government.
‘'What Stephen Skowronek dubs political time. The Politics Presidents Make (Cambridge-
Harvard University Press, 1993). B
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to discontinuity, overlapping views, unsettled constitutional meaning, partially
settled constitutional meaning, multiple orders and levels of meaning,
disjunctions, dialogues, and continued dispute. In some ways, the persistence
quest to treat constitutional questions as amenable to
-'legal" resolution is
puzzling, given our persistent conflicts over "creedal passions." which could only
result in a sort of disharmony. 1 " Given that the Constitution is both fundamental
law and our political framework, as Charles Grove Haines noted long ago. it
should not surprise us that it is the source of continued dispute. Indeed, i, would
be odd it it were otherwise. 1
1
Political actors, not surprisingly, refer to and attempt to reframe the
Constitution in light of their politics, making choices about conflicting
constitutional values and trying to order constitutional priorities based upon a
particular politics rather than abstract constitutional theorizing. Even so, the
constitutional framework and constitutional ideas shape such actors thinking and
structure the arguments they are able to make (which is true of the Court as well).
As 1 have argued throughout the last several chapters, to understand the
Constitution we must understand American constitutional development, locating
particular constitutional disputes within particular historical circumstances, rather
than theorizing generally about judicial supremacy and judicial review, judicial
activism and judicial restraint, or the role of the Congress and the president.
Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Promise ofDisharmony (Cambridge- Harvard
University Press, 1981).
Charles Grove Haines, The Supreme Court in American Government and Politics I7S5-IS35
New York: Russell and Russell, 1960) 9-49.
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The Polmeal Constitution unci Constitutional Development
Constitutional theory has a tendency to get a, these quest,ons in the
abstract. Front this perspective, the Court is seen as the primary (if„„, s0,e)
protector of the Constitution: its independence and ‘learning in the law” foster a
concern with constitutional prmciple and fidelity to constitutional text, which i,
defends with the giving of principled and reasoned arguments in its opinions. All
things considered, as Alexander and Schauer argue, i, is institutionally
predisposed to maintain the Constitution and settle disputed constitutional
questions. Against this, the political branches. Congress in particular, are said to
be driven by politics (rather than reason or principle), which leads them to be
blithely unconcerned with any son of fidelity to constitutional tex, or meaning, if
no, eager to trample upon it. Thus they are likely to be-even institutionally
predisposed to be-unconcerned with constitutional limits and rights
.
12
Furthermore, given the its independence and penchant for reasoned opinions, the
Court is far more likely than the political branches (yearning to satisfy the current
Whims of the public) to provide for stable constitutional meaning by adhering to
precedent and laying down rule-based decisions that will tell us just what the
Constitution means and thereby prevent us from succumbing to constitutional
anarchy and incoherence
.
13
This litany has become a veritable, if untested, truth.
As my historical studies suggest, the evidence does not bear out such claims.
Ronald Dworkin, Freedom ’s Law The Moral Reading ofthe Americlean Constitution(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) 344. “[Individual citizens can in fact exercise themoral responsibilities of citizenship better when final decisions involving constitutional valuesremoved from ordinary politics and assigned to courts, whose decisions are meant to turn onprmciple, not the weight of numbers or the balance of political influence."
Alexander and Schauer, "On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation.”
are
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These questions depend on particular historical circumstances and cannot be
answered detached from concrete circumstances as so much of constitutional
theory attempts to do.
14
The Court, the Congress, and the president, have all acted differently at
different periods in our history. Indeed, these institutions have acted differently
within the same time frame or constitutional order on different constitutional
issues. We cannot, then, easily assign a particular institutional role to these
branches of government insofar as constitutional maintenance is concerned.
Scholars viewing the Court as driven by law or politics, as active or restrained, or
as the great protector of constitutional limits and rights, neglect the myriad ways
in which the Court may be each of these things at different times, or even all of
these things within a given time period on different issues. We cannot say, for
example, as a general proposition, that the Court is the great protector of
constitutional rights. As I argued in Chapter 2, Congress was a far more robust
protector of the newly freed slaves constitutional rights and far more wedded to
the true meaning of the Civil War Amendments than was the Court. Yet. the
Court may have been more in tune with public sentiment in refusing to offer a
robust protection for such constitutional rights. Similarly, the current Congress, as
I touch on in Chapters 2 and 5, has arguably displayed a more robust reading of
constitutional rights in many instances than the Court has: in attempting to protect
women from various forms of sexual harassment and insure that religious
believers will be granted exceptions to general laws in order to practice their
14
Alexander Hamilton's Federalist 78 is the classic example where he calls the Court the “faithful
guardian of the Constitution.” The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor, 1999) 433, 438.
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rel,g,ous beliefs. 15 But it will not do just to speak of rights even in this manner.
Perhaps the Rehnquist Court, in strikmg down this
-rights protecting" leg, slat,on.
is genuinely concerned with constitutional limitations and views these various
acts as congressional attempts to overstep its constitutional bounds. Surely, as we
saw in Chapters 3 and 4. the Lochner Court and the early New Deal Court were
"rights protecting" in their defense of liberty of contract and deeply concerned
with constitutional limitations in actively policing the boundaries of Congress’
Commerce Power. While New Deal justices like Stone. Frankfurter, and Black
attempted to recast the meaning of constitutional rights and limitations—rejecting
the Old Court’s understanding-the Rehnquist Court has revisited part of this
question and. once more, attempted to police the limits of Congress’ Commerce
Power.
I he deeper point is that these constitutional disputes are about the proper
ordering of constitutional rights and limitations. We cannot just say: the Court is
more rights protecting, or that Congress is unconcerned with constitutional
limits. The question is how conflicting constitutional values should be ordered,
which in part is rooted in historical circumstances and political debate. Thus 1
have argued that constitutional politics between the branches of government
fosters a sort ol "living constitutionalism” as constitutional values are argued
about and realized through such constitutional conflicts, connecting the
Constitution to our politics in a more democratic form than our preoccupation
See Louis fisher, Religious Liberty' in America: Political Safeguards (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 2002) tor a general argument that Congress has been far more protective of
religious liberty than has the Court.
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With the Court would lead us to believe, bu, no, necessarily resulting in , single
.
settled, coherent constitutional vision. As Ken Kersch argues.
The Court, it turns out, is doctrinal and political, an obstacle and ahope, active and restrained, and formalistic and pragmatic Itsjurisprudence is in some areas transformed by critical elections
and in others left relatively unchanged. It embraces new
ideological visions, at times as wholes, but at others only in part It
resists change, negotiates change, and initiates change. 16
The Madison,an Constitution, attuned to this interplay, helps us better understand
how American constitutionalism actually functions.
The Political Constitution and the Limits ofConstitutional Regimes
While a regime's understanding ofAmerican constitutional development
focuses on historical context, it neglects the ways in which '•development” may be
a disorderly and uneven process. By connecting the creation and maintenance of
particular constitutional regimes to "critical elections." great constitutional
moments, or reconstructive presidents, a regimes analysis misses moments of
constitutional discontinuity, drift, and unsettlement. In Chapter 3 we saw how the
critical election ot 1 896 failed to bring order to the constitutional universe.
Constitutional meaning on the most important issues of the day was best
characterized by an incomplete dialogue between the Court and the political
branches, leading to a period of constitutional drift. While in Chapter Four we
saw how the critical election of FDR in 1932 and his reconstructive presidency
recast constitutional meaning and settled the most contentious issues of the day
the government's power to regulate economic life—this very settlement invited
lb
Ken Kersch, Discontinuous Development in American Constitutional Law: Civil Liberties and
Civil Rights in the Twentieth Century (New York. Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming) 37.
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continued debate on “civil liben.es and rights” that, to this day. remams by and
large unsettled. Here, even if the New Deal could be characterized as a new
constitutional regime, a, the hean of this reg.me were ser.ous discontinuities that
reflect the way in which constitutional coherence and settlement may exist on
some issues side by side with conflict and unsettlement on other issues. A point
that is vividly brought home in Chapter Five with Reagan's and the Rehnquis.
Court's rejection of part of the New Deal regime. If Reagan's reconstruction did
not amount to a full-scale recreation, to dismiss it as a failed "constitutional
moment'' misses the way in which it has altered our constitutional understanding
in significant ways. The Madisonian Constitution is at home with these
incongruities.
Seeing the Constitution in Madisonian terms suggests that there is no
particular imperative for “authoritative settlement” as such, let alone authoritative
judicial settlement when the political branches contest the Court's interpretation
of constitutional meaning. The dynamic of the political Constitution is open to
persistent conflict about constitutional meaning and attempts to foreclose such
debates by the Court are unlikely to succeed, as the political branches,
institutionally positioned as they are, have the capacity to persistently and
insistently question the logic of the Court's decision. When the political branches
contest judicial interpretations of the Constitution, as Teddy Roosevelt did in
antitrust and railroad rate-regulation, or as Franklin Roosevelt did on the reach of
the national government s Commerce Power, they often succeed in overturning
past judicial decisions without resorting to constitutional amendment. Indeed, let
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me reiterate here that the most significant const.tutional changes in the twentieth
century have certainly come front political changes in constitutional meaning, no,
by way of formal constitutional amendment (whether agatns, pas, Supreme Court
opinions or not).
Other instances are less clear-cut. such as the Congress's efforts to a, leas,
work against the logic of the Rehnquis, Court's opmtons on both Interstate
Commerce and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Congress has
no, clearly succeeded in overcoming these recent Supreme Court opinions (and its
not clear that its effort is aimed at doing so), it has certainly left these
constitutional questions in a state of doubt or. perhaps more favorably, openness.
We have seen, in Chapter 5, similar efforts from Reagan. His Rehnquist Court
appointees have certainly overturned long standing New Deal precedents-forged
in the const,tutional politics of that earlier era. when the Court came into line with
the political branches understanding of their constitutional power-in the sphere
ot federalism and interstate commerce. Reagan has been far less successful, as I
noted, in overturning the Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade. But even here, given
the persistent conflict over abortion rights, it would be difficult to call Roe
authoritatively settled." Indeed, if there is a consensus of sorts that women
ought to have a constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy in the early months,
the evidence suggests it is based on a social and political understandings, and not
derived from the Court s constitutional reasoning. 17
'
7
See Jeffrey Rosen, "Worst Choice: Why We'd be Better off Without Roe" The New Republic
February 24, 2003.
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Even when Court opinions have stood, striking down significant acts of
Congress, we need to focus our view more carefully. As I argued in Chapter 2. for
example, by the time the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1 875. it was.
by and large, articulating popular understandings: Congress was content to live
with the Court's opinton and not contest it. Settlement of crucial constitutional
questions is likely to come based on an emerging social consensus. Thus
constitutional meaning may be settled and then unsettled, may reach a consensus
on some issues but not on others, may be contested in ways that transform our
understanding or, over time, dissipate, depending upon the tluid pull of politics.
Thus, the language ot authoritative judicial settlement is ill suited to our
constitutional discourse, as it fails to capture the ordinary functioning of our
constitutionalism.
I he Myth ot Judicial Supremacy
The Court, constituted as it is and situated in this larger context, rarely acts
in ways that are consistent with authoritative judicial settlement. For the Court to
settle constitutional questions it should otter deeply theorized opinions that
clearly articulate a wide constitutional principle; it should, that is, be concerned
with articulating general constitutional meaning, acting as the political branches
constitutional schoolmarm, rather than simply settling the case before it. Yet
Court opinions are not always clearly reasoned statements of constitutional
principle that otter the political branches guidance on disputed constitutional
questions. Partly this stems from the nature of the Court: asked to decide concrete
“cases and controversies," the Court rarely spins out the single correct answer that
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gu.des both itself and the political branches in discerning vexing questions of
constitutional nteantng. Justice Cardozo noted this in his famous lectures On the
Nature ofthe Judicial Process. “Our survey ofjudicial methods teaches us. I
think, the lesson that the whole subject matter ofjurisprudence is more plastic,
more malleable, the moulds less definitively cast, the bounds of right and wrong
less preordained and constant, than most of us. without the aid of some such
analysis, have been accustomed to believe .” 18
At times the Court might duck the crucial constitutional issues in an
opinion, as it did in the first Enforcement Acts cases. At other times, it might
reason very clearly and very broadly about the constitutional question at hand, as
it did m £ C Knight. A Justice Scalia might argue that it is the Court’s job, as the
constitutional rule making body, to reason deeply and widely about constitutional
questions, laying down "bright-line” constitutional rules to guide the political
branches (as well as itself in the future). Justice O’Connor, on the other hand, may
approach constitutional questions on a case-by-case basis, seeking to deliberately
level unsettled constitutional issues that the Court need not touch to answer the
narrow case before it. It is thus very difficult to assign the Court a particular role.
Moreover, the fact that there might be more than one plausible answer to a
constitutional question makes it unlikely that the Supreme Court will be able to
fashion an authoritative reading of constitutional meaning that applies beyond the
specific cases // the other branches contest it. In the name of stability and
coherence, proponents ofjudicial supremacy plead for such settlement. (Though
lt!
The Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) 161.
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we might wonder how “settled” things are when discernable constitutional lines
turn on the reading of a single justice: is the Constitution really what Justice
O'Connor says it is?) As I have argued, the Court has not been able to settle such
contested questions. Rather, Court opinions themselves seem to invite continued
constitutional debate on just what the Court's opinions was, how it applies to the
particular matter at hand, and whether the Court, in fact, got the Constitution
right .
19
Seeing this traced out in the historical studies allows us to make an
empirical distinction between judicial review and judicial supremacy. The
political Constitution makes a conceptual distinction between judicial review and
judicial supremacy, but the lingering question was whether this conceptual
distinction has any empirical bite. It does. The Court's exercise ofjudicial review
does not close constitutional questions when contested by the political branches.
No doubt, the Court does strike down particular acts of Congress or the executive
as unconstitutional. Yet, the deeper question is whether the political branches then
view themselves as obligated be the Court's reading of the Constitution and not
just the particular case at hand. The political branches—sometimes explicitly, at
others implicitly—do not just lollow Court opinions and have proven successful
in overturning or modifying Supreme Court opinions that they think
This has lead Robert Nagel to suggest that social consensus is necessary for durable
constitutional meaning and that judicial interpretation may actually be at odds with stable
meaning. See his Constitutional Cultures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) 22.
Louis Michael Seidman also makes an interesting argument for “unsettlement. When the
Supreme Court uses constitutional rhetoric to shut down an argument by imposing one potential
settlement rather than another, it is doing something more than announcing the outcome of a
political struggle. It is attempting to constitute the community in a fashion that excludes the losers
for reasons that cannot be explained in a fashion comprehensible to them.” Our Unsettled
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constitutionally unsound. FDR proceeded with New Deal legislation tha, clearly
went against the Court's view of,he Constitution and ultimately prevailed. Teddy
Roosevelt adopted a broader reading of the government's commerce power in the
antitrust cases tha, was a, odds with the Court's firs, wave of opinions on this
issue. His reading of the Commerce Clause (a, leas, on antitrust) prevailed as the
Court followed suit. Ronald Reagan rejected decades of Court opinions on
federalism and the Rehnquist Court has taken up his constitutional vision,
abandoning these earlier opinions. Perhaps more importantly, as well as more
subtlety, the constitutional framework seems to belie any easy notion of
settlement.
The proponents ofjudicial supremacy envision an independent Court
working against the political branches. As I have argued throughout this
dissertation, this beginning point fails to capture the fashion in which the Court-
and the institutional framework generally—functions. The Court and the political
branches are not necessarily at odds with one another. The Congress may, as was
particularly evident in Chapter 3, invite the Court to work out constitutional
meaning. The result in these cases is best characterized as a dialogue where the
Court and the political branches negotiate the contours of constitutional meaning.
In these instances judicial review is part of the process—whether located at the
beginning or the middle but it is very rarely the end. In fact, this continual back
and forth over constitutional meaning—and one that is distinctly non-evolutionary
( (institution: A New Defense oj Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2001) 159.
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and non-linear may bes, characterizejudrcial review and the institutional
framework.
Capturing this constitutional dynamic also has important consequences for
such freighted terms as judicial activism and restraint, which, standing alone, are
not very illuminating. The very language of activism and restrain, fa, Is to capture
some of the most crucial dynamics between the Court and the political branches.
In par, this stems from the fact that both positions begin from the premise of the
legal constitution: judicial activism is seen as necessary because the Court is the
primary enforcer of the (legal) Constitution, while this very recognition leads
those like Protessor Bickel to plead for judicial restraint. What to do. though,
when the political branches themselves invite the Court to settle highly charged or
complicated constitutional questions?2" Or when the Court actively strikes down a
congressional enactment—as it did in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 that
Congress itself has little interest in defending? Such instances, which are hardly
rare, are not aptly captured by the idiom of activism and restraint. 21 To make
better sense ol such terms, we need to see the Court in relation to the other
branches ol government. Focusing on the Court divorced from an institutional and
historical setting leads to debates about the imperatives of restraint or activism
that tail to illuminate the way in which the Court actually functions.
Attempting to treat the Constitution—which is essentially a political
framework ol governance as ordinary law, proponents of judicial supremacy
Ran Hirschl, “The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization:
Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions” Law and Social Inquiry 25: 91-137 (2000).
'' See Mark Graber, “The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty” Studies in American Political Development
7 (1993).
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treat the Court in a non-historical, theoretical fashion, judging constitutional
government against their legalist (and theoretical) vision, rather than letting the
specific and historical functioning of our institutions inform them about the nature
of our constitutionalism. This leads to an insistence on constitutional settlement
and stability that distorts our constitutional history. Moreover, such thinking
neglects the tact that unsettlement, or open ended constitutional dispute, is an
ordinary feature of our constitutional framework, which has not, in fact, lead to
the chaos and instability that proponents ofjudicial supremacy so fear.
A developmental framework, which situates our institutions in historical
terms, better captures this constitutional dynamic, with the caveat that
"development” does not suggest a forward looking, evolutionary, or linear view of
the Constitution: there is no constitutional telos. 22 On the contrary, incongruities,
tensions, and conflicts are a central feature of the political Constitution. We were
reminded of this rather vividly in the 2000 presidential election, where our
twentieth century view of the electoral process and a "plebiscitary president"
clashed with the remnants of out nineteenth century institutions in the form of the
Electoral College. Such constitutional clashes are rooted in the politics and
political disputes of the day, even as they shape and reshape how we view the
Constitution. Thus we should not expect that those constitutional issues important
today will always remain important. Rather, they will vary with political
circumstances, as different parties alter and shift their constitutional views under
different circumstances. Yet, beneath the surface of these clashes is a remarkable
'' See Kersch, Discontinuous Development in American Constitutional Law, for a wonderful take
on such facile views of constitutional development.
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stability, as the public seems to have bestowed upon the Constitution that
"veneration which time bestows on every,htng. and without which perhaps the
wises, and frees, governments would no, posses the requisite stability," as
Mad,son pu, i, in the 49* Federalist Paper “ We do have, in this manner, a sort of
constitutional faith, bu, the faith is in the constitutional framework and principles
that allows for a deep clash over the parttculars of constitutional meaning in
different circumstances, continually revisiting how our constitutional values
should be ordered. Here we see continual flux and perpetual contests over
constitutional meaning.
Seemg the Constitution in a more political light should not denigrate it or
reduce constitutionalism to politics in a crass sense. Rather, recognizing that
contests over constitutional meaning are. at root, about deep political choices
should restore to politics—in all of its complexity and tension-,he dignity i,
deserves. To see the Constitution in a more political light is to recover a more
traditional understanding of constitution; it is to see how our Constitution
constitutes our political life. Recovering such a view may even give us a deeper
sense ot ourselves as a polity, illuminating the ways in which the Constitution
shapes our politics and. in turn, is shaped and reshaped by them.
The Federalist Papers
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APPENDIX
THE MEANING OF AUTHORITATIVE SETTLEMENT
I want to offer a conceptual definition of “authoritative settlement," as
a lack of definitional clarity on "authoritative settlement” has lead to
theoretical debates with little empirical grounding. Reading Larry Alexander
and Fredrick Schauer, perhaps the leading proponents of authoritative judicial
settlement, one is struck by the fact that they argue for authoritative judicial
settlement in a way that altogether skirts empirical questions: they insist that
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation undermines the Constitution. But
they conflate their concepts in such a manner that doesn't allow us to actually
get at the meaning of authoritative settlement. 1 Alexander and Schauer leave
authoritative settlement undefined, while speaking of "deference" and
"nondeference” by the political branches to judicial decisions, which gives us
some referents of what authoritative settlement might look like. “Non-
deference occurs when a nonjudicial official who disagrees with a judicial
decision on a constitutional question does not conform her actions to that
decision and perhaps even actively contradicts it.” And so we might see
authoritative settlement of constitutional questions when the political branches
defer to Supreme Court opinions. While the concept is not neatly defined, we
might know it when we see it. Concerned with normative questions first,
Alexander and Schauer are not preoccupied by empirically analyzing
authoritative settlement, so the actual cases it applies to are not always clear
1
Larry Alexander and Fredrick Schauer. “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation”
Harvard Law Review I 10, 7( 1997).
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because the definition itself is taken for granted ’ Ye, the empirical component
of their claim cannot be avoided. The attributes of authoritative settlement
should be specified more clearly, allowing us to actually ge, a, this concept.
Moreover, Alexander and Schauer merge several concepts-blurring their
logical relationship that for analytical reasons would be best separated. They
conceptualize the Constitution as necessarily demanding authoritative judicial
settlement, which itself requires stability and coherence in constitutional
meaning. Yet this is all pul forward by definition. Authoritative settlement is
collapsed into their notion of an •authoritative constitution.” which allows
them to posit (not demonstrate) that non-deference to Court opinions by the
political branches undermines the Constitution. Bui because they do not give
us a clear definition of what constitutes authoritative settlement of
constitutional meaning, it is difficult to evaluate their claims empirically. And
even if they are engaged in a normative argument, they cannot simply avoid
the empirical dimension of their theorizing, as their normative arguments
often rest on empirical presuppositions
.
3
As it is. their claims remain rooted in
their theory and not in questions of actual constitutional governance. While
we might see particular instances of “deference” and “nondeference” to
judicial decisions under their terms, we cannot get at the bigger theoretical
Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin offer a more robust definition of authoritative
settlement, yet they too are primarily concerned with the normative aspects of settlement
insofar as is necessary to "law” as such—and not whether the Supreme Court actually acts in
this capacity. The Rule ofRules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas ofLaw (Durham- Duke
University Press, 2001) 12-13.
1 A Pomt Alexander and Schauer concede in a recent piece, but do little to change.
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply" Constitutional Commentary 17 (2000). See also
Alexander and Sherwin, The Rule ofRules, 45-46.
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questions they raise; that is. does nondeference to Supreme Court opmions
undermine the Constitution?
Bruce Peabody suggests that the debate is lacking definitional clarity.
giv[mg] insufficient attention to what is being analyzed and proposed (and
consequently, what is excluded from consideration).” The result is that
theoretical, normative, and empirical issues are not separated and scholars
speak past one another. True. But Peabody himself never tells us what he
means by authoritative settlement
.
4
This is also true of Scott Gant's defense
and Keith Whittington's critique of authoritative judicial settlement
.
5
Perhaps
authoritative settlement is so patently obvious, its general definition so
transparent, that we don't need to spend time defining it. This is troublesome,
though. A definition ot authoritative settlement needs to be posited for a
number of reasons.
A lack ot conceptual clarity at this narrower level leads to problems at
a higher level ot conceptual abstraction. When authoritative settlement is
simply collapsed into the notion of the Constitution, one (conceptual) view of
the Constitution is posited and authoritative settlement is deemed necessary by
definition (as we see with Alexander and Schauer). By not separating the
distinct concepts of "What is the Constitution?" from "Who may interpret it?”
we don't sort out what we are analyzing and never give it solid grounding. So
4
"Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and New Agenda for
Research” Constitutional Commentary 16, 63 (1999),
5 Scott Gant
-
“Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution"
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 24 (1997) and Keith Whittington, "Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and a Response” North Carolina Law Review
2002 .
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we don't dearly get at the important questions we are speaking to: is
authoritative settlement of constitutional questions central to our constitution?
Does the Supreme Court actually settle such questions for the branches of the
national government? At a more specific level, the lack of clarity surrounding
authoritative settlement doesn't allow us to address important smaller
questions. Does unsettled constitutional meaning really promote constitutional
instability? What is behind authoritative settlement? Is there even such a
thing? Smaller-order concepts—anarchy, stability, and coherence, for
example rest on the meaning of authoritative settlement. Yet, as Whittington
suggests, these concepts too should be distinct from authoritative settlement. 6
While closely related to settlement, it is possible to imagine that unresolved
constitutional questions—with hotly contested meaning-^io not necessarily
lead to political instability or chaos. Indeed, need unsettlement even lead to
constitutional incoherence? Just because constitutional meaning is not
authoritatively settled does not mean it is incoherent.
I suggest that authoritative settlement by the judiciary occurs when a
contested constitutional question between the Congress, the president, and the
Court is resolved by following the Court’s opinion. This means that ( 1
.) The
constitutional question must have been contested by one (or both) of the
political branches. This is important. If the political branches abide by a Court
decision when they didn't contest constitutional meaning, we have only
shown that the Court settles constitutional questions “to the extent that
6
Whittington, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation.”
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Congress, the President, and the general public find the decisions convincing,
reasonable, and acceptable."7 We have not shown that the Court
authoritatively resolves constitutional questions with which the political
branches disagree. (2.) The branches now accept the constitutional question in
dispute as clearly settled. (3.) They abide by the settlement even if they
disagree with it. And (4.) They view the constitutional question as closed
(even tor the judiciary). This is, admittedly, a sort of "ideal type.” but it will
allow us to see how close the Court comes (if at all) to actually settling
constitutional questions.
7
Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 244,
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